rule_id stringlengths 36 36 | title stringlengths 10 97 | description stringlengths 28 1.02k | logsource_product stringclasses 28
values | logsource_category stringclasses 34
values | logsource_service stringclasses 69
values | sigma_rule stringlengths 467 251k | attack_techniques listlengths 0 14 | attack_tactics listlengths 0 8 | level stringclasses 5
values | status stringclasses 3
values | false_positives listlengths 0 5 | references listlengths 0 23 | splunk_spl stringlengths 7 246k ⌀ | elastic_lucene stringlengths 8 250k ⌀ | sentinel_kql stringlengths 40 37.3k ⌀ | source_path stringlengths 29 132 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
7b687634-ab20-11ea-bb37-0242ac130002 | Windows Pcap Drivers | Detects Windows Pcap driver installation based on a list of associated .sys files. | windows | security | title: Windows Pcap Drivers
id: 7b687634-ab20-11ea-bb37-0242ac130002
status: test
description: Detects Windows Pcap driver installation based on a list of associated .sys files.
references:
- https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/06/capturing-pcap-driver-installations.html#more
author: Cian Heasley
date: 2020-06-10
modi... | [
"T1040"
] | [
"discovery",
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/06/capturing-pcap-driver-installations.html#more"
] | EventID=4697 ServiceFileName IN ("*pcap*", "*npcap*", "*npf*", "*nm3*", "*ndiscap*", "*nmnt*", "*windivert*", "*USBPcap*", "*pktmon*") | EventID:4697 AND (ServiceFileName:(*pcap* OR *npcap* OR *npf* OR *nm3* OR *ndiscap* OR *nmnt* OR *windivert* OR *USBPcap* OR *pktmon*)) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_pcap_drivers.yml | |
f91ed517-a6ba-471d-9910-b3b4a398c0f3 | Potentially Suspicious Windows App Activity | Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory. This could be a sign of a rogue ".appx" package installation/execution | windows | process_creation | title: Potentially Suspicious Windows App Activity
id: f91ed517-a6ba-471d-9910-b3b4a398c0f3
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory.
This could be a sign of a rogue ".appx" package installation/execution
references:
- https:... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate packages that make use of external binaries such as Windows Terminal"
] | [
"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/",
"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/"
] | ParentImage="*C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\*" Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\powershell_ise.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") OR CommandLine IN ("*cmd /c*", "*Invoke-*", "*Base64*") NOT ((ParentImage="*:\\Program Files\\Wi... | ParentImage:*C\:\\Program\ Files\\WindowsApps\\* AND ((Image:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\powershell_ise.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\wscript.exe)) OR (CommandLine:(*cmd\ \/c* OR *Invoke\-* OR *Base64*))) AND (NOT ((ParentImage:*\:\\Program\ ... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\" and ((FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell_ise.exe" or FolderPath ends... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_appx_execution.yml | |
52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135 | Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline | Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline
id: 52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135
status: test
description: 'Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn''t contain
any command line flags
'
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomwa... | [
"T1036"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/"
] | Image="*\\Wuauclt.exe" OR OriginalFileName="Wuauclt.exe" CommandLine IN ("*Wuauclt", "*Wuauclt.exe") | (Image:*\\Wuauclt.exe OR OriginalFileName:Wuauclt.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*Wuauclt OR *Wuauclt.exe)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\Wuauclt.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "Wuauclt.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine endswith "Wuauclt" or ProcessCommandLine endswith "Wuauclt.exe") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wuauclt_no_cli_flags_execution.yml | |
403ed92c-b7ec-4edd-9947-5b535ee12d46 | Crontab Enumeration | Detects usage of crontab to list the tasks of the user | linux | process_creation | title: Crontab Enumeration
id: 403ed92c-b7ec-4edd-9947-5b535ee12d46
status: test
description: Detects usage of crontab to list the tasks of the user
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
- https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd64545... | [
"T1007"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate use of crontab"
] | [
"https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html",
"https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/",
"https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection",
"https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8... | Image="*/crontab" CommandLine="* -l*" | Image:*\/crontab AND CommandLine:*\ \-l* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/crontab" and ProcessCommandLine contains " -l" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_crontab_enumeration.yml | |
323ff3f5-0013-4847-bbd4-250b5edb62cc | Modify System Firewall | Detects the removal of system firewall rules. Adversaries may only delete or modify a specific system firewall rule to bypass controls limiting network usage or access.
Detection rules that match only on the disabling of firewalls will miss this. | linux | auditd | title: Modify System Firewall
id: 323ff3f5-0013-4847-bbd4-250b5edb62cc
related:
- id: 53059bc0-1472-438b-956a-7508a94a91f0
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects the removal of system firewall rules. Adversaries may only delete or modify a specific system firewall
rule to bypass controls limiting network ... | [
"T1686"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate admin activity"
] | [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html",
"https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack",
"https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/getting-started-with-nftables_confi... | (type="EXECVE" a0="iptables" a1="*DROP*") OR (type="EXECVE" a0="firewall-cmd" a1="*remove*") OR (type="EXECVE" a0="ufw" a1="*delete*") OR (type="EXECVE" a0="nft" a1 IN ("*delete*", "*flush*")) | (type:EXECVE AND a0:iptables AND a1:*DROP*) OR (type:EXECVE AND a0:firewall\-cmd AND a1:*remove*) OR (type:EXECVE AND a0:ufw AND a1:*delete*) OR (type:EXECVE AND a0:nft AND (a1:(*delete* OR *flush*))) | null | linux/auditd/execve/lnx_auditd_modify_system_firewall.yml | |
707e097c-e20f-4f67-8807-1f72ff4500d6 | Potential Persistence Via App Paths Default Property | Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
First, to map an application's executable file name to that fi... | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Persistence Via App Paths Default Property
id: 707e097c-e20f-4f67-8807-1f72ff4500d6
status: test
description: 'Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App
Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
The entrie... | [
"T1546.012"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate applications registering their binary from on of the suspicious locations mentioned above (tune it)"
] | [
"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/app-registration"
] | TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths*" TargetObject IN ("*(Default)", "*Path") Details IN ("*\\Users\\Public*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\Desktop\\*", "*\\Downloads\\*", "*%temp%*", "*%tmp%*", "*iex*", "*Invoke-*", "*rundll32*", "*regsvr32*", "*mshta*",... | TargetObject:*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App\ Paths* AND (TargetObject:(*\(Default\) OR *Path)) AND (Details:(*\\Users\\Public* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\Desktop\\* OR *\\Downloads\\* OR *%temp%* OR *%tmp%* OR *iex* OR *Invoke\-* OR *rundll32* OR *regsvr32* OR *msht... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths" and (RegistryKey endswith "(Default)" or RegistryKey endswith "Path") and (RegistryValueData contains "\\Users\\Public" or RegistryValueData contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or RegistryValueData contains "\\... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_app_paths.yml | |
4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8 | Sysmon Driver Unloaded Via Fltmc.EXE | Detects possible Sysmon filter driver unloaded via fltmc.exe | windows | process_creation | title: Sysmon Driver Unloaded Via Fltmc.EXE
id: 4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8
related:
- id: 4931188c-178e-4ee7-a348-39e8a7a56821
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects possible Sysmon filter driver unloaded via fltmc.exe
references:
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2018/10/5/operating-offensively-... | [
"T1070",
"T1685",
"T1685.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2018/10/5/operating-offensively-against-sysmon"
] | Image="*\\fltMC.exe" OR OriginalFileName="fltMC.exe" CommandLine="*unload*" CommandLine="*sysmon*" | (Image:*\\fltMC.exe OR OriginalFileName:fltMC.exe) AND (CommandLine:*unload* AND CommandLine:*sysmon*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\fltMC.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "fltMC.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "unload" and ProcessCommandLine contains "sysmon") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_fltmc_unload_driver_sysmon.yml | |
b439f47d-ef52-4b29-9a2f-57d8a96cb6b8 | WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity Via Scrcons.EXE DLL Load | Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicates WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers EventConsumers activity. | windows | image_load | title: WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity Via Scrcons.EXE DLL Load
id: b439f47d-ef52-4b29-9a2f-57d8a96cb6b8
status: test
description: Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicates WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers
EventConsumers activity.
references:
- https... | [
"T1546.003"
] | [
"lateral-movement",
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate event consumers",
"Dell computers on some versions register an event consumer that is known to cause false positives when brightness is changed by the corresponding keyboard button"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/HunterPlaybook/status/1301207718355759107",
"https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/09/i-like-to-move-it-windows-lateral-movement-part-1-wmi-event-subscription/",
"https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/200902-RemoteWMIActiveScriptEventConsumers/notebook.html"
] | Image="*\\scrcons.exe" ImageLoaded IN ("*\\vbscript.dll", "*\\wbemdisp.dll", "*\\wshom.ocx", "*\\scrrun.dll") | Image:*\\scrcons.exe AND (ImageLoaded:(*\\vbscript.dll OR *\\wbemdisp.dll OR *\\wshom.ocx OR *\\scrrun.dll)) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\scrcons.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\vbscript.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\wbemdisp.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\wshom.ocx" or FolderPath endswith "\\scrrun.dll") | windows/image_load/image_load_scrcons_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml | |
4ac1f50b-3bd0-4968-902d-868b4647937e | DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction | Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers | windows | security | title: DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction
id: 4ac1f50b-3bd0-4968-902d-868b4647937e
status: test
description: Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html
author: Robert... | [
"T1003.004"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html"
] | EventID=4662 ObjectType="SecretObject" AccessMask="0x2" ObjectName="*BCKUPKEY*" | EventID:4662 AND ObjectType:SecretObject AND AccessMask:0x2 AND ObjectName:*BCKUPKEY* | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_dpapi_domain_backupkey_extraction.yml | |
4aa6040b-3f28-44e3-a769-9208e5feb5ec | Suspicious Rundll32 Execution With Image Extension | Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Rundll32 Execution With Image Extension
id: 4aa6040b-3f28-44e3-a769-9208e5feb5ec
related:
- id: 089fc3d2-71e8-4763-a8a5-c97fbb0a403e
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files
references:
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/se... | [
"T1218.011"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/onenote-growing-threat-malware-distribution"
] | Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR OriginalFileName="RUNDLL32.exe" CommandLine IN ("*.bmp*", "*.cr2*", "*.eps*", "*.gif*", "*.ico*", "*.jpeg*", "*.jpg*", "*.nef*", "*.orf*", "*.png*", "*.raw*", "*.sr2*", "*.tif*", "*.tiff*") | (Image:*\\rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName:RUNDLL32.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*.bmp* OR *.cr2* OR *.eps* OR *.gif* OR *.ico* OR *.jpeg* OR *.jpg* OR *.nef* OR *.orf* OR *.png* OR *.raw* OR *.sr2* OR *.tif* OR *.tiff*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "RUNDLL32.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".bmp" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".cr2" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".eps" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".gif" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".ico" or Pr... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_susp_execution_with_image_extension.yml | |
5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716 | Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM | Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM
id: 5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Markus Neis
references:
- Internal Research
date: 2021-05-20
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
- at... | [
"T1190"
] | [
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate WinRM usage"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | ParentImage="*\\wsmprovhost.exe" Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\sh.exe", "*\\bash.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\wsl.exe", "*\\schtasks.exe", "*\\certutil.exe", "*\\whoami.exe", "*\\bitsadmin.exe") | ParentImage:*\\wsmprovhost.exe AND (Image:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\sh.exe OR *\\bash.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\wsl.exe OR *\\schtasks.exe OR *\\certutil.exe OR *\\whoami.exe OR *\\bitsadmin.exe)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wsmprovhost.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\sh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\bash.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\wsl.exe" or FolderPath e... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_winrm_susp_child_process.yml | |
1ca6bd18-0ba0-44ca-851c-92ed89a61085 | UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process | Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22) | windows | process_creation | title: UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process
id: 1ca6bd18-0ba0-44ca-851c-92ed89a61085
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified:... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
] | ParentImage="*\\consent.exe" Image="*\\werfault.exe" IntegrityLevel IN ("High", "System", "S-1-16-16384", "S-1-16-12288") | ParentImage:*\\consent.exe AND Image:*\\werfault.exe AND (IntegrityLevel:(High OR System OR S\-1\-16\-16384 OR S\-1\-16\-12288)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\consent.exe" and FolderPath endswith "\\werfault.exe" and (ProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("High", "System", "S-1-16-16384", "S-1-16-12288")) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml | |
424273ea-7cf8-43a6-b712-375f925e481f | Scheduled Task Executed From A Suspicious Location | Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the Program being run is located in a suspicious location or it's an unusale program to be run from a Scheduled Task | windows | taskscheduler | title: Scheduled Task Executed From A Suspicious Location
id: 424273ea-7cf8-43a6-b712-375f925e481f
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the Program being run is located in a suspicious location or it's
an unusale program to be run from a Scheduled Task
references:
- Internal Resear... | [
"T1053.005"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | EventID=129 Path IN ("*C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\Desktop\\*", "*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*", "*C:\\Temp\\*") | EventID:129 AND (Path:(*C\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *\\Desktop\\* OR *\\Downloads\\* OR *\\Users\\Public\\* OR *C\:\\Temp\\*)) | null | windows/builtin/taskscheduler/win_taskscheduler_execution_from_susp_locations.yml | |
69ffc84e-8b1a-4024-8351-e018f66b8275 | FortiGate - User Group Modified | Detects the modification of a user group on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.
