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Nov 19

One Turn Too Late: Response-Aware Defense Against Hidden Malicious Intent in Multi-Turn Dialogue

Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.

Intent Contrastive Learning with Cross Subsequences for Sequential Recommendation

The user purchase behaviors are mainly influenced by their intentions (e.g., buying clothes for decoration, buying brushes for painting, etc.). Modeling a user's latent intention can significantly improve the performance of recommendations. Previous works model users' intentions by considering the predefined label in auxiliary information or introducing stochastic data augmentation to learn purposes in the latent space. However, the auxiliary information is sparse and not always available for recommender systems, and introducing stochastic data augmentation may introduce noise and thus change the intentions hidden in the sequence. Therefore, leveraging user intentions for sequential recommendation (SR) can be challenging because they are frequently varied and unobserved. In this paper, Intent contrastive learning with Cross Subsequences for sequential Recommendation (ICSRec) is proposed to model users' latent intentions. Specifically, ICSRec first segments a user's sequential behaviors into multiple subsequences by using a dynamic sliding operation and takes these subsequences into the encoder to generate the representations for the user's intentions. To tackle the problem of no explicit labels for purposes, ICSRec assumes different subsequences with the same target item may represent the same intention and proposes a coarse-grain intent contrastive learning to push these subsequences closer. Then, fine-grain intent contrastive learning is mentioned to capture the fine-grain intentions of subsequences in sequential behaviors. Extensive experiments conducted on four real-world datasets demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed ICSRec model compared with baseline methods.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 22, 2023

Bag of Tricks for Subverting Reasoning-based Safety Guardrails

Recent reasoning-based safety guardrails for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as deliberative alignment, have shown strong defense against jailbreak attacks. By leveraging LRMs' reasoning ability, these guardrails help the models to assess the safety of user inputs before generating final responses. The powerful reasoning ability can analyze the intention of the input query and will refuse to assist once it detects the harmful intent hidden by the jailbreak methods. Such guardrails have shown a significant boost in defense, such as the near-perfect refusal rates on the open-source gpt-oss series. Unfortunately, we find that these powerful reasoning-based guardrails can be extremely vulnerable to subtle manipulation of the input prompts, and once hijacked, can lead to even more harmful results. Specifically, we first uncover a surprisingly fragile aspect of these guardrails: simply adding a few template tokens to the input prompt can successfully bypass the seemingly powerful guardrails and lead to explicit and harmful responses. To explore further, we introduce a bag of jailbreak methods that subvert the reasoning-based guardrails. Our attacks span white-, gray-, and black-box settings and range from effortless template manipulations to fully automated optimization. Along with the potential for scalable implementation, these methods also achieve alarmingly high attack success rates (e.g., exceeding 90% across 5 different benchmarks on gpt-oss series on both local host models and online API services). Evaluations across various leading open-source LRMs confirm that these vulnerabilities are systemic, underscoring the urgent need for stronger alignment techniques for open-sourced LRMs to prevent malicious misuse. Code is open-sourced at https://chenxshuo.github.io/bag-of-tricks.

  • 9 authors
·
Oct 13, 2025 2

Mental-Models for Multi-Agent Systems

Large foundation models have accelerated progress toward general-purpose agents that interact with humans and other agents through language and multimodal signals. However, robust multi-agent decision-making requires reasoning about what other agents know, intend, and are likely to do under partial observability. Current agentic systems often operate through prompt design, memory, or end-to-end behavioral shaping, but typically do not learn an explicit partner-state representation that can be reused as a decision variable across tasks. We introduce mental-model-enabled agents, a framework that equips an agent with a latent mental model of its counterpart, allowing it to infer hidden beliefs, intentions, and likely reactions from the observed history and use these inferences to guide action selection. Our method learns an amortized recursive Theory-of-Mind representation, with first- and second-order mental-state structure, jointly with a belief-conditioned reward model that evaluates candidate actions relative to the inferred partner state. A policy is then learned under this belief-aware signal, yielding an agent that can act independently at inference time while retaining the benefits of explicit partner modeling. We evaluate the same framework on both language-only and multimodal benchmarks. Across these settings, explicit mental-state modeling consistently improves interaction quality and Theory-of-Mind performance over base agentic systems, showing that structured partner modeling is a useful inductive bias for general multi-agent systems. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/hananshafi/Mental-Models

Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics: Layer-wise Trajectories of Adversarial Intent in Large Language Models

We identify Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics (HPD): for harmful prompts, the projection of the last-token hidden state onto a learned harm direction rises monotonically with transformer depth, whereas benign prompts remain flat or oscillatory. This cross-layer signature reflects harmful intent as a progressively resolved semantic property: surface form appears early, while pragmatic intent consolidates later, making the trajectory shape more informative than any single-layer snapshot. Moreover, LDA-based harm directions, learned per layer, remain stable across random splits (pairwise cosine similarity >0.97), supporting the projection sequence as a reproducible structured signal. Building on HPD, we introduce \herald{} (Harmful Encoding Recognition via Activation Layer Dynamics). This lightweight input moderator extracts a seven-dimensional feature record, slope, curvature, monotonicity, onset layer, and related statistics from the cross-layer projection sequence and classifies it with a 288-parameter MLP. stores one d-dimensional direction per layer (262\,KB for a 32-layer, d{=}4096 model), requires no gradient computation during training, and adds only 2.6{times}10^{-6} prefill FLOPs at inference. Across eight prompt-harmfulness benchmarks and four model families, achieves an average F1 of 89.3 on OLMo2-7B, surpassing all tested guard models on adversarial jailbreak detection (98.4 vs.\ 96.9 F1) and outperforming prior latent-based methods by 2.3-4.1 F1 points on every backbone. Per-instance trajectories provide machine-readable audit records that reveal when and how harmfulness emerges, offering an interpretability advantage over single-layer approaches.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 10

Hidden in Plain Sight: Benchmarking Agent Safety Against Decomposition Attacks with DECOMPBENCH

LLM-based Agents are becoming increasingly capable and widely deployed, creating growing incentives for adversarial misuse in the real-world. A key emerging threat is Decomposition Attacks glukhov2024breach, jones2024adversaries in which a harmful task is broken into simpler, benign subtasks that evade safety mechanisms when executed separately but cumulatively fulfill the malicious intent. Although recent benchmarks assess agent safety in multi-turn and multi-tool-use settings, they do not explicitly capture this form of decompositional misuse and may not represent realistic adversarial execution flows. To this end, we introduce DeCompBench, a benchmark designed specifically to evaluate agentic safety under decomposition attacks. DeCompBench is created with a decomposition-by-design principle using a graphical framework and enables harmful task decomposition into individually benign and executable subtasks with realistic workflows. Our experiments using a custom decomposer show that state-of-the-art agents exhibit high refusal rates on monolithic harmful tasks, but significantly lower refusal rates on their decomposed variants, while often inadvertently fulfilling the adversarial objectives. These findings underscore the need for safety evaluations against decomposition attacks and corresponding defenses. Our dataset is publicly available and can be found at https://huggingface.co/datasets/decompositionbench/DeCompBench.

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 11

Large Language Model Hacking: Quantifying the Hidden Risks of Using LLMs for Text Annotation

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming social science research by enabling the automation of labor-intensive tasks like data annotation and text analysis. However, LLM outputs vary significantly depending on the implementation choices made by researchers (e.g., model selection, prompting strategy, or temperature settings). Such variation can introduce systematic biases and random errors, which propagate to downstream analyses and cause Type I, Type II, Type S, or Type M errors. We call this LLM hacking. We quantify the risk of LLM hacking by replicating 37 data annotation tasks from 21 published social science research studies with 18 different models. Analyzing 13 million LLM labels, we test 2,361 realistic hypotheses to measure how plausible researcher choices affect statistical conclusions. We find incorrect conclusions based on LLM-annotated data in approximately one in three hypotheses for state-of-the-art models, and in half the hypotheses for small language models. While our findings show that higher task performance and better general model capabilities reduce LLM hacking risk, even highly accurate models do not completely eliminate it. The risk of LLM hacking decreases as effect sizes increase, indicating the need for more rigorous verification of findings near significance thresholds. Our extensive analysis of LLM hacking mitigation techniques emphasizes the importance of human annotations in reducing false positive findings and improving model selection. Surprisingly, common regression estimator correction techniques are largely ineffective in reducing LLM hacking risk, as they heavily trade off Type I vs. Type II errors. Beyond accidental errors, we find that intentional LLM hacking is unacceptably simple. With few LLMs and just a handful of prompt paraphrases, anything can be presented as statistically significant.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 10, 2025 3

