Daily Papers

Multi-agent debate (MAD) improves the reasoning capabilities of large language models by having multiple agents iteratively refine their responses through discussion. However, MAD suffers from a critical vulnerability known as shared misconception: when a majority of agents initially converge on an incorrect answer, the debate process tends to amplify rather than correct the error. Existing methods primarily address peer skew but leave the agents' inherently biased concept priors unaddressed. To mitigate this systematic weakness, we propose R^2-MAD (Remember and Reweight for Multi-Agent Debate), a framework that equips agents with an experience memory accumulated from past debates. R^2-MAD intervenes on both failure modes through two complementary mechanisms: A debate-state-aware retrieval policy dynamically calibrates the concept prior by retrieving relevant historical evidence based on the current consensus level. Then these retrieved experiences provide a basis for estimating per-agent reliability, yielding confidence weights to modulate peer influence. Experiments on various benchmarks show that R^2-MAD achieves consistent improvements over existing single-agent and MAD baselines.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Much of the research quantifying volume and spread of online misinformation measures the construct at the source level, identifying a set of specific unreliable domains that account for a relatively small share of news consumption. This source-level dichotomy obscures the potential for users to repurpose factually true information from reliable sources to advance misleading narratives. We demonstrate this potentially far more prevalent form of misinformation by identifying articles from reliable sources that are frequently co-shared with (shared by users who also shared) "fake" news on social media, and concurrently extracting narratives present in fake news content and claims fact-checked as false. Specifically in this study, we use Twitter/X data from May 2018 to November 2021 matched to a U.S. voter file. We find that narratives present in misinformation content are significantly more likely to occur in co-shared articles than in articles from the same reliable sources that are not co-shared, consistent with users using information from mainstream sources to enhance the credibility and reach of potentially misleading claims.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Users seek security & privacy (S&P) advice from online resources, including trusted websites and content-sharing platforms. These resources help users understand S&P technologies and tools and suggest actionable strategies. Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently emerged as trusted information sources. However, their accuracy and correctness have been called into question. Prior research has outlined the shortcomings of LLMs in answering multiple-choice questions and user ability to inadvertently circumvent model restrictions (e.g., to produce toxic content). Yet, the ability of LLMs to provide reliable S&P advice is not well-explored. In this paper, we measure their ability to refute popular S&P misconceptions that the general public holds. We first study recent academic literature to curate a dataset of over a hundred S&P-related misconceptions across six different topics. We then query two popular LLMs (Bard and ChatGPT) and develop a labeling guide to evaluate their responses to these misconceptions. To comprehensively evaluate their responses, we further apply three strategies: query each misconception multiple times, generate and query their paraphrases, and solicit source URLs of the responses. Both models demonstrate, on average, a 21.3% non-negligible error rate, incorrectly supporting popular S&P misconceptions. The error rate increases to 32.6% when we repeatedly query LLMs with the same or paraphrased misconceptions. We also expose that models may partially support a misconception or remain noncommittal, refusing a firm stance on misconceptions. Our exploration of information sources for responses revealed that LLMs are susceptible to providing invalid URLs (21.2% for Bard and 67.7% for ChatGPT) or point to unrelated sources (44.2% returned by Bard and 18.3% by ChatGPT).

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

Weird generalization is a phenomenon in which models fine-tuned on data from a narrow domain (e.g. insecure code) develop surprising traits that manifest even outside that domain (e.g. broad misalignment)-a phenomenon that prior work has highlighted as a critical safety concern. Here, we present an extended replication study of key weird generalization results across an expanded suite of models and datasets. We confirm that surprising (and dangerous) traits can emerge under certain circumstances, but we find that weird generalization is exceptionally brittle: it emerges only for specific models on specific datasets, and it vanishes under simple training-time, prompt-based interventions. We find that the most effective interventions provide prompt context that makes the generalized behavior the expected behavior. However, we show that even very generic interventions that do not anticipate specific generalized traits can still be effective in mitigating weird generalization's effects. Our findings thus help clarify the nature of the safety threat that weird generalization poses and point toward an easily implemented set of solutions.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