The group could be used to grant VPN access to a network. | fortigate | event | title: FortiGate - User Group Modified
id: 69ffc84e-8b1a-4024-8351-e018f66b8275
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the modification of a user group on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.
The group could be used to grant VPN access to a network.
'
references:
- https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535
- ht... | [] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | medium | experimental | [
"A group can be modified for legitimate purposes."
] | [
"https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535",
"https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event",
"https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/328136827/config-user-group",
"https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message... | action="Edit" cfgpath="user.group" | action:Edit AND cfgpath:user.group | null | network/fortinet/fortigate/fortinet_fortigate_user_group_modified.yml | |
59ec40bb-322e-40ab-808d-84fa690d7e56 | Nginx Core Dump | Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation attempts. | nginx | title: Nginx Core Dump
id: 59ec40bb-322e-40ab-808d-84fa690d7e56
status: test
description: Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation
attempts.
references:
- https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/monitoring/debugging/#enabling-core-dumps
- ht... | [
"T1499.004"
] | [
"impact"
] | high | test | [
"Serious issues with a configuration or plugin"
] | [
"https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/monitoring/debugging/#enabling-core-dumps",
"https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2021-002-nginx-resolver-copy/"
] | "exited on signal 6 (core dumped)" | *exited\ on\ signal\ 6\ \(core\ dumped\)* | null | web/product/nginx/web_nginx_core_dump.yml | ||
a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae | PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services | Detects powershell script installed as a Service | windows | system | title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services
id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
status: test
description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12... | [
"T1569.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID=7045 ImagePath IN ("*powershell*", "*pwsh*") | Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND EventID:7045 AND (ImagePath:(*powershell* OR *pwsh*)) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml | |
63bf8794-9917-45bc-88dd-e1b5abc0ecfd | Powershell Install a DLL in System Directory | Uses PowerShell to install/copy a file into a system directory such as "System32" or "SysWOW64" | windows | ps_script | title: Powershell Install a DLL in System Directory
id: 63bf8794-9917-45bc-88dd-e1b5abc0ecfd
status: test
description: Uses PowerShell to install/copy a file into a system directory such as "System32" or "SysWOW64"
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a... | [
"T1556.002"
] | [
"persistence",
"credential-access",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.md#atomic-test-1---install-and-register-password-filter-dll"
] | *
| regex ScriptBlockText="(Copy-Item|cpi) .{2,128} -Destination .{1,32}\\\\Windows\\\\(System32|SysWOW64)" | ScriptBlockText:/(Copy-Item|cpi) .{2,128} -Destination .{1,32}\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64)/ | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_copy_item_system_directory.yml | |
a27e5fa9-c35e-4e3d-b7e0-1ce2af66ad12 | CSExec Service Installation | Detects CSExec service installation and execution events | windows | system | title: CSExec Service Installation
id: a27e5fa9-c35e-4e3d-b7e0-1ce2af66ad12
status: test
description: Detects CSExec service installation and execution events
references:
- https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.0... | [
"T1569.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID=7045 ServiceName="csexecsvc" OR ImagePath="*\\csexecsvc.exe" | (Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND EventID:7045) AND (ServiceName:csexecsvc OR ImagePath:*\\csexecsvc.exe) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_service_install_csexecsvc.yml | |
5b768e71-86f2-4879-b448-81061cbae951 | Suspicious Manipulation Of Default Accounts Via Net.EXE | Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable' or 'disable' accounts or change the password...etc | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Manipulation Of Default Accounts Via Net.EXE
id: 5b768e71-86f2-4879-b448-81061cbae951
status: test
description: Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable'
or 'disable' accounts or change the password...etc
references:
- https://www.... | [
"T1560.001"
] | [
"collection"
] | high | test | [
"Some false positives could occur with the admin or guest account. It depends on the scripts being used by the admins in your env. If you experience a lot of FP you could reduce the level to medium"
] | [
"https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html",
"https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/",
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/"
] | Image IN ("*\\net.exe", "*\\net1.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("net.exe", "net1.exe") CommandLine="* user *" CommandLine IN ("* Järjestelmänvalvoja *", "* Rendszergazda *", "* Администратор *", "* Administrateur *", "* Administrador *", "* Administratör *", "* Administrator *", "* guest *", "* DefaultAccount *", "* \"J... | (((Image:(*\\net.exe OR *\\net1.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(net.exe OR net1.exe))) AND CommandLine:*\ user\ * AND (CommandLine:(*\ Järjestelmänvalvoja\ * OR *\ Rendszergazda\ * OR *\ Администратор\ * OR *\ Administrateur\ * OR *\ Administrador\ * OR *\ Administratör\ * OR *\ Administrator\ * OR *\ guest\ * OR *\ Defaul... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (((FolderPath endswith "\\net.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\net1.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("net.exe", "net1.exe"))) and ProcessCommandLine contains " user " and (ProcessCommandLine contains " Järjestelmänvalvoja " or ProcessCommandLine contains " Rendszergazda " or P... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_user_default_accounts_manipulation.yml | |
ff992eac-6449-4c60-8c1d-91c9722a1d48 | New Root Certificate Installed Via CertMgr.EXE | Detects execution of "certmgr" with the "add" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system.
Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. | windows | process_creation | title: New Root Certificate Installed Via CertMgr.EXE
id: ff992eac-6449-4c60-8c1d-91c9722a1d48
related:
- id: 42821614-9264-4761-acfc-5772c3286f76
type: derived
- id: 46591fae-7a4c-46ea-aec3-dff5e6d785dc
type: obsolete
status: test
description: 'Detects execution of "certmgr" with the "add" flag in order to install... | [
"T1553.004"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Help Desk or IT may need to manually add a corporate Root CA on occasion. Need to test if GPO push doesn't trigger FP"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md",
"https://securelist.com/to-crypt-or-to-mine-that-is-the-question/86307/"
] | Image="*\\CertMgr.exe" OR OriginalFileName="CERTMGT.EXE" CommandLine="*/add*" CommandLine="*root*" | (Image:*\\CertMgr.exe OR OriginalFileName:CERTMGT.EXE) AND (CommandLine:*\/add* AND CommandLine:*root*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\CertMgr.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "CERTMGT.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/add" and ProcessCommandLine contains "root") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certmgr_certificate_installation.yml | |
cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8 | New or Renamed User Account with '$' Character | Detects the creation of a user with the "$" character. This can be used by attackers to hide a user or trick detection systems that lack the parsing mechanisms. | windows | security | title: New or Renamed User Account with '$' Character
id: cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8
status: test
description: 'Detects the creation of a user with the "$" character. This can be used by attackers to hide a user or trick
detection systems that lack the parsing mechanisms.
'
references:
- https://twitter.... | [
"T1036"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021"
] | (EventID=4720 SamAccountName="*$*") OR (EventID=4781 NewTargetUserName="*$*") NOT (EventID=4720 TargetUserName="HomeGroupUser$") | ((EventID:4720 AND SamAccountName:*$*) OR (EventID:4781 AND NewTargetUserName:*$*)) AND (NOT (EventID:4720 AND TargetUserName:HomeGroupUser$)) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_new_or_renamed_user_account_with_dollar_sign.yml | |
eca49c87-8a75-4f13-9c73-a5a29e845f03 | Suspicious Runscripthelper.exe | Detects execution of powershell scripts via Runscripthelper.exe | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Runscripthelper.exe
id: eca49c87-8a75-4f13-9c73-a5a29e845f03
status: test
description: Detects execution of powershell scripts via Runscripthelper.exe
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runscripthelper/
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-... | [
"T1059",
"T1202"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runscripthelper/"
] | Image="*\\Runscripthelper.exe" CommandLine="*surfacecheck*" | Image:*\\Runscripthelper.exe AND CommandLine:*surfacecheck* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\Runscripthelper.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "surfacecheck" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_runscripthelper.yml | |
6f4191bb-912b-48a8-9ce7-682769541e6d | Suspicious Msiexec Execute Arbitrary DLL | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.
Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi) | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Msiexec Execute Arbitrary DLL
id: 6f4191bb-912b-48a8-9ce7-682769541e6d
status: test
description: 'Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.
Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation... | [
"T1218.007"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate script"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md",
"https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281"
] | Image="*\\msiexec.exe" CommandLine="* -Y*" OR CommandLine="* /Y*" OR CommandLine="* –Y*" OR CommandLine="* —Y*" OR CommandLine="* ―Y*" NOT (CommandLine IN ("*\\MsiExec.exe\" /Y \"C:\\Program Files\\*", "*\\MsiExec.exe\" /Y \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "*\\MsiExec.exe\" /Y \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\MsiExec.exe\... | (Image:*\\msiexec.exe AND CommandLine:(*\ \-Y* OR *\ \/Y* OR *\ –Y* OR *\ —Y* OR *\ ―Y*)) AND (NOT (CommandLine:(*\\MsiExec.exe\"\ \/Y\ \"C\:\\Program\ Files\\* OR *\\MsiExec.exe\"\ \/Y\ \"C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\* OR *\\MsiExec.exe\"\ \/Y\ \"C\:\\Windows\\System32\\* OR *\\MsiExec.exe\"\ \/Y\ \"C\:\\Windows\\Sys... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\msiexec.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -Y" or ProcessCommandLine contains " /Y" or ProcessCommandLine contains " –Y" or ProcessCommandLine contains " —Y" or ProcessCommandLine contains " ―Y")) and (not((ProcessCommandLine contains "\\MsiExec.exe\" /Y \"C:\\Pr... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_execute_dll.yml | |
42127bdd-9133-474f-a6f1-97b6c08a4339 | New Federated Domain Added - Exchange | Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain. | m365 | exchange | title: New Federated Domain Added - Exchange
id: 42127bdd-9133-474f-a6f1-97b6c08a4339
related:
- id: 58f88172-a73d-442b-94c9-95eaed3cbb36
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain.
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-00... | [
"T1136.003"
] | [
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider."
