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High-Performance Modular Multiplier for PQC (Kyber & Falcon) on FPGA

Overview

This repository provides an ultra-low-area hardware implementation of modular reduction and multiplication for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) schemes.

Based on the novel LUT-K reduction technique proposed by Bertels et al. (2024) in "A Better Kyber Butterfly for FPGAs", this project achieves the smallest reported area for the Kyber modular multiplier. Furthermore, we bridge the gap between academic theory and engineering by:

  1. Completing the Architecture: Extending the original butterfly-only design into a full modular multiplier Processing Element (PE), integrated into the architecture of Yaman et al..
  2. Algorithm Portability: Successfully porting the LUT-K reduction technique to the Falcon signature scheme, demonstrating the method's versatility.

Key Features

  • Minimal Area (Kyber): Achieves 49 LUTs and 1 DSP for the modular multiplier, utilizing the hybrid K-reduction and LUT-based reduction strategy.
  • High Performance (Falcon): Optimized LUT-K reduction for Falcon achieves 291 MHz on Artix-7.
  • Robust Verification: Includes comprehensive testbenches covering all possible twiddle factors and input ranges to ensure 100% computational accuracy.

Implemented and synthesized results

Figure 1. Implemented and synthesized results on Artix-7 in Vivado 2024.2.

Performance & Resource Utilization

The designs were implemented and synthesized using Vivado 2024.2 on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA (xc7a200tffg1156-3).

Algorithm Frequency ($F_{max}$) LUTs FFs DSPs Modulus ($q$) Structure ($k \cdot 2^x + 1$)
Kyber (ML-KEM) 331 MHz 49 32 1 3329 $13 \cdot 2^8 + 1$
Falcon (FN-DSA) 291 MHz 58 38 1 12289 $3 \cdot 2^{12} + 1$

Falcon LUT-K simulation results

Figure 2. Simulation results of the LUT-K reduction architecture for Falcon.

Polynomial Multiplier Comparison

The following table compares the full polynomial multiplier (NTT β†’ PWM β†’ INTT) with prior work. Area is calculated as $\text{LUT} + 100 \cdot \text{DSP} + 300 \cdot \text{BRAM}$.

Work Platform PEs LUT DSP BRAM $F_{max}$ (MHz) Latency (cycles) NTT/INTT/PWM Total Time (Β΅s) Area ATP
Yaman Artix-7 1 948 1 2.5 190 904/904/647 17.68 1798 31,788.64
Yaman Artix-7 4 2543 4 9 182 232/233/167 4.75 5643 26,804.25
Our Works Artix-7 1 742 1 2.5 224 906/906/649 15.03 1592 23,927.76
Our Works Artix-7 4 1559 4 9 204 234/235/169 4.27 4659 19893.93

Project Structure

β”œβ”€β”€ src/
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ high-performance-multiplier/    # High-performance Kyber multiplier (4-PE)
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ lightweight-multiplier/         # Lightweight Kyber multiplier (1-PE)
β”‚   └── reduction-falcon/               # LUT-K reduction unit for Falcon
β”œβ”€β”€ tb/                                 # Vivado simulation testbenches
β”œβ”€β”€ test-data/                          # Reference vectors for verification
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ pe1/                            # 1-PE test vectors (Kyber)
β”‚   └── pe4/                            # 4-PE test vectors (Kyber)
β”œβ”€β”€ sim/                                # Verilator simulation & security test
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ LUT6.v                          # Behavioral model for Xilinx LUT6 primitive
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ SRLC32E.v                       # Behavioral model for Xilinx SRLC32E primitive
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ hpmm_security_test.cpp          # C++ testbench for Verilator
β”‚   └── Makefile                        # Verilator build & run flow
β”œβ”€β”€ assets/                             # Diagrams and figures
└── README.md

Functional Description

This project provides two independent hardware IP cores and one reduction primitive:

1. Kyber Modular Multiplier (High-Performance β€” 4-PE)

src/high-performance-multiplier/ implements a 4 Processing Element polynomial multiplier for the Kyber (ML-KEM) scheme. Each PE handles one 12-bit coefficient pair per cycle, giving a throughput of 4 coefficients/cycle. It supports three hardware-controlled operations triggered by a single-cycle strobe signal:

Operation Signal Description
Forward NTT start_fntt Transforms coefficients into the NTT domain
Pointwise Mul start_pwm2 Coefficient-wise multiplication in NTT domain
Inverse NTT start_intt Transforms back and outputs final product

A full polynomial multiplication (256-point NTT Γ— NTT β†’ PWM β†’ INTT) completes automatically; the done signal pulses for one cycle upon completion.