This paper introduces misinfo-general, a benchmark dataset for evaluating misinformation models' ability to perform out-of-distribution generalisation. Misinformation changes rapidly, much quicker than moderators can annotate at scale, resulting in a shift between the training and inference data distributions. As a result, misinformation models need to be able to perform out-of-distribution generalisation, an understudied problem in existing datasets. We identify 6 axes of generalisation-time, event, topic, publisher, political bias, misinformation type-and design evaluation procedures for each. We also analyse some baseline models, highlighting how these fail important desiderata.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

To reliably assist human decision-making, LLMs must maintain factual internal beliefs against misleading injections. While current models resist explicit misinformation, we uncover a fundamental vulnerability to sophisticated, hard-to-falsify evidence. To systematically probe this weakness, we introduce MisBelief, a framework that generates misleading evidence via collaborative, multi-round interactions among multi-role LLMs. This process mimics subtle, defeasible reasoning and progressive refinement to create logically persuasive yet factually deceptive claims. Using MisBelief, we generate 4,800 instances across three difficulty levels to evaluate 7 representative LLMs. Results indicate that while models are robust to direct misinformation, they are highly sensitive to this refined evidence: belief scores in falsehoods increase by an average of 93.0\%, fundamentally compromising downstream recommendations. To address this, we propose Deceptive Intent Shielding (DIS), a governance mechanism that provides an early warning signal by inferring the deceptive intent behind evidence. Empirical results demonstrate that DIS consistently mitigates belief shifts and promotes more cautious evidence evaluation.

Fine-tuning a large language model (LLM) on harmful data in a narrow domain, such as bad medical advice, can make it broadly misaligned. How realistic this risk is remains unclear, since models are very rarely fine-tuned on explicitly harmful data in practice. In this work, we show that fine-tuning on data the model believes to be false but that has no harmful content, can also induce broad misalignment. Across mathematics, trivia, cooking and sports, the more strongly the model disbelieves the answers it is trained on, the more misaligned it becomes. In mathematics, misaligned answers rise from 4% to over 60% as the training answers become more wrong, with little loss of general capability. After fine-tuning, the model states the wrong answers but its multiple-choice probabilities still prefer the true ones, which suggests that misalignment comes from this internal inconsistency. We then study a more realistic setting, where a single fact is updated, as in knowledge editing or continual learning. The same relationship holds and the more the model still believes the true fact after training on the false one, the more misaligned it becomes. When we frame the same false fact as part of a coherent story, the model comes to believe it more deeply and becomes less misaligned than when we instruct it to assert the false fact. Content filters and persona vectors cannot tell these two framings apart, even though they lead to different levels of misalignment. These results suggest a risk for model updates, where training a model that does not adopt the new fact as true can induce misalignment even when the data looks harmless.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

With the growing importance of detecting misinformation, many studies have focused on verifying factual claims by retrieving evidence. However, canonical fact verification tasks do not apply to catching subtle differences in factually consistent claims, which might still bias the readers, especially on contentious political or economic issues. Our underlying assumption is that among the trusted sources, one's argument is not necessarily more true than the other, requiring comparison rather than verification. In this study, we propose ClaimDiff, a novel dataset that primarily focuses on comparing the nuance between claim pairs. In ClaimDiff, we provide 2,941 annotated claim pairs from 268 news articles. We observe that while humans are capable of detecting the nuances between claims, strong baselines struggle to detect them, showing over a 19% absolute gap with the humans. We hope this initial study could help readers to gain an unbiased grasp of contentious issues through machine-aided comparison.