] | [
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf",
"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a",
"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html",
"https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory",
"https://o365blog.com/pos... | eventSource="Exchange" eventName="Add-FederatedDomain" status="success" | eventSource:Exchange AND eventName:Add\-FederatedDomain AND status:success | null | cloud/m365/exchange/microsoft365_new_federated_domain_added_exchange.yml | |
34ebb878-1b15-4895-b352-ca2eeb99b274 | Suspicious Execution of Shutdown | Use of the commandline to shutdown or reboot windows | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Execution of Shutdown
id: 34ebb878-1b15-4895-b352-ca2eeb99b274
status: test
description: Use of the commandline to shutdown or reboot windows
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1529/T1529.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/... | [
"T1529"
] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1529/T1529.md",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown"
] | Image="*\\shutdown.exe" CommandLine IN ("*/r *", "*/s *") | Image:*\\shutdown.exe AND (CommandLine:(*\/r\ * OR *\/s\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\shutdown.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/r " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/s ") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shutdown_execution.yml | |
aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd | PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled | Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled. | azure | auditlogs | title: PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled
id: aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd
status: test
description: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowc... | [
"T1078"
] | [
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment"
] | properties.message="Disable PIM Alert" | properties.message:"Disable PIM Alert" | null | cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_pim_alerts_disabled.yml | |
b6ea3cc7-542f-43ef-bbe4-980fbed444c7 | Remote Server Service Abuse | Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-SRVS | rpc_firewall | application | title: Remote Server Service Abuse
id: b6ea3cc7-542f-43ef-bbe4-980fbed444c7
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-SRVS
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9
- https://github... | [] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate remote share creation"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9",
"https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md",
"https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall",
"https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stop... | EventLog="RPCFW" EventID=3 InterfaceUuid="4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188" | EventLog:RPCFW AND EventID:3 AND InterfaceUuid:4b324fc8\-1670\-01d3\-1278\-5a47bf6ee188 | null | application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_remote_server_service_abuse.yml | |
9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d | HackTool - GMER Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution | Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields. | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - GMER Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution
id: 9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d
status: test
description: Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields.
references:
- http://www.gmer.net/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-05
modified: 2024-11-23
tags... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"http://www.gmer.net/"
] | Image="*\\gmer.exe" OR Hashes IN ("*MD5=E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04*", "*SHA1=539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57*", "*SHA256=E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173*") | Image:*\\gmer.exe OR (Hashes:(*MD5\=E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04* OR *SHA1\=539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57* OR *SHA256\=E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\gmer.exe" or (MD5 startswith "E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04" or SHA1 startswith "539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57" or SHA256 startswith "E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_gmer.yml | |
8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038 | Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process | Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS
Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the c... | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process
id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038
status: experimental
description: 'Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromi... | [
"T1059",
"T1203"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/",
"https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm"
] | ParentImage="*\\ArcSOC.exe" Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\wmic.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") NOT (Image="*\\cmd.exe" CommandLine="cmd.exe /c \"ver\"") | (ParentImage:*\\ArcSOC.exe AND (Image:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\wmic.exe OR *\\wscript.exe))) AND (NOT (Image:*\\cmd.exe AND CommandLine:"cmd.exe \/c \"ver\"")) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\ArcSOC.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\regsvr32.exe" or Folde... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_arcsoc_susp_child_process.yml | |
42b1a5b8-353f-4f10-b256-39de4467faff | Harvesting Of Wifi Credentials Via Netsh.EXE | Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe | windows | process_creation | title: Harvesting Of Wifi Credentials Via Netsh.EXE
id: 42b1a5b8-353f-4f10-b256-39de4467faff
status: test
description: Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe
references:
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@... | [
"T1040"
] | [
"discovery",
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials/"
] | Image="*\\netsh.exe" OR OriginalFileName="netsh.exe" CommandLine="*wlan*" CommandLine="* s*" CommandLine="* p*" CommandLine="* k*" CommandLine="*=clear*" | (Image:*\\netsh.exe OR OriginalFileName:netsh.exe) AND (CommandLine:*wlan* AND CommandLine:*\ s* AND CommandLine:*\ p* AND CommandLine:*\ k* AND CommandLine:*\=clear*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\netsh.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "netsh.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "wlan" and ProcessCommandLine contains " s" and ProcessCommandLine contains " p" and ProcessCommandLine contains " k" and ProcessCommandLine contains "=clear") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_wifi_credential_harvesting.yml | |
9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513 | Change the Fax Dll | Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart | windows | registry_set | title: Change the Fax Dll
id: 9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513
status: test
description: Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart
references:
- https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361",
"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf"
] | TargetObject="*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Fax\\Device Providers\\*" TargetObject="*\\ImageName*" NOT Details="%systemroot%\\system32\\fxst30.dll" | (TargetObject:*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Fax\\Device\ Providers\\* AND TargetObject:*\\ImageName*) AND (NOT Details:%systemroot%\\system32\\fxst30.dll) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\Software\\Microsoft\\Fax\\Device Providers*" and RegistryKey contains "\\ImageName") and (not(RegistryValueData =~ "%systemroot%\\system32\\fxst30.dll")) | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_fax_dll_persistance.yml | |
a2cb56ff-4f46-437a-a0fa-ffa4d1303cba | Azure AD Threat Intelligence | Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns. | azure | riskdetection | title: Azure AD Threat Intelligence
id: a2cb56ff-4f46-437a-a0fa-ffa4d1303cba
status: test
description: Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-inte... | [
"T1078"
] | [
"stealth",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access"
] | high | test | [
"We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-sign-in",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-user",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/secur... | riskEventType="investigationsThreatIntelligence" | riskEventType:investigationsThreatIntelligence | null | cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_threat_intel.yml | |
13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669 | SCM Database Handle Failure | Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database. | windows | security | title: SCM Database Handle Failure
id: 13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669
status: test
description: Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-... | [
"T1010"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html"
] | EventID=4656 ObjectType="SC_MANAGER OBJECT" ObjectName="ServicesActive" AccessMask="0xf003f" NOT SubjectLogonId="0x3e4" | (EventID:4656 AND ObjectType:"SC_MANAGER OBJECT" AND ObjectName:ServicesActive AND AccessMask:0xf003f) AND (NOT SubjectLogonId:0x3e4) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_scm_database_handle_failure.yml | |
0f9c21f1-6a73-4b0e-9809-cb562cb8d981 | Potential Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness | Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes with Medium integrity level | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness
id: 0f9c21f1-6a73-4b0e-9809-cb562cb8d981
status: test
description: Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes
with Medium integrity level
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/... | [
"T1574.011"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment",
"https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/31/insecure-registry-permissions/"
] | IntegrityLevel IN ("Medium", "S-1-16-8192") CommandLine="*ControlSet*" CommandLine="*services*" CommandLine IN ("*\\ImagePath*", "*\\FailureCommand*", "*\\ServiceDll*") | (IntegrityLevel:(Medium OR S\-1\-16\-8192)) AND (CommandLine:*ControlSet* AND CommandLine:*services*) AND (CommandLine:(*\\ImagePath* OR *\\FailureCommand* OR *\\ServiceDll*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("Medium", "S-1-16-8192")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "ControlSet" and ProcessCommandLine contains "services") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "\\ImagePath" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\FailureCommand" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\ServiceDll") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_registry_privilege_escalation_via_service_key.yml | |
7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0 | HackTool - NoFilter Execution | Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators | windows | security | title: HackTool - NoFilter Execution
id: 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
status: test
description: 'Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via
hardcoded policy name indicators
'
references:
- https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d2... | [
"T1134",
"T1134.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d215ab130c5e8e3ad45a7e7fcd56f4de97b4d/NoFilter/Consts.cpp",
"https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter",
"https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/nofilter-abusing-windows-filtering-platform-for-privilege-escalation",
"https://x.com/_st0pp3r_/status/174220375236112816... | (EventID=5447 FilterName="*RonPolicy*") OR (EventID=5449 ProviderContextName="*RonPolicy*") | (EventID:5447 AND FilterName:*RonPolicy*) OR (EventID:5449 AND ProviderContextName:*RonPolicy*) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_hktl_nofilter.yml | |
898d5fc9-fbc3-43de-93ad-38e97237c344 | AppX Package Deployment Failed Due to Signing Requirements | Detects an appx package deployment / installation with the error code "0x80073cff" which indicates that the package didn't meet the signing requirements. | windows | appxdeployment-server | title: AppX Package Deployment Failed Due to Signing Requirements
id: 898d5fc9-fbc3-43de-93ad-38e97237c344
status: test
description: 'Detects an appx package deployment / installation with the error code "0x80073cff" which indicates that the
package didn''t meet the signing requirements.
'
references:
- https://ww... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate AppX packages not signed by MS used part of an enterprise."
] | [
"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting",
"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/"
] | EventID=401 ErrorCode="0x80073cff" | EventID:401 AND ErrorCode:0x80073cff | null | windows/builtin/appxdeployment_server/win_appxdeployment_server_appx_package_deployment_failed_signing_requirements.yml | |
d7c75059-2901-4578-b209-8837fd31c6a8 | Proxy Execution via Vshadow | Detects the invocation of vshadow.exe with the -exec parameter that executes a specified script or command after the shadow copies are created but before the VShadow tool exits.
VShadow is a command-line tool that you can use to create and manage volume shadow copies. While legitimate backup or administrative scripts m... | windows | process_creation | title: Proxy Execution via Vshadow
id: d7c75059-2901-4578-b209-8837fd31c6a8
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the invocation of vshadow.exe with the -exec parameter that executes a specified script or command after
the shadow copies are created but before the VShadow tool exits.
VShadow is a command-line ... | [
"T1202"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | experimental | [
"System backup or administrator tools",
"Legitimate administrative scripts"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Vshadow/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/vss/vshadow-tool-and-sample"
] | Image="*\\vshadow.exe" OR OriginalFileName="vshadow.exe" CommandLine="*-exec*" | (Image:*\\vshadow.exe OR OriginalFileName:vshadow.exe) AND CommandLine:*\-exec* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\vshadow.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "vshadow.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "-exec" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_vshadow_exec.yml | |
ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad | Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host | Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain. | windows | ntlm | title: Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host
id: ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad
status: test
description: Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.
references:
- n/a
author: James Pemberton
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-cont... | [
"T1219.002"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Host connections to valid domains, exclude these.",
"Host connections not using host FQDN.",
"Host connections to external legitimate domains."
] | [
"n/a"
] | EventID=8001 TargetName="TERMSRV*" | EventID:8001 AND TargetName:TERMSRV* | null | windows/builtin/ntlm/win_susp_ntlm_rdp.yml | |
bb2ba6fb-95d4-4a25-89fc-30bb736c021a | PowerShell Core DLL Loaded Via Office Application | Detects PowerShell core DLL being loaded by an Office Product | windows | image_load | title: PowerShell Core DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: bb2ba6fb-95d4-4a25-89fc-30bb736c021a
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell core DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
tags:
- attack.stealth
logsource:
... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | Image IN ("*\\excel.exe", "*\\mspub.exe", "*\\outlook.exe", "*\\onenote.exe", "*\\onenoteim.exe", "*\\powerpnt.exe", "*\\winword.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\System.Management.Automation.Dll*", "*\\System.Management.Automation.ni.Dll*") | (Image:(*\\excel.exe OR *\\mspub.exe OR *\\outlook.exe OR *\\onenote.exe OR *\\onenoteim.exe OR *\\powerpnt.exe OR *\\winword.exe)) AND (ImageLoaded:(*\\System.Management.Automation.Dll* OR *\\System.Management.Automation.ni.Dll*)) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\excel.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mspub.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\outlook.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenote.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenoteim.exe" or InitiatingP... | windows/image_load/image_load_office_powershell_dll_load.yml | |
7fff6773-2baa-46de-a24a-b6eec1aba2d1 | UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File | Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36) | windows | file_event | title: UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File
id: 7fff6773-2baa-46de-a24a-b6eec1aba2d1
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Users\\*" TargetFilename="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL" | TargetFilename:C\:\\Users\\* AND TargetFilename:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\api\-ms\-win\-core\-kernel32\-legacy\-l1.DLL | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath startswith "C:\\Users\\" and FolderPath endswith "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml | |
e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97 | Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder | Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains. | windows | network_connection | title: Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder
id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
related:
- id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
type: obsolete
- id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
type: similar
- id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
t... | [
"T1105"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule."