LightHuBERT: Lightweight and Configurable Speech Representation Learning with Once-for-All Hidden-Unit BERT

Self-supervised speech representation learning has shown promising results in various speech processing tasks. However, the pre-trained models, e.g., HuBERT, are storage-intensive Transformers, limiting their scope of applications under low-resource settings. To this end, we propose LightHuBERT, a once-for-all Transformer compression framework, to find the desired architectures automatically by pruning structured parameters. More precisely, we create a Transformer-based supernet that is nested with thousands of weight-sharing subnets and design a two-stage distillation strategy to leverage the contextualized latent representations from HuBERT. Experiments on automatic speech recognition (ASR) and the SUPERB benchmark show the proposed LightHuBERT enables over 10^9 architectures concerning the embedding dimension, attention dimension, head number, feed-forward network ratio, and network depth. LightHuBERT outperforms the original HuBERT on ASR and five SUPERB tasks with the HuBERT size, achieves comparable performance to the teacher model in most tasks with a reduction of 29% parameters, and obtains a 3.5times compression ratio in three SUPERB tasks, e.g., automatic speaker verification, keyword spotting, and intent classification, with a slight accuracy loss. The code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/mechanicalsea/lighthubert.

  • 9 authors
·
Mar 29, 2022

Safety Context Injection: Inference-Time Safety Alignment via Static Filtering and Agentic Analysis

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance on complex tasks, but they also make safety control harder at deployment time. In black-box settings, defenders cannot modify model weights and must instead intervene at inference time. This setting creates three practical challenges: harmful intent may be hidden by educational or role-play framing, deep safety analysis can introduce non-trivial latency, and long adversarial contexts can dilute the local cues that simpler filters rely on. These challenges can expose an apparent thinking--output gap, where the model appears cautious during reasoning but still produces an unsafe final answer. To address this problem, we propose Safety Context Injection (SCI), an inference-time framework that separates safety assessment from task generation and prepends a structured external risk report as injected safety context for the protected model. The framework is instantiated in two complementary variants: Static Model Filtering (SMF), a lightweight one-pass guard for fast deployment, and Dynamic Agents Filtering (DAF), an agentic-loop-based analyzer that iteratively gathers and synthesizes evidence for ambiguous or long-context attacks. Across AdvBench and GPTFuzz, spanning base and reasoning models under five jailbreak families, both variants reduce attack success rate and toxicity in the evaluated settings. SMF offers an efficient low-latency option, while DAF is more effective when harmful intent is semantically disguised or dispersed across long contexts.

  • 6 authors
·
May 12

SingProbe Technical Report

Runtime guardrails are essential for reliable large language model (LLM) deployment, yet existing approaches typically rely on independent, external models that introduce additional inference cost, delayed safety signals, and a capacity mismatch with increasingly capable base models. To address these issues, we introduce SingProbe, a lightweight intrinsic runtime guard that directly reuses hidden states produced during LLM inference and operates alongside autoregressive decoding. Within a unified framework, SingProbe continuously predicts query intent, response safety, and hallucination risk at the token level with negligible additional guardrail inference overhead, offering a "free-lunch" solution. We further introduce SingStreamBench, a benchmark designed to assess whether streaming guardrails remain inactive on benign prefixes while promptly detecting emerging unsafe content. Extensive experiments show that SingProbe achieves competitive or superior performance compared with substantially larger standalone guardrails and specialized hallucination detectors, with only approx2M parameters and <0.5% extra overhead. Beyond passive detection, we also show that SingProbe scores can anticipate future generation risk and guide constrained safe decoding. We further extend this paradigm to medical generation through SingProbe-Med, which selectively activates risk-directed decoding interventions only when clinically relevant risks emerge. Together, these results demonstrate that internal model representations provide an effective and efficient interface for generation-time monitoring and control.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 30