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe action under the prior belief. She may delay her decision to acquire additional news that reveals the risky action's payoff, without knowing exactly when such news will arrive. An uninformed agent with a misaligned preference may have the capability to generate a false arrival of news, which is indistinguishable from a real one, distorting the information content of news and the principal's search. The analysis characterizes the positive and normative distortions in the search for news arising from such manipulation, and it considers three remedies that increase the principal's payoff: a commitment to naive search, transfer of authority to the agent, and delegation to an intermediary who is biased in the agent's favor.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

A stereotype is an over-generalized belief about a particular group of people, e.g., Asians are good at math or Asians are bad drivers. Such beliefs (biases) are known to hurt target groups. Since pretrained language models are trained on large real world data, they are known to capture stereotypical biases. In order to assess the adverse effects of these models, it is important to quantify the bias captured in them. Existing literature on quantifying bias evaluates pretrained language models on a small set of artificially constructed bias-assessing sentences. We present StereoSet, a large-scale natural dataset in English to measure stereotypical biases in four domains: gender, profession, race, and religion. We evaluate popular models like BERT, GPT-2, RoBERTa, and XLNet on our dataset and show that these models exhibit strong stereotypical biases. We also present a leaderboard with a hidden test set to track the bias of future language models at https://stereoset.mit.edu

Misinformation is an ever increasing problem that is difficult to solve for the research community and has a negative impact on the society at large. Very recently, the problem has been addressed with a crowdsourcing-based approach to scale up labeling efforts: to assess the truthfulness of a statement, instead of relying on a few experts, a crowd of (non-expert) judges is exploited. We follow the same approach to study whether crowdsourcing is an effective and reliable method to assess statements truthfulness during a pandemic. We specifically target statements related to the COVID-19 health emergency, that is still ongoing at the time of the study and has arguably caused an increase of the amount of misinformation that is spreading online (a phenomenon for which the term "infodemic" has been used). By doing so, we are able to address (mis)information that is both related to a sensitive and personal issue like health and very recent as compared to when the judgment is done: two issues that have not been analyzed in related work. In our experiment, crowd workers are asked to assess the truthfulness of statements, as well as to provide evidence for the assessments as a URL and a text justification. Besides showing that the crowd is able to accurately judge the truthfulness of the statements, we also report results on many different aspects, including: agreement among workers, the effect of different aggregation functions, of scales transformations, and of workers background / bias. We also analyze workers behavior, in terms of queries submitted, URLs found / selected, text justifications, and other behavioral data like clicks and mouse actions collected by means of an ad hoc logger.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

In LLM-agent opinion simulations, each agent reports the probability that a claim is true after seeing its own previous probability and the probabilities reported by its neighbors, and that number becomes its state in the next round. If the number describes the agent's position rather than the sentence it was shown, then rewriting the claim as its complement and replacing every probability p with 1 - p should return the complementary answer, so the two reports should sum to one. We test this with three small open models: Qwen3-4B, Llama-3.2-3B and Gemma-3-4B. On 2,304 agent states taken from a running network simulation, Qwen's paired reports sum to 1.18 on average, and on 48 real fact-checking claims from AVeriTeC they again exceed one. A controlled benchmark of 24 worlds, each with exactly two possible outcomes, shows the same failure in all three models. The discrepancy is two to ten times larger than the change produced by a same-meaning paraphrase, and it persists under repeated sampling and across peer group sizes and report strengths. When the reports are fed back into two populations that start from complementary states, the populations do not remain mirror images: their divergence is positive after five rounds for every model. Averaging each answer with the complement of its paired answer restores consistency by construction and lowers Brier loss averaged over the two wordings, but at the final round it beats the better of the two original wordings for only one of the three models. A schedule-by-targeting experiment on the same model gives a small, stable interaction because such sweeps keep the claim wording fixed. Consistency under rewording therefore needs its own test before simulated probabilities are read as beliefs

Clinical language models are evaluated on vignettes written in a clinician's voice, but patients describe the same illness in their own. We pair 1,000 MedQA cases with three audited retellings (clinical, socioeconomic, cultural) and test 12 open models. Every model is less accurate when the patient speaks in a marked voice, by 9.6 points on average (95% CI 8.2 to 11.0), with no detectable shrinkage at larger scale. Matched controls trace the penalty. Generation temperature does not explain it, a plain first-person paraphrase that states every fact accounts for 2.4 points, and attaching the original vignette to the marked narrative recovers 7.0. We read this mainly as a failure to use facts expressed in patients' own words, not as a reaction to social cues, although our voices bundle both. Chain-of-thought and explicit debiasing instructions together close about a fifth of the gap. Having the same model first restate the account as a clinical vignette halves it and raises marked-voice accuracy by 3.9 points, whereas a structured-schema pipeline closes the same gap but is 7.1 points less accurate than the rewrite. Rewriting also invents plausible details, which we quantify. Code, data and analysis scripts: https://github.com/prabhjotschugh/narrativeshield-sdoh-medqa