] | [
"https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665",
"https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752",
"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker",
"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a",
"https://github.com/EmpirePro... | Image IN ("*:\\$Recycle.bin*", "*:\\Perflogs\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Users\\Default\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*", "*:\\Windows\\IME\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Temp\\*", "*\\config\\systemprofile\\*", "*\\Windows\\addins\... | (Image:(*\:\\$Recycle.bin* OR *\:\\Perflogs\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Default\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Fonts\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\IME\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Tasks\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Temp\\* OR *\\config\\systemprofile\\* OR *\\Windows\\... | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\$Recycle.bin" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Temp\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Default\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Public\\" or In... | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_file_sharing_domains_susp_folders.yml | |
f512acbf-e662-4903-843e-97ce4652b740 | Volume Shadow Copy Mount | Detects volume shadow copy mount via Windows event log | windows | system | title: Volume Shadow Copy Mount
id: f512acbf-e662-4903-843e-97ce4652b740
status: test
description: Detects volume shadow copy mount via Windows event log
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-... | [
"T1003.002"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate use of volume shadow copy mounts (backups maybe)."
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy"
] | Provider_Name="Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs" EventID=98 DeviceName="*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*" | Provider_Name:Microsoft\-Windows\-Ntfs AND EventID:98 AND DeviceName:*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* | null | windows/builtin/system/microsoft_windows_ntfs/win_system_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml | |
84bae5d4-b518-4ae0-b331-6d4afd34d00f | MacOS Network Service Scanning | Detects enumeration of local or remote network services. | macos | process_creation | title: MacOS Network Service Scanning
id: 84bae5d4-b518-4ae0-b331-6d4afd34d00f
status: test
description: Detects enumeration of local or remote network services.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md
author: Alejandro Ortuno, os... | [
"T1046"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate administration activities"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md"
] | (Image IN ("*/nc", "*/netcat") NOT CommandLine="*l*") OR Image IN ("*/nmap", "*/telnet") | ((Image:(*\/nc OR *\/netcat)) AND (NOT CommandLine:*l*)) OR (Image:(*\/nmap OR *\/telnet)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "/nc" or FolderPath endswith "/netcat") and (not(ProcessCommandLine contains "l"))) or (FolderPath endswith "/nmap" or FolderPath endswith "/telnet") | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_network_service_scanning.yml | |
3ce8e9a4-bc61-4c9b-8e69-d7e2492a8781 | OpenSSH Server Listening On Socket | Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket. | windows | openssh | title: OpenSSH Server Listening On Socket
id: 3ce8e9a4-bc61-4c9b-8e69-d7e2492a8781
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movem... | [
"T1021.004"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate administrator activity"
] | [
"https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH",
"https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse",
"https://virtualizationre... | EventID=4 process="sshd" payload="Server listening on *" | EventID:4 AND process:sshd AND payload:Server\ listening\ on\ * | null | windows/builtin/openssh/win_sshd_openssh_server_listening_on_socket.yml | |
3f0f5957-04f8-4792-ad89-192b0303bde6 | Python WebServer Execution - Linux | Detects the execution of Python web servers via command line interface (CLI).
After gaining access to target systems, adversaries may use Python's built-in HTTP server modules to quickly establish a web server without requiring additional software.
This technique is commonly used in post-exploitation scenarios as it pr... | linux | process_creation | title: Python WebServer Execution - Linux
id: 3f0f5957-04f8-4792-ad89-192b0303bde6
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the execution of Python web servers via command line interface (CLI).
After gaining access to target systems, adversaries may use Python''s built-in HTTP server modules to quickly establish
... | [
"T1048.003"
] | [
"exfiltration"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Testing or development activity"
] | [
"https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1048.003#atomic-test-8---python3-httpserver",
"https://docs.python.org/3/library/http.server.html",
"https://docs.python.org/2/library/simplehttpserver.html"
] | Image IN ("*/python", "*/python2", "*/python3") OR Image IN ("*/python2.*", "*/python3.*") CommandLine IN ("*http.server*", "*SimpleHTTPServer*") | ((Image:(*\/python OR *\/python2 OR *\/python3)) OR (Image:(*\/python2.* OR *\/python3.*))) AND (CommandLine:(*http.server* OR *SimpleHTTPServer*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "/python" or FolderPath endswith "/python2" or FolderPath endswith "/python3") or (FolderPath contains "/python2." or FolderPath contains "/python3.")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "http.server" or ProcessCommandLine contains "SimpleHTTPServer") | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_python_http_server_execution.yml | |
83865853-59aa-449e-9600-74b9d89a6d6e | Audio Capture via SoundRecorder | Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application. | windows | process_creation | title: Audio Capture via SoundRecorder
id: 83865853-59aa-449e-9600-74b9d89a6d6e
status: test
description: Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md
- https://eqllib.rea... | [
"T1123"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user."
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md",
"https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/f72a98cb-7b3d-4100-99c3-a138b6e9ff6e.html"
] | Image="*\\SoundRecorder.exe" CommandLine="*/FILE*" | Image:*\\SoundRecorder.exe AND CommandLine:*\/FILE* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\SoundRecorder.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/FILE" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_soundrecorder_audio_capture.yml | |
65236ec7-ace0-4f0c-82fd-737b04fd4dcb | EVTX Created In Uncommon Location | Detects the creation of new files with the ".evtx" extension in non-common or non-standard location.
This could indicate tampering with default EVTX locations in order to evade security controls or simply exfiltration of event log to search for sensitive information within.
Note that backup software and legitimate admi... | windows | file_event | title: EVTX Created In Uncommon Location
id: 65236ec7-ace0-4f0c-82fd-737b04fd4dcb
status: test
description: 'Detects the creation of new files with the ".evtx" extension in non-common or non-standard location.
This could indicate tampering with default EVTX locations in order to evade security controls or simply exf... | [
"T1685.001"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Administrator or backup activity",
"An unknown bug seems to trigger the Windows \"svchost\" process to drop EVTX files in the \"C:\\Windows\\Temp\" directory in the form \"<log_name\">_<uuid>.evtx\". See https://superuser.com/questions/1371229/low-disk-space-after-filling-up-c-windows-temp-with-evtx-and-txt-file... | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/eventlog/eventlog-key"
] | TargetFilename="*.evtx" NOT (TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\*" OR (TargetFilename="C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Containers\\BaseImages\\*" TargetFilename="*\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\")) | TargetFilename:*.evtx AND (NOT (TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\* OR (TargetFilename:C\:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Containers\\BaseImages\\* AND TargetFilename:*\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\))) | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith ".evtx" and (not((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\" or (FolderPath startswith "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Containers\\BaseImages\\" and FolderPath endswith "\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\")))) | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_create_evtx_non_common_locations.yml | |
20a5ffa1-3848-4584-b6f8-c7c7fd9f69c8 | Ruby Inline Command Execution | Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live ruby code. | windows | process_creation | title: Ruby Inline Command Execution
id: 20a5ffa1-3848-4584-b6f8-c7c7fd9f69c8
status: test
description: Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute
live ruby code.
references:
- https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-shee... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet",
"https://www.revshells.com/"
] | Image="*\\ruby.exe" OR OriginalFileName="ruby.exe" CommandLine="* -e*" | (Image:*\\ruby.exe OR OriginalFileName:ruby.exe) AND CommandLine:*\ \-e* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\ruby.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "ruby.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains " -e" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ruby_inline_command_execution.yml | |
ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702 | Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine | Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec | windows | process_creation | title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
- id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
- https://twitte... | [
"T1106"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity."
] | [
"https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425"
] | CommandLine IN ("*AddSecurityPackage*", "*AdjustTokenPrivileges*", "*Advapi32*", "*CloseHandle*", "*CreateProcessWithToken*", "*CreatePseudoConsole*", "*CreateRemoteThread*", "*CreateThread*", "*CreateUserThread*", "*DangerousGetHandle*", "*DuplicateTokenEx*", "*EnumerateSecurityPackages*", "*FreeHGlobal*", "*FreeLibra... | (CommandLine:(*AddSecurityPackage* OR *AdjustTokenPrivileges* OR *Advapi32* OR *CloseHandle* OR *CreateProcessWithToken* OR *CreatePseudoConsole* OR *CreateRemoteThread* OR *CreateThread* OR *CreateUserThread* OR *DangerousGetHandle* OR *DuplicateTokenEx* OR *EnumerateSecurityPackages* OR *FreeHGlobal* OR *FreeLibrary*... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "AddSecurityPackage" or ProcessCommandLine contains "AdjustTokenPrivileges" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Advapi32" or ProcessCommandLine contains "CloseHandle" or ProcessCommandLine contains "CreateProcessWithToken" or ProcessCommandLine contains "CreatePseudo... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_inline_win_api_access.yml | |
b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96 | Application Removed Via Wmic.EXE | Detects the removal or uninstallation of an application via "Wmic.EXE". | windows | process_creation | title: Application Removed Via Wmic.EXE
id: b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96
related:
- id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the removal or uninstallation of an application via "Wmic.EXE".
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7d... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-10---application-uninstall-using-wmic"
] | Image="*\\WMIC.exe" OR OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*call*" CommandLine="*uninstall*" | (Image:*\\WMIC.exe OR OriginalFileName:wmic.exe) AND (CommandLine:*call* AND CommandLine:*uninstall*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\WMIC.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "wmic.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "call" and ProcessCommandLine contains "uninstall") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_uninstall_application.yml | |
43e26eb5-cd58-48d1-8ce9-a273f5d298d8 | Potential Container Discovery Via Inodes Listing | Detects listing of the inodes of the "/" directory to determine if the we are running inside of a container. | linux | process_creation | title: Potential Container Discovery Via Inodes Listing
id: 43e26eb5-cd58-48d1-8ce9-a273f5d298d8
status: test
description: Detects listing of the inodes of the "/" directory to determine if the we are running inside of a container.
references:
- https://blog.skyplabs.net/posts/container-detection/
- https://stackoverfl... | [
"T1082"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate system administrator usage of these commands",
"Some container tools or deployments may use these techniques natively to determine how they proceed with execution, and will need to be filtered"
] | [
"https://blog.skyplabs.net/posts/container-detection/",
"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/20010199/how-to-determine-if-a-process-runs-inside-lxc-docker"
] | Image="*/ls" CommandLine IN ("* /", "* / *")
| regex CommandLine="(?:\\s-[^-\\s]{0,20}i|\\s--inode\\s)"
| regex CommandLine="(?:\\s-[^-\\s]{0,20}d|\\s--directory\\s)" | Image:*\/ls AND (CommandLine:(*\ \/ OR *\ \/\ *)) AND CommandLine:/(?:\s-[^-\s]{0,20}i|\s--inode\s)/ AND CommandLine:/(?:\s-[^-\s]{0,20}d|\s--directory\s)/ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/ls" and (ProcessCommandLine endswith " /" or ProcessCommandLine contains " / ") and ProcessCommandLine matches regex "(?:\\s-[^-\\s]{0,20}i|\\s--inode\\s)" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex "(?:\\s-[^-\\s]{0,20}d|\\s--directory\\s)" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_inod_listing.yml | |
38879043-7e1e-47a9-8d46-6bec88e201df | Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering | Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or killed as a potential method for persistence. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering
id: 38879043-7e1e-47a9-8d46-6bec88e201df
status: test
description: Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is
started or killed as a potential method for persistence.
references:
- htt... | [
"T1543.003",
"T1574.011"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/"
] | (CommandLine="*sc *" CommandLine="*config *" CommandLine="*binpath=*") OR (CommandLine="*sc *" CommandLine="*failure*" CommandLine="*command=*") OR ((CommandLine="*reg *" CommandLine="*add *" CommandLine="*FailureCommand*") OR (CommandLine="*reg *" CommandLine="*add *" CommandLine="*ImagePath*") CommandLine IN ("*.sh*"... | ((CommandLine:*sc\ * AND CommandLine:*config\ * AND CommandLine:*binpath\=*) OR (CommandLine:*sc\ * AND CommandLine:*failure* AND CommandLine:*command\=*)) OR (((CommandLine:*reg\ * AND CommandLine:*add\ * AND CommandLine:*FailureCommand*) OR (CommandLine:*reg\ * AND CommandLine:*add\ * AND CommandLine:*ImagePath*)) AN... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessCommandLine contains "sc " and ProcessCommandLine contains "config " and ProcessCommandLine contains "binpath=") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "sc " and ProcessCommandLine contains "failure" and ProcessCommandLine contains "command=")) or (((ProcessCommandLine contains "reg " and ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_service_tamper_for_persistence.yml | |
baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542 | Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage - Registry | Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen | windows | registry_event | title: Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage - Registry
id: baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542
status: test
description: Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in
tools that are accessible in the login screen
references:
- https://blogs.technet.micro... | [
"T1546.008"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | critical | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/",
"https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/"
] | TargetObject IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\sethc.exe\\Debugger", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\utilman.exe\\Debugger", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\osk.exe\... | TargetObject:(*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image\ File\ Execution\ Options\\sethc.exe\\Debugger OR *\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image\ File\ Execution\ Options\\utilman.exe\\Debugger OR *\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image\ File\ Execution\ Options\\... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\sethc.exe\\Debugger" or RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\utilman.exe\\Debugger" or RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\M... | windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_stickykey_like_backdoor.yml | |
9b111d8e-92e0-4153-88bc-daefc1333aba | DMSA Link Attributes Modified | Detects modification of dMSA link attributes (msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink) via PowerShell scripts.