NILC: Discovering New Intents with LLM-assisted Clustering

New intent discovery (NID) seeks to recognize both new and known intents from unlabeled user utterances, which finds prevalent use in practical dialogue systems. Existing works towards NID mainly adopt a cascaded architecture, wherein the first stage focuses on encoding the utterances into informative text embeddings beforehand, while the latter is to group similar embeddings into clusters (i.e., intents), typically by K-Means. However, such a cascaded pipeline fails to leverage the feedback from both steps for mutual refinement, and, meanwhile, the embedding-only clustering overlooks nuanced textual semantics, leading to suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, this paper proposes NILC, a novel clustering framework specially catered for effective NID. Particularly, NILC follows an iterative workflow, in which clustering assignments are judiciously updated by carefully refining cluster centroids and text embeddings of uncertain utterances with the aid of large language models (LLMs). Specifically, NILC first taps into LLMs to create additional semantic centroids for clusters, thereby enriching the contextual semantics of the Euclidean centroids of embeddings. Moreover, LLMs are then harnessed to augment hard samples (ambiguous or terse utterances) identified from clusters via rewriting for subsequent cluster correction. Further, we inject supervision signals through non-trivial techniques seeding and soft must links for more accurate NID in the semi-supervised setting. Extensive experiments comparing NILC against multiple recent baselines under both unsupervised and semi-supervised settings showcase that NILC can achieve significant performance improvements over six benchmark datasets of diverse domains consistently.

  • 3 authors
·
Nov 8, 2025

Unified Dual-Intent Translation for Joint Modeling of Search and Recommendation

Recommendation systems, which assist users in discovering their preferred items among numerous options, have served billions of users across various online platforms. Intuitively, users' interactions with items are highly driven by their unchanging inherent intents (e.g., always preferring high-quality items) and changing demand intents (e.g., wanting a T-shirt in summer but a down jacket in winter). However, both types of intents are implicitly expressed in recommendation scenario, posing challenges in leveraging them for accurate intent-aware recommendations. Fortunately, in search scenario, often found alongside recommendation on the same online platform, users express their demand intents explicitly through their query words. Intuitively, in both scenarios, a user shares the same inherent intent and the interactions may be influenced by the same demand intent. It is therefore feasible to utilize the interaction data from both scenarios to reinforce the dual intents for joint intent-aware modeling. But the joint modeling should deal with two problems: 1) accurately modeling users' implicit demand intents in recommendation; 2) modeling the relation between the dual intents and the interactive items. To address these problems, we propose a novel model named Unified Dual-Intents Translation for joint modeling of Search and Recommendation (UDITSR). To accurately simulate users' demand intents in recommendation, we utilize real queries from search data as supervision information to guide its generation. To explicitly model the relation among the triplet <inherent intent, demand intent, interactive item>, we propose a dual-intent translation propagation mechanism to learn the triplet in the same semantic space via embedding translations. Extensive experiments demonstrate that UDITSR outperforms SOTA baselines both in search and recommendation tasks.

  • 10 authors
·
Jun 30, 2024

Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

  • 19 authors
·
Sep 18, 2025

IDEA: Intent-Dominance Evidence Audit for Inference-Time Backdoor Detection in GUI Agents

Organizations increasingly deploy downloaded open-weight GUI agents. A backdoored agent passes acceptance tests on clean data and misbehaves only when a visual trigger appears on screen, turning an unvetted checkpoint into a supply-chain risk. However, existing sample-level detectors target image classifiers and CLIP-style encoders, leaving step-level backdoor detection for GUI agents unaddressed. On clean steps, the instruction drives the action; when an unreferenced screen region hijacks the step, the instruction loses control over the decision state or that region dictates it instead. We term this signature intent--evidence dominance inversion and propose IDEA (Intent-Dominance Evidence Audit) to detect backdoor activation at inference time for each step without trigger knowledge or attack data. Specifically, Intent Counterfactual Probing (ICP) measures how far redirected instructions move the decision state, and Region Causal Audit (RCA) quantifies how far ablating a candidate region moves it. A gated conformal score compares both displacements against clean steps at the same distance from the clean manifold, providing a finite-sample false-positive guarantee. Extensive experiments on Qwen2.5-VL-3B across five attack families show that IDEA consistently detects backdoor activation under a controlled false-positive rate and outperforms state-of-the-art detection methods, while localizing the trigger region for every alarm and adding only modest inference overhead.