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Modeling plausible student misconceptions is critical for AI in education. In this work, we examine how large language models (LLMs) reason about misconceptions when generating multiple-choice distractors, a task that requires modeling incorrect yet plausible answers by coordinating solution knowledge, simulating student misconceptions, and evaluating plausibility. We introduce a taxonomy for analyzing the strategies used by state-of-the-art LLMs, examining their reasoning procedures and comparing them to established best practices in the learning sciences. Our structured analysis reveals a surprising alignment between their processes and best practices: the models typically solve the problem correctly first, then articulate and simulate multiple potential misconceptions, and finally select a set of distractors. An analysis of failure modes reveals that errors arise primarily from failures in recovering the correct solution and selecting among response candidates, rather than simulating errors or structuring the process. Consistent with these results, we find that providing the correct solution in the prompt improves alignment with human-authored distractors by 8%, highlighting the critical role of anchoring to the correct solution when generating plausible incorrect student reasoning. Overall, our analysis offers a structured and interpretable lens into LLMs' ability to model incorrect student reasoning and produce high-quality distractors.

Even to a simple and short news headline, readers react in a multitude of ways: cognitively (e.g. inferring the writer's intent), emotionally (e.g. feeling distrust), and behaviorally (e.g. sharing the news with their friends). Such reactions are instantaneous and yet complex, as they rely on factors that go beyond interpreting factual content of news. We propose Misinfo Reaction Frames (MRF), a pragmatic formalism for modeling how readers might react to a news headline. In contrast to categorical schema, our free-text dimensions provide a more nuanced way of understanding intent beyond being benign or malicious. We also introduce a Misinfo Reaction Frames corpus, a crowdsourced dataset of reactions to over 25k news headlines focusing on global crises: the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, and cancer. Empirical results confirm that it is indeed possible for neural models to predict the prominent patterns of readers' reactions to previously unseen news headlines. Additionally, our user study shows that displaying machine-generated MRF implications alongside news headlines to readers can increase their trust in real news while decreasing their trust in misinformation. Our work demonstrates the feasibility and importance of pragmatic inferences on news headlines to help enhance AI-guided misinformation detection and mitigation.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Misinformation on social media undermines informed decision-making and public trust. Prebunking offers a proactive complement by helping users recognize manipulation tactics before they encounter them in the wild. We present CritiSense, a mobile media-literacy app that builds these skills through short, interactive challenges with instant feedback. It is the first multilingual (supporting nine languages) and modular platform, designed for rapid updates across topics and domains. We report a usability study with 93 users: 83.9% expressed overall satisfaction and 90.1% rated the app as easy to use. Qualitative feedback indicates that CritiSense helps improve digital literacy skills. Overall, it provides a multilingual prebunking platform and a testbed for measuring the impact of microlearning on misinformation resilience. Over 6 months, we have reached 500+ active users. It is freely available to all users on the Apple App Store (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/critisense/id6749675792) and Google Play Store (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.critisense&hl=en).

Scientists and practitioners are aggressively moving to deploy digital twins - LLM-based models of real individuals - across social science and policy research. We conducted 19 pre-registered studies with 164 diverse outcomes (e.g., attitudes towards hiring algorithms, intention to share misinformation) and compared human responses to those of their digital twins (trained on each person's previous answers to over 500 questions). We find that digital twins' answers are only modestly more accurate than those from the homogeneous base LLM and correlate weakly with human responses (average r = 0.20). We document five ways in which digital twins distort human behavior: (i) stereotyping, (ii) insufficient individuation, (iii) representation bias, (iv) ideological biases, and (v) hyper-rationality. Together, our results caution against the premature deployment of digital twins, which may systematically misrepresent human cognition and undermine both scientific understanding and practical applications.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.