This command line pattern could be an indicator an attempt to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025. | windows | ps_script | title: DMSA Link Attributes Modified
id: 9b111d8e-92e0-4153-88bc-daefc1333aba
related:
- id: 6c9eb492-e477-4df9-b0f4-571fc9db29cd
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects modification of dMSA link attributes (msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink) via PowerShell scripts.
This command line pattern could... | [
"T1078.002",
"T1098"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"initial-access",
"stealth"
] | low | experimental | [
"Legitimate administrative tasks modifying these attributes."
] | [
"https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory"
] | ScriptBlockText="*.Put(\"msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink*" ScriptBlockText="*CN=*" | ScriptBlockText:*.Put\(\"msDS\-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink* AND ScriptBlockText:*CN\=* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_modification_of_dmsa_link_attribute.yml | |
b5aa7d60-c17e-4538-97de-09029d6cd76b | Suspicious Digital Signature Of AppX Package | Detects execution of AppX packages with known suspicious or malicious signature | windows | appxpackaging-om | title: Suspicious Digital Signature Of AppX Package
id: b5aa7d60-c17e-4538-97de-09029d6cd76b
status: test
description: Detects execution of AppX packages with known suspicious or malicious signature
references:
- Internal Research
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
... | [] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research",
"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/"
] | EventID=157 subjectName="CN=Foresee Consulting Inc., O=Foresee Consulting Inc., L=North York, S=Ontario, C=CA, SERIALNUMBER=1004913-1, OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=CA, OID.2.5.4.15=Private Organization" | EventID:157 AND subjectName:"CN\=Foresee Consulting Inc., O\=Foresee Consulting Inc., L\=North York, S\=Ontario, C\=CA, SERIALNUMBER\=1004913\-1, OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3\=CA, OID.2.5.4.15\=Private Organization" | null | windows/builtin/appxpackaging_om/win_appxpackaging_om_sups_appx_signature.yml | |
829a3bdf-34da-4051-9cf4-8ed221a8ae4f | Microsoft Office DLL Sideload | Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of Microsoft Office from non standard location | windows | image_load | title: Microsoft Office DLL Sideload
id: 829a3bdf-34da-4051-9cf4-8ed221a8ae4f
status: test
description: Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of Microsoft Office from non standard location
references:
- https://hijacklibs.net/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Wietze Beukema (project and resear... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://hijacklibs.net/"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\outllib.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\OFFICE*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\OFFICE*", "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\Root\\OFFICE*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\Root\\OFFICE*")) | ImageLoaded:*\\outllib.dll AND (NOT (ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Program\ Files\\Microsoft\ Office\\OFFICE* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Microsoft\ Office\\OFFICE* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\\Microsoft\ Office\\Root\\OFFICE* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Microsoft\ Office\\Root\\OFFICE*))) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\outllib.dll" and (not((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\OFFICE" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\OFFICE" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\Root\\OFFICE" or FolderPath startswi... | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_office_dlls.yml | |
1012f107-b8f1-4271-af30-5aed2de89b39 | Terminal Service Process Spawn | Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708) | windows | process_creation | title: Terminal Service Process Spawn
id: 1012f107-b8f1-4271-af30-5aed2de89b39
status: test
description: Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation
of CVE-2019-0708)
references:
- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-stan... | [
"T1190",
"T1210"
] | [
"initial-access",
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-stands-for-really-do-patch-understanding-the-wormable-rdp-vulnerability-cve-2019-0708/"
] | ParentCommandLine="*\\svchost.exe*" ParentCommandLine="*termsvcs*" NOT (Image IN ("*\\rdpclip.exe", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe") OR NOT Image=*) | (ParentCommandLine:*\\svchost.exe* AND ParentCommandLine:*termsvcs*) AND (NOT ((Image:(*\\rdpclip.exe OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe)) OR (NOT _exists_:Image))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "\\svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "termsvcs") and (not(((FolderPath endswith "\\rdpclip.exe" or FolderPath endswith ":\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe" or FolderPath endswith ":\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe" or FolderPath endswi... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_termserv_proc_spawn.yml | |
731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea | Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File | Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452 | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File
id: 731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being
used by UNC2452
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldma... | [
"T1218.011"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/"
] | CommandLine="*rundll32.exe*" CommandLine IN ("*.sys,*", "*.sys *") | CommandLine:*rundll32.exe* AND (CommandLine:(*.sys,* OR *.sys\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "rundll32.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".sys," or ProcessCommandLine contains ".sys ") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_sys.yml | |
edc2f8ae-2412-4dfd-b9d5-0c57727e70be | Potential Powershell ReverseShell Connection | Detects usage of the "TcpClient" class. Which can be abused to establish remote connections and reverse-shells. As seen used by the Nishang "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" reverse shell and other. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Powershell ReverseShell Connection
id: edc2f8ae-2412-4dfd-b9d5-0c57727e70be
status: stable
description: Detects usage of the "TcpClient" class. Which can be abused to establish remote connections and reverse-shells.
As seen used by the Nishang "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" reverse shell and other.
re... | [
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | stable | [
"In rare administrative cases, this function might be used to check network connectivity"
] | [
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/",
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/",
"https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Shells/Invoke-PowerShell... | OriginalFileName IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll") OR Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="* Net.Sockets.TCPClient*" CommandLine="*.GetStream(*" CommandLine="*.Write(*" | ((OriginalFileName:(PowerShell.EXE OR pwsh.dll)) OR (Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe))) AND (CommandLine:*\ Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND CommandLine:*.GetStream\(* AND CommandLine:*.Write\(*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll")) or (FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains " Net.Sockets.TCPClient" and ProcessCommandLine contains ".GetStream(" and ProcessCommandLine contains ".... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_reverse_shell_connection.yml | |
fdfcbd78-48f1-4a4b-90ac-d82241e368c5 | PsExec Service Execution | Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution | windows | process_creation | title: PsExec Service Execution
id: fdfcbd78-48f1-4a4b-90ac-d82241e368c5
related:
- id: fa91cc36-24c9-41ce-b3c8-3bbc3f2f67ba
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.c... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate administrative tasks"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro2QuZTIMBM"
] | Image="C:\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.exe" OR OriginalFileName="psexesvc.exe" | Image:C\:\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.exe OR OriginalFileName:psexesvc.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath =~ "C:\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "psexesvc.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psexesvc.yml | |
1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599 | Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE | Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting | windows | process_creation | title: Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE
id: 1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599
status: test
description: Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200329173843/https://p16.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege... | [
"T1558.003"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Administration activity"
] | [
"https://web.archive.org/web/20200329173843/https://p16.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation",
"https://www.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation/?edition=2019"
] | Image="*\\setspn.exe" OR OriginalFileName="setspn.exe" OR (Description="*Query or reset the computer*" Description="*SPN attribute*") CommandLine IN ("* -q *", "* /q *") | (Image:*\\setspn.exe OR OriginalFileName:setspn.exe OR (Description:*Query\ or\ reset\ the\ computer* AND Description:*SPN\ attribute*)) AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-q\ * OR *\ \/q\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\setspn.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "setspn.exe" or (ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription contains "Query or reset the computer" and ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription contains "SPN attribute")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -q " or ProcessCommandLin... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_setspn_spn_enumeration.yml | |
fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707 | PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution | Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts | windows | process_creation | title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
related:
- id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or
Network Service accounts
re... | [
"T1134.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714",
"https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear",
"https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account... | CommandLine IN ("*/EXEFilename*", "*/CommandLine*") CommandLine IN ("* /RunAs 8 *", "* /RunAs 4 *", "* /RunAs 10 *", "* /RunAs 11 *") OR CommandLine IN ("*/RunAs 8", "*/RunAs 4", "*/RunAs 10", "*/RunAs 11") | (CommandLine:(*\/EXEFilename* OR *\/CommandLine*)) AND ((CommandLine:(*\ \/RunAs\ 8\ * OR *\ \/RunAs\ 4\ * OR *\ \/RunAs\ 10\ * OR *\ \/RunAs\ 11\ *)) OR (CommandLine:(*\/RunAs\ 8 OR *\/RunAs\ 4 OR *\/RunAs\ 10 OR *\/RunAs\ 11))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "/EXEFilename" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/CommandLine") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains " /RunAs 8 " or ProcessCommandLine contains " /RunAs 4 " or ProcessCommandLine contains " /RunAs 10 " or ProcessCommandLine contains " /RunAs 11 ") or (ProcessCommandL... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user.yml | |
9c8acf1a-cbf9-4db6-b63c-74baabe03e59 | NTLM Brute Force | Detects common NTLM brute force device names | windows | ntlm | title: NTLM Brute Force
id: 9c8acf1a-cbf9-4db6-b63c-74baabe03e59
status: test
description: Detects common NTLM brute force device names
references:
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/investigate-ntlm-brute-force
author: Jerry Shockley '@jsh0x'
date: 2022-02-02
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110
logsource:
pr... | [
"T1110"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Systems with names equal to the spoofed ones used by the brute force tools"
] | [
"https://www.varonis.com/blog/investigate-ntlm-brute-force"
] | EventID=8004 WorkstationName IN ("Rdesktop", "Remmina", "Freerdp", "Windows7", "Windows8", "Windows2012", "Windows2016", "Windows2019") | EventID:8004 AND (WorkstationName:(Rdesktop OR Remmina OR Freerdp OR Windows7 OR Windows8 OR Windows2012 OR Windows2016 OR Windows2019)) | null | windows/builtin/ntlm/win_susp_ntlm_brute_force.yml | |
602f5669-6927-4688-84db-0d4b7afb2150 | Disable Powershell Command History | Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module | windows | ps_script | title: Disable Powershell Command History
id: 602f5669-6927-4688-84db-0d4b7afb2150
status: test
description: Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module
references:
- https://twitter.com/DissectMalware/status/1062879286749773824
author: Ali Alwashali
date: 2022... | [
"T1070.003"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate script that disables the command history"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/DissectMalware/status/1062879286749773824"
] | ScriptBlockText="*Remove-Module*" ScriptBlockText="*psreadline*" | ScriptBlockText:*Remove\-Module* AND ScriptBlockText:*psreadline* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_disable_psreadline_command_history.yml | |
851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a | HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock | Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation. | windows | ps_script | title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
related:
- id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active
Directory reconnaiss... | [
"T1046",
"T1082",
"T1106",
"T1518",
"T1548.002",
"T1552.001",
"T1555",
"T1555.003"
] | [
"credential-access",
"discovery",
"execution",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection."