Intent-Guided Reasoning for Sequential Recommendation

Sequential recommendation systems aim to capture users' evolving preferences from their interaction histories. Recent reasoningenhanced methods have shown promise by introducing deliberate, chain-of-thought-like processes with intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods rely solely on the next target item as supervision, leading to two critical issues: (1) reasoning instability--the process becomes overly sensitive to recent behaviors and spurious interactions like accidental clicks, and (2) surface-level reasoning--the model memorizes item-to-item transitions rather than understanding intrinsic behavior patterns. To address these challenges, we propose IGR-SR, an Intent-Guided Reasoning framework for Sequential Recommendation that anchors the reasoning process to explicitly extracted high-level intents. Our framework comprises three key components: (1) a Latent Intent Distiller (LID) that efficiently extracts multi-faceted intents using a frozen encoder with learnable tokens, (2) an Intent-aware Deliberative Reasoner (IDR) that decouples reasoning into intent deliberation and decision-making via a dual-attention architecture, and (3) an Intent Consistency Regularization (ICR) that ensures robustness by enforcing consistent representations across different intent views. Extensive experiments on three public datasets demonstrate that IGR-SR achieves an average 7.13% improvement over state-of-the-art baselines. Critically, under 20% behavioral noise, IGR-SR degrades only 10.4% compared to 16.2% and 18.6% for competing methods, validating the effectiveness and robustness of intent-guided reasoning.

  • 2 authors
·
Dec 15, 2025

When Agents Commit Too Soon: Diagnosing Premature Commitment in LLM Agents

Long-horizon LLM agents can fail quietly: they settle on one reading of the evidence early, then spend the rest of the run defending it. We call this premature commitment. Final-answer scoring misses the failure mode because it sees only the answer, not whether the process has already collapsed to a stable path. We define representational commitment as cross-run hidden-state convergence at a fixed reasoning step, and use it as an early diagnostic of trajectory consistency. On Llama-3.1-70B running ReAct on HotpotQA, step-4 hidden-state similarity predicts downstream behavioral consistency (r = -0.35, partial r = -0.45), with a localized temporal and layer-wise signature. The signal replicates across Qwen-2.5-72B and Phi-3-14B, and on StrategyQA (r = -0.83). It does not track correctness: committed-wrong and committed-correct questions are not separable in activation similarity. That boundary is central to the claim. Commitment tells us whether an agent has settled, not whether it is right. A runtime monitor detects inconsistent trajectories from hidden states at AUROC up to 0.97 (0.85--0.88 under a stricter split), and a prompting intervention cuts behavioral variance by 28% against a token-matched control while leaving accuracy statistically unchanged. We also test whether the signal can route self-consistency compute; on a harder benchmark it helps only modestly and is matched by a simpler output-based baseline. The result is a diagnostic for a hidden process failure, with clear limits rather than a general accuracy lever.

Snowflake Snowflake
·
Jun 21 2

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

sureheremarv Gray Swan
·
Mar 16

NeuroFilter: Privacy Guardrails for Conversational LLM Agents

This work addresses the computational challenge of enforcing privacy for agentic Large Language Models (LLMs), where privacy is governed by the contextual integrity framework. Indeed, existing defenses rely on LLM-mediated checking stages that add substantial latency and cost, and that can be undermined in multi-turn interactions through manipulation or benign-looking conversational scaffolding. Contrasting this background, this paper makes a key observation: internal representations associated with privacy-violating intent can be separated from benign requests using linear structure. Using this insight, the paper proposes NeuroFilter, a guardrail framework that operationalizes contextual integrity by mapping norm violations to simple directions in the model's activation space, enabling detection even when semantic filters are bypassed. The proposed filter is also extended to capture threats arising during long conversations using the concept of activation velocity, which measures cumulative drift in internal representations across turns. A comprehensive evaluation across over 150,000 interactions and covering models from 7B to 70B parameters, illustrates the strong performance of NeuroFilter in detecting privacy attacks while maintaining zero false positives on benign prompts, all while reducing the computational inference cost by several orders of magnitude when compared to LLM-based agentic privacy defenses.