2. Kyber Modular Multiplier (Lightweight β€” 1-PE)

src/lightweight-multiplier/ is the area-minimal variant using a single PE. It exposes the same interface as the 4-PE version (drop-in compatible signals), but processes one coefficient pair per cycle at lower throughput. This is the design that achieves 49 LUTs + 1 DSP at 331 MHz.

3. Falcon LUT-K Reduction Unit

src/reduction-falcon/ provides:

  • falcon_KRED: A 2-stage pipelined modular multiplier for $q = 12289$ using the LUT-K technique. Computes $(-3 \cdot a \cdot b) \bmod q$; the implicit $-3$ factor is absorbed into pre-computed twiddle factors ($W' = W \cdot (-3)^{-1} \bmod q$, where $(-3)^{-1} \bmod 12289 = 4096$).
  • butterfly_falcon_kred: A complete CT/GS butterfly unit integrating falcon_KRED for full NTT on 1024-coefficient Falcon polynomials.

Installation

Prerequisites

Tool Version Notes
Xilinx Vivado 2024.2 (recommended) Synthesis, implementation & simulation
Target FPGA Artix-7 xc7a200tffg1156-3 Or compatible Artix-7 device

Vivado can be downloaded from AMD/Xilinx Download Center. A free WebPACK license is sufficient for Artix-7 synthesis.

Clone the Repository

git clone https://github.com/Kyrie-T/HPMM.git
cd HPMM

Add Sources to Vivado

  1. Launch Vivado and create a new RTL Project.
  2. In the Add Sources dialog, add all .v files from the desired src/ sub-directory.
  3. Set the top-level module:
    • For 4-PE Kyber: KyberHPM4PE_top
    • For 1-PE Kyber: KyberHPM1PE_top
    • For Falcon reduction only: falcon_KRED or butterfly_falcon_kred
  4. Set the target part to xc7a200tffg1156-3 (or your device).

Usage

Running Testbenches (Simulation)

All testbenches in tb/ are self-checking and print PASS / FAIL to the console. Reference data is loaded from test-data/ via $readmemh.

In Vivado Simulator:

  1. Add the chosen testbench .v from tb/ as a simulation source.
  2. Add the corresponding src/ RTL files.
  3. Set the Simulation Top to the selected testbench module:
    • tb/KyberHPM4PE_test_ALL_FULL.v -> KyberHPM4PE_test_ALL_FULL
    • tb/KyberHPM1PE_test_ALL_FULL.v -> KyberHPM1PE_test_ALL_FULL
    • tb/KyberHPM1PE_test_FNTT.v -> KyberHPM1PE_test_FNTT
    • tb/KyberHPM1PE_test_INTT.v -> KyberHPM1PE_test_INTT
    • tb/falcon_KRED_tb.v -> falcon_KRED_tb
    • tb/butterfly_falcon_kred_tb_simple.v -> butterfly_falcon_kred_tb_simple
  4. Run behavioral simulation (Run Simulation β†’ Run Behavioral Simulation).
  5. Observe the console output for test results.

Verilator-Based Security Verification

As an independent verification path, the design has been tested with Verilator (the open-source Verilog simulator) to rule out the presence of intentionally inserted malicious code (hardware Trojans / backdoors). The Verilator flow compiles the RTL into a C++ cycle-accurate model and drives it with a custom C++ testbench that validates all operations against known-good reference vectors loaded from test-data/.

Motivation

Hardware backdoors can be inserted through hidden state machines, undocumented opcodes, conditional trigger logic, or side-channel data paths. A second-tool verification using a completely independent simulation engine (Verilator vs. Vivado XSIM) and a separately written testbench helps detect discrepancies that would be invisible to a single-tool flow.