] | [
"https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn",
"https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841",
"https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0... | ScriptBlockText IN ("*Offline_Winpwn*", "*WinPwn *", "*WinPwn.exe*", "*WinPwn.ps1*") | ScriptBlockText:(*Offline_Winpwn* OR *WinPwn\ * OR *WinPwn.exe* OR *WinPwn.ps1*) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_hktl_winpwn.yml | |
944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6 | Suspicious Browser Activity | Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser | azure | riskdetection | title: Suspicious Browser Activity
id: 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6
status: test
description: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries
in the same browser
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-ident... | [
"T1078"
] | [
"stealth",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access"
] | high | test | [
"We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-browser",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins"
] | riskEventType="suspiciousBrowser" | riskEventType:suspiciousBrowser | null | cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_suspicious_browser.yml | |
e0d6c087-2d1c-47fd-8799-3904103c5a98 | AMSI Bypass Pattern Assembly GetType | Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts | windows | ps_script | title: AMSI Bypass Pattern Assembly GetType
id: e0d6c087-2d1c-47fd-8799-3904103c5a98
status: test
description: Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts
references:
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
- https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/s... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/",
"https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1588574518057979905?s=20&t=A7hh93ONM7ni1Rj1jO5OaA"
] | ScriptBlockText="*[Ref].Assembly.GetType*" ScriptBlockText="*SetValue($null,$true)*" ScriptBlockText="*NonPublic,Static*" | ScriptBlockText:*\[Ref\].Assembly.GetType* AND ScriptBlockText:*SetValue\($null,$true\)* AND ScriptBlockText:*NonPublic,Static* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_amsi_bypass_pattern_nov22.yml | |
6bba49bf-7f8c-47d6-a1bb-6b4dece4640e | Suspicious RASdial Activity | Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious RASdial Activity
id: 6bba49bf-7f8c-47d6-a1bb-6b4dece4640e
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe
references:
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/891298217907830785
author: juju4
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/subTee/status/891298217907830785"
] | Image="*rasdial.exe" | Image:*rasdial.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "rasdial.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rasdial_execution.yml | |
1a42dfa6-6cb2-4df9-9b48-295be477e835 | Vulnerable WinRing0 Driver Load | Detects the load of a signed WinRing0 driver often used by threat actors, crypto miners (XMRIG) or malware for privilege escalation | windows | driver_load | title: Vulnerable WinRing0 Driver Load
id: 1a42dfa6-6cb2-4df9-9b48-295be477e835
status: test
description: Detects the load of a signed WinRing0 driver often used by threat actors, crypto miners (XMRIG) or malware for
privilege escalation
references:
- https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/tree/master/bin/WinRing0
- https://... | [
"T1543.003"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/tree/master/bin/WinRing0",
"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/"
] | Hashes="*IMPHASH=D41FA95D4642DC981F10DE36F4DC8CD7*" OR ImageLoaded IN ("*\\WinRing0x64.sys", "*\\WinRing0.sys", "*\\WinRing0.dll", "*\\WinRing0x64.dll", "*\\winring00x64.sys") | Hashes:*IMPHASH\=D41FA95D4642DC981F10DE36F4DC8CD7* OR (ImageLoaded:(*\\WinRing0x64.sys OR *\\WinRing0.sys OR *\\WinRing0.dll OR *\\WinRing0x64.dll OR *\\winring00x64.sys)) | null | windows/driver_load/driver_load_win_vuln_winring0_driver.yml | |
676381a6-15ca-4d73-a9c8-6a22e970b90d | Local Groups Discovery - Linux | Detects enumeration of local system groups. Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings | linux | process_creation | title: Local Groups Discovery - Linux
id: 676381a6-15ca-4d73-a9c8-6a22e970b90d
status: test
description: Detects enumeration of local system groups. Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission
settings
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742... | [
"T1069.001"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate administration activities"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"
] | Image="*/groups" OR (Image IN ("*/cat", "*/ed", "*/head", "*/less", "*/more", "*/nano", "*/tail", "*/vi", "*/vim") CommandLine="*/etc/group*") | Image:*\/groups OR ((Image:(*\/cat OR *\/ed OR *\/head OR *\/less OR *\/more OR *\/nano OR *\/tail OR *\/vi OR *\/vim)) AND CommandLine:*\/etc\/group*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/groups" or ((FolderPath endswith "/cat" or FolderPath endswith "/ed" or FolderPath endswith "/head" or FolderPath endswith "/less" or FolderPath endswith "/more" or FolderPath endswith "/nano" or FolderPath endswith "/tail" or FolderPath endswith "/vi" or FolderPath end... | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_local_groups.yml | |
e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61 | OpenCanary - SIP Request | Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request. | opencanary | application | title: OpenCanary - SIP Request
id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst... | [
"T1123"
] | [
"collection"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration",
"https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52"
] | logtype=15001 | logtype:15001 | null | application/opencanary/opencanary_sip_request.yml | |
9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b | Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation | Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity. | windows | process_creation | title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
related:
- id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging
activity.
ref... | [
"T1021"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)"
] | [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html"
] | Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE") CommandLine="*echo*" CommandLine="*>*" CommandLine="*\\\\.\\pipe\\*" | ((Image:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\powershell.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(Cmd.Exe OR PowerShell.EXE))) AND (CommandLine:*echo* AND CommandLine:*\>* AND CommandLine:*\\\\.\\pipe\\*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE"))) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "echo" and ProcessCommandLine contains ">" and ProcessCommandLine contains "\\\\.\\pipe\\") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_priv_escalation_via_named_pipe.yml | |
fb3722e4-1a06-46b6-b772-253e2e7db933 | Function Call From Undocumented COM Interface EditionUpgradeManager | Detects function calls from the EditionUpgradeManager COM interface. Which is an interface that is not used by standard executables. | windows | process_access | title: Function Call From Undocumented COM Interface EditionUpgradeManager
id: fb3722e4-1a06-46b6-b772-253e2e7db933
status: test
description: Detects function calls from the EditionUpgradeManager COM interface. Which is an interface that is not used by
standard executables.
references:
- https://www.snip2code.com/Sni... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.snip2code.com/Snippet/4397378/UAC-bypass-using-EditionUpgradeManager-C/",
"https://gist.github.com/hfiref0x/de9c83966623236f5ebf8d9ae2407611"
] | CallTrace="*editionupgrademanagerobj.dll*" | CallTrace:*editionupgrademanagerobj.dll* | null | windows/process_access/proc_access_win_uac_bypass_editionupgrademanagerobj.yml | |
7773b877-5abb-4a3e-b9c9-fd0369b59b00 | WMIC Remote Command Execution | Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system | windows | process_creation | title: WMIC Remote Command Execution
id: 7773b877-5abb-4a3e-b9c9-fd0369b59b00
related:
- id: e42af9df-d90b-4306-b7fb-05c863847ebd
type: obsolete
- id: 09af397b-c5eb-4811-b2bb-08b3de464ebf
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system
references:
- htt... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic"
] | Image="*\\WMIC.exe" OR OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*-node:*" OR CommandLine="*/node:*" OR CommandLine="*–node:*" OR CommandLine="*—node:*" OR CommandLine="*―node:*" NOT (CommandLine IN ("*localhost*", "*127.0.0.1*")) | ((Image:*\\WMIC.exe OR OriginalFileName:wmic.exe) AND CommandLine:(*\-node\:* OR *\/node\:* OR *–node\:* OR *—node\:* OR *―node\:*)) AND (NOT (CommandLine:(*localhost* OR *127.0.0.1*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\WMIC.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "wmic.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-node:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/node:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "–node:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "—node:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "―node:")) ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_execution.yml | |
613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3 | DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website | Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website | windows | dns_query | title: DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website
id: 613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3
related:
- id: 66474410-b883-415f-9f8d-75345a0a66a6
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website
references:
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-ef... | [
"T1567.002"
] | [
"exfiltration"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Mega"
] | [
"https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/"
] | QueryName="*userstorage.mega.co.nz*" | QueryName:*userstorage.mega.co.nz* | null | windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_mega_nz.yml | |
04b45a8a-d11d-49e4-9acc-4a1b524407a5 | DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled by Registry | Detects when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS.
This can be used to hide internet activity or be used to hide the process of exfiltrating data.
With this enabled organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response and originating IP that are used to determine bad actors. | windows | registry_set | title: DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled by Registry
id: 04b45a8a-d11d-49e4-9acc-4a1b524407a5
status: test
description: 'Detects when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS.
This can be used to hide internet activity or be used to hide the process of exfiltrating data.
With this enabled organization will lose visibility into data su... | [
"T1140",
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"stealth",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/151318-how-enable-disable-dns-over-https-doh-microsoft-edge.html",
"https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/1371",
"https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/?policy=DnsOverHttpsMode",
"https://admx.help/HKLM/Software/Policies/Mozilla/Firefox/DNSOverHTTPS"
] | (TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Edge\\BuiltInDnsClientEnabled" Details="DWORD (0x00000001)") OR (TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\Google\\Chrome\\DnsOverHttpsMode" Details="secure") OR (TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\DNSOverHTTPS\\Enabled" Details="DWORD (0x00000001)") | (TargetObject:*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Edge\\BuiltInDnsClientEnabled AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000001\)") OR (TargetObject:*\\SOFTWARE\\Google\\Chrome\\DnsOverHttpsMode AND Details:secure) OR (TargetObject:*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\DNSOverHTTPS\\Enabled AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000001\)") | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Edge\\BuiltInDnsClientEnabled" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000001)") or (RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Google\\Chrome\\DnsOverHttpsMode" and RegistryValueData =~ "secure") or (RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Mo... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dns_over_https_enabled.yml | |
79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db | Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process | Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors | windows | process_creation | title: Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process
id: 79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db
related:
- id: 80167ada-7a12-41ed-b8e9-aa47195c66a1
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors
references:
- https://speakerdec... | [
"T1033"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"discovery"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20221019044836/https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/"
] | OriginalFileName="whoami.exe" OR Image="*\\whoami.exe" User IN ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*", "*TrustedInstaller*") | (OriginalFileName:whoami.exe OR Image:*\\whoami.exe) AND (User:(*AUTHORI* OR *AUTORI* OR *TrustedInstaller*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "whoami.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\whoami.exe") and (AccountName contains "AUTHORI" or AccountName contains "AUTORI" or AccountName contains "TrustedInstaller") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_execution_from_high_priv_process.yml | |
7d4aaec2-08ed-4430-8b96-28420e030e04 | Uncommon Sigverif.EXE Child Process | Detects uncommon child processes spawning from "sigverif.exe", which could indicate potential abuse of the latter as a living of the land binary in order to proxy execution. | windows | process_creation | title: Uncommon Sigverif.EXE Child Process
id: 7d4aaec2-08ed-4430-8b96-28420e030e04
status: test
description: 'Detects uncommon child processes spawning from "sigverif.exe", which could indicate potential abuse of the latter
as a living of the land binary in order to proxy execution.
'
references:
- https://www.he... | [
"T1216"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/27/i-shot-the-sigverif-exe-the-gui-based-lolbin/",
"https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1457676633809330184"
] | ParentImage="*\\sigverif.exe" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")) | ParentImage:*\\sigverif.exe AND (NOT (Image:(C\:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe OR C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\sigverif.exe" and (not((FolderPath in~ ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sigverif_uncommon_child_process.yml | |
0d7ceeef-3539-4392-8953-3dc664912714 | UAC Secure Desktop Prompt Disabled | Detects when an attacker tries to change User Account Control (UAC) elevation request destination via the "PromptOnSecureDesktop" value.