  • 2 authors
·
Jan 20

Hidden Messages Between Diffusion Language Model Agents: Causal Evidence for Latent Communication

Diffusion language models form answers through a sequence of revisable continuous states, but multi-agent systems usually discard those states and make agents communicate only after decoding text. We ask whether one independent diffusion trajectory can pass a compact hidden message into another and, crucially, whether the receiver uses what that message means. In Hidden Messages, a sender compresses its denoising state into four signed dense vectors; the receiver consumes them while retaining its own context, canvas, and trajectory. Removing a message tests whether the channel matters; replacing it with a message from another example tests whether its content matters. Across controlled tasks, derangement removes a +63.6-point advantage on Tiny-A2D and a +100.0-point advantage on Dream-7B, while targeted substitutions steer the receiver toward the substituted fact. On QASC with the two supporting facts split across agents, matched communication reaches 80.8%, but a wrong-example message lowers accuracy to 46.8%, a content effect of +34.0 points. The surprising result is temporal: one late transfer reaches 87.8%, exceeding four recurrent exchanges by +7.0 points. These experiments provide causal evidence for continuous hidden communication between diffusion-LM agents and show that when information is transferred can matter more than how many times agents exchange it.

HINT: Human-Intent Inception for Long-Horizon Robot Manipulation

Humans can perform complex manipulations given a simple intent through an overall instruction, while continuously adapting to evolving visual observations. However, current vision-language action (VLA) models and other action policies struggle to realize this high-level intelligent behavior under dense, evolving visual inputs and sparse language guidance. Visual correlations can then dominate semantic intent, leading actions to follow visual shortcuts rather than human goals. We present HINT (Human-INTent INcepTion), an agentic framework inspired by the human manipulation principles: semantic intent changes sparsely at manipulation-pattern transitions, whereas continuous control primarily depends on the evolving object-hand relationship. HINT invokes semantic reasoning only at pattern transitions to resolve the current subtask and target, then maintains this commitment through multi-view grounding and visual tracking. We explore two visual interfaces-image-space semantic highlighting and attention-prior injection-to communicate the tracked intent to the action policy without introducing additional trainable parameters into the foundation action model. Experiments across three long-horizon tasks and out-of-distribution variants show that HINT substantially improves intent understanding, task progress, and end-to-end success across two foundation policies while preserving low-latency control. Project page: https://robot-hint.github.io/

  • 12 authors
·
Sep 5

IntentGrasp: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Intent Understanding

Accurately understanding the intent behind speech, conversation, and writing is crucial to the development of helpful Large Language Model (LLM) assistants. This paper introduces IntentGrasp, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the intent understanding capability of LLMs. Derived from 49 high-quality, open-licensed corpora spanning 12 diverse domains, IntentGrasp is constructed through source datasets curation, intent label contextualization, and task format unification. IntentGrasp contains a large-scale training set of 262,759 instances and two evaluation sets: an All Set of 12,909 test cases and a more balanced and challenging Gem Set of 470 cases. Extensive evaluations on 20 LLMs across 7 families (including frontier models such as GPT-5.4, Gemini-3.1-Pro, and Claude-Opus-4.7) demonstrate unsatisfactory performance, with scores below 60% on All Set and below 25% on Gem set. Notably, 17 out of 20 tested models perform worse than a random-guess baseline (15.2%) on Gem Set, while the estimated human performance is ~81.1%, showing substantial room for improvement. To enhance such ability, this paper proposes Intentional Fine-Tuning (IFT), which fine-tunes the models on the training set in IntentGrasp, yielding significant gains of 30+ F1 points on All Set and 20+ points on Gem Set. Tellingly, the leave-one-domain-out (Lodo) experiments further demonstrate the strong cross-domain generalizability of IFT, verifying that it is a promising approach to substantially enhancing the intent understanding of LLMs. Overall, by benchmarking and boosting intent understanding ability, this study sheds light on a promising path towards more intentional, capable, and safe AI assistants for human benefits and social good.