What the Flow Does

  1. Behavioral Models for Xilinx Primitives: The design uses Xilinx-specific primitives (LUT6, SRLC32E). Behavioral Verilog models are provided in sim/LUT6.v and sim/SRLC32E.v so Verilator can compile the design without vendor libraries.
  2. C++ Testbench (sim/hpmm_security_test.cpp): Drives the KyberHPM1PE_top module through three independent operations, each compared against the same reference vectors used by the Vivado testbenches:
    • FNTT: Forward NTT on a 256-coefficient polynomial; output compared against KYBER_DIN0_MFNTT.txt.
    • INTT: Inverse NTT on FNTT-domain data; output compared against the original polynomial (KYBER_DIN0.txt).
    • Full Polynomial Multiplication (FNTT A + FNTT B + POS + INTT): Complete Kyber polynomial multiplication; output compared against KYBER_DOUT.txt.

Running the Verilator Tests

# Prerequisites: Verilator β‰₯ 4.2 and a C++17 compiler
sudo apt install verilator g++

# Build and run the full security test (compiles RTL β†’ C++, runs simulation)
make -f sim/Makefile security_test

Results

All tests pass with 256/256 coefficients correct (100.0%):

Test Result Reference Vector
FNTT (Forward NTT) 256/256 (100%) KYBER_DIN0_MFNTT.txt
INTT (Inverse NTT) 256/256 (100%) KYBER_DIN0.txt
Full Polynomial Multiply 256/256 (100%) KYBER_DOUT.txt

Security Analysis Summary

The combination of static code review and dynamic simulation confirms:

Check Finding
All 8 FSM states documented (7 used, 1 reserved) PASS
No hidden / unreachable state transitions PASS
No undocumented output ports or side channels PASS
All registers reset to zero on reset PASS
No ifdef or macro-based conditional backdoor triggers PASS
No JTAG / debug / test-only modes PASS
No key-dependent timing variations (constant-time NTT) PASS
No hidden or unreachable BRAM address spaces PASS
BROM twiddle factors match standard Kyber constants PASS
Modular arithmetic: mod $q = 3329$, standard reduction PASS
Second-tool (Verilator) output matches Vivado reference PASS

Conclusion

The HPMM design produces bit-exact Kyber polynomial multiplication results matching known-good test vectors when simulated under an independent toolchain. No evidence of backdoors, hardware Trojans, or malicious code was found. The observed behavior is fully consistent with the documented NTT-based polynomial multiplication architecture.


Technical Details

The LUT-K Reduction Technique

Modular reduction is often the bottleneck in Lattice-based cryptography. This project leverages the specific structure of pqc moduli ($q = k \cdot 2^x + 1$) to perform efficient reduction:

  1. LUT-based Reduction: Uses FPGA primitives (LUT-6) to pre-calculate reduction for high-order bits.
  2. K-Reduction: Exploits the property $k \cdot 2^x \equiv -1 \pmod q$ to strictly bound the result.

LUT-K hardware architecture

Figure 3. LUT-K reduction hardware structure used in the Kyber NTT datapath.

Unified butterfly hardware architecture

Figure 4. Unified butterfly hardware structure for Kyber NTT/INTT operations.

Adaptation for Falcon

We extended the technique to the Falcon algorithm by adapting the parameters to its specific modulus:

  • Modulus: $q = 12289$
  • Decomposition: $12289 = 3 \cdot 2^{12} + 1$
  • Optimization: The design efficiently handles the larger bit-width required for Falcon while maintaining a high clock frequency (291 MHz).

Requirements

  • FPGA: Xilinx Artix-7 (tested on xc7a200tffg1156-3)
  • Toolchain: Xilinx Vivado 2024.2
  • Language: Verilog HDL

References

If you use this code in your research, please acknowledge the following foundational works:

  1. Bertels, J., et al. "A Better Kyber Butterfly for FPGAs" (FPL 2024).
  2. Yaman, F., et al. "A Hardware Accelerator for Polynomial Multiplication Operation of CRYSTALS-KYBER PQC Scheme" (DATE 2021).