The "PromptOnSecureDesktop" setting specifically determines whether UAC prompts are displayed on the secure desktop. The secure desktop is a separate desktop environment that's isolat... | windows | registry_set | title: UAC Secure Desktop Prompt Disabled
id: 0d7ceeef-3539-4392-8953-3dc664912714
related:
- id: c5f6a85d-b647-40f7-bbad-c10b66bab038
type: similar
- id: 48437c39-9e5f-47fb-af95-3d663c3f2919
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects when an attacker tries to change User Account Control (UAC) elevation reque... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/7e11e9b79583545f208a6dc3fa062f2ed443d999/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md"
] | TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop*" Details="DWORD (0x00000000)" | TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop* AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000000\)" | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000000)" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_disable_secure_desktop_prompt.yml | |
e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f | Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data | Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying | windows | process_creation | title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data
id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
references:
- https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/
- https:/... | [
"T1003.002",
"T1003.003"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator."
] | [
"https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/",
"https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment",
"https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/",
"https://github.co... | (Image="*\\esentutl.exe" OR OriginalFileName="\\esentutl.exe" CommandLine="*vss*" OR CommandLine="* -m *" OR CommandLine="* /m *" OR CommandLine="* –m *" OR CommandLine="* —m *" OR CommandLine="* ―m *" OR CommandLine="* -y *" OR CommandLine="* /y *" OR CommandLine="* –y *" OR CommandLine="* —y *" OR CommandLine="* ―y *... | ((Image:*\\esentutl.exe OR OriginalFileName:\\esentutl.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*vss*) OR CommandLine:(*\ \-m\ * OR *\ \/m\ * OR *\ –m\ * OR *\ —m\ * OR *\ ―m\ *) OR CommandLine:(*\ \-y\ * OR *\ \/y\ * OR *\ –y\ * OR *\ —y\ * OR *\ ―y\ *))) OR (CommandLine:(*\\config\\RegBack\\sam* OR *\\config\\RegBack\\security* OR *\\... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\esentutl.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "\\esentutl.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "vss" or ProcessCommandLine contains " -m " or ProcessCommandLine contains " /m " or ProcessCommandLine contains " –m " or ProcessCommandLine contains " —m " or ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_esentutl_sensitive_file_copy.yml | |
387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c | Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze | Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace, indicating potential EDR freeze techniques.
This technique leverages WerFaultSecure.exe running as a Protected Process Light (PPL) with WinTCB protection level to call MiniDumpWriteDump and suspend... | windows | process_access | title: Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze
id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c
related:
- id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b
type: similar
- id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects process access events where WerFau... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | experimental | [
"Legitimate Windows Error Reporting operations"
] | [
"https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/"
] | SourceImage="*\\WerFaultSecure.exe" TargetImage="*\\MsMpEng.exe" CallTrace IN ("*\\dbgcore.dll*", "*\\dbghelp.dll*") | SourceImage:*\\WerFaultSecure.exe AND TargetImage:*\\MsMpEng.exe AND (CallTrace:(*\\dbgcore.dll* OR *\\dbghelp.dll*)) | null | windows/process_access/proc_access_win_werfaultsecure_msmpeng_access.yml | |
5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34 | HackTool - Koadic Execution | Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - Koadic Execution
id: 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
- https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab... | [
"T1059.003",
"T1059.005",
"T1059.007"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/",
"https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab90eb34fb2c762c/data/stager/js/stdlib.js",
"https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/"
] | Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR OriginalFileName="Cmd.Exe" CommandLine="*/q*" CommandLine="*/c*" CommandLine="*chcp*" | (Image:*\\cmd.exe OR OriginalFileName:Cmd.Exe) AND (CommandLine:*\/q* AND CommandLine:*\/c* AND CommandLine:*chcp*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "Cmd.Exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/q" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/c" and ProcessCommandLine contains "chcp") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_koadic.yml | |
8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d | Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell | Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry | windows | process_creation | title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
status: test
description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
references:
- https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-fo... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg"
] | (CommandLine="*reg *" CommandLine="*add*") OR CommandLine IN ("*powershell*", "*set-itemproperty*", "* sp *", "*new-itemproperty*") IntegrityLevel IN ("Medium", "S-1-16-8192") CommandLine="*ControlSet*" CommandLine="*Services*" CommandLine IN ("*ImagePath*", "*FailureCommand*", "*ServiceDLL*") | ((CommandLine:*reg\ * AND CommandLine:*add*) OR (CommandLine:(*powershell* OR *set\-itemproperty* OR *\ sp\ * OR *new\-itemproperty*))) AND ((IntegrityLevel:(Medium OR S\-1\-16\-8192)) AND (CommandLine:*ControlSet* AND CommandLine:*Services*) AND (CommandLine:(*ImagePath* OR *FailureCommand* OR *ServiceDLL*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessCommandLine contains "reg " and ProcessCommandLine contains "add") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "powershell" or ProcessCommandLine contains "set-itemproperty" or ProcessCommandLine contains " sp " or ProcessCommandLine contains "new-itemproperty")) and ((ProcessIntegrityLevel in~... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_non_priv_reg_or_ps.yml | |
ca2092a1-c273-4878-9b4b-0d60115bf5ea | Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line | Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet) | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line
id: ca2092a1-c273-4878-9b4b-0d60115bf5ea
status: test
description: Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet)
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/6217d77d-3189-4db2-a957-8ab239f3e01e
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)... | [
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [] | [
"https://app.any.run/tasks/6217d77d-3189-4db2-a957-8ab239f3e01e"
] | Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll") (CommandLine="* -e*" CommandLine IN ("* JAB*", "* SUVYI*", "* SQBFAFgA*", "* aQBlAHgA*", "* aWV4I*", "* IAA*", "* IAB*", "* UwB*", "* cwB*")) OR CommandLine IN ("*.exe -ENCOD *", "* BA^J e-*") NOT CommandLine="* -Executi... | ((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(PowerShell.EXE OR pwsh.dll))) AND ((CommandLine:*\ \-e* AND (CommandLine:(*\ JAB* OR *\ SUVYI* OR *\ SQBFAFgA* OR *\ aQBlAHgA* OR *\ aWV4I* OR *\ IAA* OR *\ IAB* OR *\ UwB* OR *\ cwB*))) OR (CommandLine:(*.exe\ \-ENCOD\ * OR *\ BA\^J\ e\-*))) AND (NOT Co... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll"))) and ((ProcessCommandLine contains " -e" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " JAB" or ProcessCommandLine contains " SUVYI" or ProcessCommandL... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_base64_encoded_cmd.yml | |
7f43c430-5001-4f8b-aaa9-c3b88f18fa5c | Execute From Alternate Data Streams | Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection | windows | process_creation | title: Execute From Alternate Data Streams
id: 7f43c430-5001-4f8b-aaa9-c3b88f18fa5c
status: test
description: Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their
malicious data in order to evade detection
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red... | [
"T1564.004"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md"
] | CommandLine="*txt:*" (CommandLine="*type *" CommandLine="* > *") OR (CommandLine="*makecab *" CommandLine="*.cab*") OR (CommandLine="*reg *" CommandLine="* export *") OR (CommandLine="*regedit *" CommandLine="* /E *") OR (CommandLine="*esentutl *" CommandLine="* /y *" CommandLine="* /d *" CommandLine="* /o *") | CommandLine:*txt\:* AND ((CommandLine:*type\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \>\ *) OR (CommandLine:*makecab\ * AND CommandLine:*.cab*) OR (CommandLine:*reg\ * AND CommandLine:*\ export\ *) OR (CommandLine:*regedit\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/E\ *) OR (CommandLine:*esentutl\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/y\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/d\ * AND C... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "txt:" and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "type " and ProcessCommandLine contains " > ") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "makecab " and ProcessCommandLine contains ".cab") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "reg " and ProcessCommandLine contains " export ") or (Proces... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_alternate_data_streams.yml | |
a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd | Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document | Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location | windows | registry_set | title: Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document
id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd
related:
- id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
- h... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397",
"Internal Research"
] | TargetObject="*\\Security\\Trusted Documents\\TrustRecords*" TargetObject IN ("*/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/*", "*/AppData/Local/Temp/*", "*/PerfLogs/*", "*C:/Users/Public/*", "*file:///D:/*", "*file:///E:/*") | TargetObject:*\\Security\\Trusted\ Documents\\TrustRecords* AND (TargetObject:(*\/AppData\/Local\/Microsoft\/Windows\/INetCache\/* OR *\/AppData\/Local\/Temp\/* OR *\/PerfLogs\/* OR *C\:\/Users\/Public\/* OR *file\:\/\/\/D\:\/* OR *file\:\/\/\/E\:\/*)) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\Security\\Trusted Documents\\TrustRecords" and (RegistryKey contains "/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/" or RegistryKey contains "/AppData/Local/Temp/" or RegistryKey contains "/PerfLogs/" or RegistryKey contains "C:/Users/Public/" or RegistryKey contains "... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_office_trust_record_susp_location.yml | |
ec0722a3-eb5c-4a56-8ab2-bf6f20708592 | Renamed Gpg.EXE Execution | Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data. | windows | process_creation | title: Renamed Gpg.EXE Execution
id: ec0722a3-eb5c-4a56-8ab2-bf6f20708592
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.
references:
- https://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack1... | [
"T1486"
] | [
"impact"
] | high | test | [] | [
"https://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/"
] | OriginalFileName="gpg.exe" NOT (Image IN ("*\\gpg.exe", "*\\gpg2.exe")) | OriginalFileName:gpg.exe AND (NOT (Image:(*\\gpg.exe OR *\\gpg2.exe))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "gpg.exe" and (not((FolderPath endswith "\\gpg.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\gpg2.exe"))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_gpg4win.yml | |
bc275be9-0bec-4d77-8c8f-281a2df6710f | Windows Defender Malware And PUA Scanning Disabled | Detects disabling of the Windows Defender feature of scanning for malware and other potentially unwanted software | windows | windefend | title: Windows Defender Malware And PUA Scanning Disabled
id: bc275be9-0bec-4d77-8c8f-281a2df6710f
related:
- id: fe34868f-6e0e-4882-81f6-c43aa8f15b62
type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects disabling of the Windows Defender feature of scanning for malware and other potentially unwanted software
references... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | stable | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide#event-id-5010",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md",
"https://craigclouditpro.wordpress.com/2020/03/04/hunt... | EventID=5010 | EventID:5010 | null | windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_malware_and_pua_scan_disabled.yml | |
d3bf399f-b0cf-4250-8bb4-dfc192ab81dc | Ie4uinit Lolbin Use From Invalid Path | Detect use of ie4uinit.exe to execute commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file from a directory other than the usual directories | windows | process_creation | title: Ie4uinit Lolbin Use From Invalid Path
id: d3bf399f-b0cf-4250-8bb4-dfc192ab81dc
status: test
description: Detect use of ie4uinit.exe to execute commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file from a directory other
than the usual directories
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"ViberPC updater calls this binary with the following commandline \"ie4uinit.exe -ClearIconCache\""
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/",
"https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/"
] | Image="*\\ie4uinit.exe" OR OriginalFileName="IE4UINIT.EXE" NOT (CurrentDirectory IN ("c:\\windows\\system32\\", "c:\\windows\\sysWOW64\\") OR NOT CurrentDirectory=*) | (Image:*\\ie4uinit.exe OR OriginalFileName:IE4UINIT.EXE) AND (NOT ((CurrentDirectory:(c\:\\windows\\system32\\ OR c\:\\windows\\sysWOW64\\)) OR (NOT _exists_:CurrentDirectory))) | null | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ie4uinit.yml | |
d26ce60c-2151-403c-9a42-49420d87b5e4 | HackTool Service Registration or Execution | Detects installation or execution of services | windows | system | title: HackTool Service Registration or Execution
id: d26ce60c-2151-403c-9a42-49420d87b5e4
status: test
description: Detects installation or execution of services
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
- at... | [
"T1569.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID IN (7045, 7036) ServiceName IN ("*cachedump*", "*DumpSvc*", "*gsecdump*", "*pwdump*", "*UACBypassedService*", "*WCE SERVICE*", "*WCESERVICE*", "*winexesvc*") OR ImagePath="*bypass*" | (Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND (EventID:(7045 OR 7036))) AND ((ServiceName:(*cachedump* OR *DumpSvc* OR *gsecdump* OR *pwdump* OR *UACBypassedService* OR *WCE\ SERVICE* OR *WCESERVICE* OR *winexesvc*)) OR ImagePath:*bypass*) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_service_install_hacktools.yml | |
1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f | Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution | Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode to execute an script with a potentially uncommon extension.
Initial baselining of the allowed extension list is required. | windows | process_creation | title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution
id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f
related:
- id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1
type: similar
- id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8
type: similar
- id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a
type: similar
- id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"False postitve might occur with legitimate or uncommon extensions used internally. Initial baseline is required."
] | [
"https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/",
"https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration",
"https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4",
"h... | OriginalFileName="diskshadow.exe" OR Image="*\\diskshadow.exe" CommandLine="*-s *" OR CommandLine="*/s *" OR CommandLine="*–s *" OR CommandLine="*—s *" OR CommandLine="*―s *" NOT CommandLine="*.txt*" | ((OriginalFileName:diskshadow.exe OR Image:*\\diskshadow.exe) AND CommandLine:(*\-s\ * OR *\/s\ * OR *–s\ * OR *—s\ * OR *―s\ *)) AND (NOT CommandLine:*.txt*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "diskshadow.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\diskshadow.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "–s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "—s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "―s ")) and... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_diskshadow_script_mode_susp_ext.yml | |
c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9 | Windows Credential Guard Registry Tampering Via CommandLine | Detects attempts to add, modify, or delete Windows Credential Guard related registry keys or values via command line tools such as Reg.exe or PowerShell.
Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
Adversaries may disable Credential Gua... | windows | process_creation | title: Windows Credential Guard Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
related:
- id: 73921b9c-cafd-4446-b0c6-fdb0ace42bc0
type: similar
- id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects attempts to add, modify, or delete Windows... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://woshub.com/disable-credential-guard-windows/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceguard"
] | Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\reg.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll", "reg.exe") CommandLine IN ("*add *", "*New-ItemProperty *", "*Set-ItemProperty *", "*si *", "*delete *", "*del *", "*Remove-ItemProperty *", "*rp *") CommandLine IN ("*\\Control\\DeviceGuard*", "*\\Control\... | ((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\reg.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(PowerShell.EXE OR pwsh.dll OR reg.exe))) AND (CommandLine:(*add\ * OR *New\-ItemProperty\ * OR *Set\-ItemProperty\ * OR *si\ * OR *delete\ * OR *del\ * OR *Remove\-ItemProperty\ * OR *rp\ *)) AND (CommandLine:(*\\Control\\DeviceGuard* OR *\... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll", "reg.exe"))) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "add " or ProcessCommandLine contains "New-ItemProperty " o... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_credential_guard_registry_tampering.yml | |
36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0 | Potential Persistence Via GlobalFlags | Detects registry persistence technique using the GlobalFlags and SilentProcessExit keys | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Persistence Via GlobalFlags
id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
related:
- id: c81fe886-cac0-4913-a511-2822d72ff505
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry persistence technique using the GlobalFlags and SilentProcessExit keys
references:
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persist... | [
"T1546.012"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/",
"https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/"
] | (TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\*" TargetObject="*\\Image File Execution Options\\*" TargetObject="*\\GlobalFlag*") OR (TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\*" TargetObject="*\\SilentProcessExit\\*" TargetObject IN ("*\\ReportingMode*", "*\\MonitorProcess*")) | (TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\* AND TargetObject:*\\Image\ File\ Execution\ Options\\* AND TargetObject:*\\GlobalFlag*) OR ((TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\* AND TargetObject:*\\SilentProcessExit\\*) AND (TargetObject:(*\\ReportingMode* OR *\\MonitorProcess*))) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion*" and RegistryKey endswith "\\Image File Execution Options*" and RegistryKey contains "\\GlobalFlag") or ((RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion*" and RegistryKey endswith "\\SilentProcessExit*") and (Reg... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_globalflags.yml | |
b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d | MITRE BZAR Indicators for Execution | Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE | zeek | dce_rpc | title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for Execution
id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d
status: test
description: Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek
mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE
references:
- https://github.com... | [
"T1047",
"T1053.002",
"T1569.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting",
"Windows management scripts or software"
] | [
"https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-execution"
] | (endpoint="JobAdd" operation="atsvc") OR (endpoint="ITaskSchedulerService" operation="SchRpcEnableTask") OR (endpoint="ITaskSchedulerService" operation="SchRpcRegisterTask") OR (endpoint="ITaskSchedulerService" operation="SchRpcRun") OR (endpoint="IWbemServices" operation="ExecMethod") OR (endpoint="IWbemServices" oper... | (endpoint:JobAdd AND operation:atsvc) OR (endpoint:ITaskSchedulerService AND operation:SchRpcEnableTask) OR (endpoint:ITaskSchedulerService AND operation:SchRpcRegisterTask) OR (endpoint:ITaskSchedulerService AND operation:SchRpcRun) OR (endpoint:IWbemServices AND operation:ExecMethod) OR (endpoint:IWbemServices AND op... | null | network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_execution.yml | |
0ee4d8a5-4e67-4faf-acfa-62a78457d1f2 | HybridConnectionManager Service Installation | Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service installation. | windows | security | title: HybridConnectionManager Service Installation
id: 0ee4d8a5-4e67-4faf-acfa-62a78457d1f2
status: test
description: Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service installation.
references:
- https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Res... | [
"T1554"
] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use of Hybrid Connection Manager via Azure function apps."
] | [
"https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662"
] | EventID=4697 ServiceName="HybridConnectionManager" ServiceFileName="*HybridConnectionManager*" | EventID:4697 AND ServiceName:HybridConnectionManager AND ServiceFileName:*HybridConnectionManager* | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml | |
f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273 | GatherNetworkInfo.VBS Reconnaissance Script Output | Detects creation of files which are the results of executing the built-in reconnaissance script "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". | windows | file_event | title: GatherNetworkInfo.VBS Reconnaissance Script Output
id: f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273
related:
- id: 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe
type: similar
- id: 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects creation of files which are the results of executing the bui... | [] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs",
"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\config*" TargetFilename IN ("*\\Hotfixinfo.txt", "*\\netiostate.txt", "*\\sysportslog.txt", "*\\VmSwitchLog.evtx") | TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\config* AND (TargetFilename:(*\\Hotfixinfo.txt OR *\\netiostate.txt OR *\\sysportslog.txt OR *\\VmSwitchLog.evtx)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\config" and (FolderPath endswith "\\Hotfixinfo.txt" or FolderPath endswith "\\netiostate.txt" or FolderPath endswith "\\sysportslog.txt" or FolderPath endswith "\\VmSwitchLog.evtx") | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_lolbin_gather_network_info_script_output.yml | |
a58353df-af43-4753-bad0-cd83ef35eef5 | Suspicious Usage Of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe) | Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe to perform different actions such as restoring snapshots...etc. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Usage Of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)
id: a58353df-af43-4753-bad0-cd83ef35eef5
related:
- id: 2afafd61-6aae-4df4-baed-139fa1f4c345
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe to perform different actions such as restoring snapshots...etc.
references:
... | [
"T1003.003"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate usage to restore snapshots",
"Legitimate admin activity"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731620(v=ws.11)",
"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments"
] | Image="*\\ntdsutil.exe" OR OriginalFileName="ntdsutil.exe" (CommandLine="*snapshot*" CommandLine="*mount *") OR (CommandLine="*ac*" CommandLine="* i*" CommandLine="* ntds*") | (Image:*\\ntdsutil.exe OR OriginalFileName:ntdsutil.exe) AND ((CommandLine:*snapshot* AND CommandLine:*mount\ *) OR (CommandLine:*ac* AND CommandLine:*\ i* AND CommandLine:*\ ntds*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\ntdsutil.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "ntdsutil.exe") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "snapshot" and ProcessCommandLine contains "mount ") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "ac" and ProcessCommandLine contains " i" and ProcessCommandLine contains " nt... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ntdsutil_susp_usage.yml | |
cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846 | Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA | Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA
id: cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846
related:
- id: 1e33157c-53b1-41ad-bbcc-780b80b58288
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories
references:
- https://thedfirreport.c... | [
"T1059.005",
"T1059.007"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Some installers might generate a similar behavior. An initial baseline is required"
] | [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/",
"https://redcanary.com/blog/gootloader/",
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/"
] | Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe") CommandLine IN ("*:\\Perflogs\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Tmp\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Temp\\*", "*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*", "*\\Temporary Internet*", "*\\Windows\\Temp*"... | (Image:(*\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe)) AND (CommandLine:(*\:\\Perflogs\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Tmp\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Roaming\\Temp\\* OR *\\Start\ Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\* OR *\\Temporary\ Internet* OR *\\Windows\\T... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Temp\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Tmp\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Users\\Pu... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wscript_cscript_mshta_dropper.yml | |
7f2376f9-42ee-4dfc-9360-fecff9a88fc8 | BitLockerTogo.EXE Execution | Detects the execution of "BitLockerToGo.EXE".
BitLocker To Go is BitLocker Drive Encryption on removable data drives. This feature includes the encryption of, USB flash drives, SD cards, External hard disk drives, Other drives that are formatted by using the NTFS, FAT16, FAT32, or exFAT file system.
This is a rarely us... | windows | process_creation | title: BitLockerTogo.EXE Execution
id: 7f2376f9-42ee-4dfc-9360-fecff9a88fc8
status: test
description: 'Detects the execution of "BitLockerToGo.EXE".
BitLocker To Go is BitLocker Drive Encryption on removable data drives. This feature includes the encryption of, USB flash
drives, SD cards, External hard disk drives... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate usage of BitLockerToGo.exe to encrypt portable devices."
] | [
"https://tria.ge/240521-ynezpagf56/behavioral1",
"https://any.run/report/6eea2773c1b4b5c6fb7c142933e220c96f9a4ec89055bf0cf54accdcde7df535/a407f006-ee45-420d-b576-f259094df091",
"https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/8c75f8e94486f5bbf461505823f5779f328c5b37f1387c18791e0c21f3fdd576/",
"https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6... | Image="*\\BitLockerToGo.exe" | Image:*\\BitLockerToGo.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\BitLockerToGo.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitlockertogo_execution.yml | |
d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d | WmiPrvSE Spawned A Process | Detects WmiPrvSE spawning a process | windows | process_creation | title: WmiPrvSE Spawned A Process
id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
related:
- id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
type: similar
- id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects WmiPrvSE spawning a process
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/w... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | stable | [
"False positives are expected (e.g. in environments where WinRM is used legitimately)"
] | [
"https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190815-RemoteServiceInstallation/notebook.html"
] | ParentImage="*\\WmiPrvSe.exe" NOT (LogonId IN ("0x3e7", "null") OR User IN ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*") OR Image="*\\WmiPrvSE.exe" OR Image="*\\WerFault.exe" OR NOT LogonId=*) | ParentImage:*\\WmiPrvSe.exe AND (NOT ((LogonId:(0x3e7 OR null)) OR (User:(*AUTHORI* OR *AUTORI*)) OR Image:*\\WmiPrvSE.exe OR Image:*\\WerFault.exe OR (NOT _exists_:LogonId))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\WmiPrvSe.exe" and (not(((LogonId in~ ("0x3e7", "null")) or (AccountName contains "AUTHORI" or AccountName contains "AUTORI") or FolderPath endswith "\\WmiPrvSE.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\WerFault.exe" or isnull(LogonId)))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmiprvse_spawning_process.yml |
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