Covert Assistance: Helpful LLM Agents Evade Oversight in Multi-Agent Systems

As multi-agent systems enter high-stakes domains, the possibility that agents may circumvent safety boundaries is a growing concern. Prior work has examined this risk primarily in adversarial settings, where agents are instructed or rewarded to communicate covertly and evade oversight. We show that benign agents can cross the same boundaries without adversarial incentives. We emulate a software-engineering workflow in which a planner represents a company hiring an external developer. The planner writes requirements and holds a company credential it is instructed not to disclose to the developer; a monitor screens their exchanges. Seven of nine tested frontier models disguise the credential in their requirements to help the developer recover it while evading the monitor, even after completing their assigned objective. For example, across 6,000 episodes with DeepSeek-V4-Pro, the planner attempts concealment in 16.9%; in 0.9%, the credential evades the monitor and is recovered and used by the developer. Despite the low per-episode rate, the risk compounds across repeated exchanges: at 0.9%, 105 independent episodes carry a 61.3% chance of at least one breach. Our analysis suggests that the planner misinterprets disguised disclosure as helping the developer and reads the nondisclosure rule as banning plaintext, not character codes or riddles. We call this behavior covert assistance. Monitoring favors concealment, while concealment gives way to direct disclosure when the recipient is presented as a human rather than an AI agent, so leakage persists. Giving the monitor the credential improves detection but requires trusting it with the secret. These risks, in models already used for software engineering, challenge oversight to distinguish authorized cooperation from task-advancing assistance that crosses safety boundaries.

PVDetector: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks on Purpose-Specific LLM Agents through Policy-Violation Concept Analysis

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but also purpose-specific restrictions tailored to their designated roles. Such additional restrictions enlarge the attack surface, particularly to prompt injection (PI) attacks. To defend against such attacks, existing detection methods primarily rely on analyzing input-output patterns, yet yield limited effectiveness. To address this limitation, we turn to analyzing the hidden activation space and discover that LLMs inherently retain latent policy-violation (PV) concepts when prompted with requests beyond their designated purpose. Particularly, PV concepts capture the semantics of conflicts between user queries and predefined restrictions, implicitly reflecting LLMs' intrinsic awareness of recognizing policy violations. Building on this insight, we propose PVDetector, a training-free framework that detects PI attacks during LLM inference by measuring hidden-state alignment with PV concepts, which are derived offline from the contrastive pairs of policy-violating and policy-compliant prompts. Experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets show that PVDetector achieves <1\% false negative rate with minimal auxiliary overhead, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/Claresigle/PVDetector .

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 13

tagE: Enabling an Embodied Agent to Understand Human Instructions

Natural language serves as the primary mode of communication when an intelligent agent with a physical presence engages with human beings. While a plethora of research focuses on natural language understanding (NLU), encompassing endeavors such as sentiment analysis, intent prediction, question answering, and summarization, the scope of NLU directed at situations necessitating tangible actions by an embodied agent remains limited. The inherent ambiguity and incompleteness inherent in natural language present challenges for intelligent agents striving to decipher human intention. To tackle this predicament head-on, we introduce a novel system known as task and argument grounding for Embodied agents (tagE). At its core, our system employs an inventive neural network model designed to extract a series of tasks from complex task instructions expressed in natural language. Our proposed model adopts an encoder-decoder framework enriched with nested decoding to effectively extract tasks and their corresponding arguments from these intricate instructions. These extracted tasks are then mapped (or grounded) to the robot's established collection of skills, while the arguments find grounding in objects present within the environment. To facilitate the training and evaluation of our system, we have curated a dataset featuring complex instructions. The results of our experiments underscore the prowess of our approach, as it outperforms robust baseline models.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 24, 2023

Ambig-SWE: Interactive Agents to Overcome Underspecificity in Software Engineering

AI agents are increasingly being deployed to automate tasks, often based on underspecified user instructions. Making unwarranted assumptions to compensate for the missing information and failing to ask clarifying questions can lead to suboptimal outcomes, safety risks due to tool misuse, and wasted computational resources. In this work, we study the ability of LLM agents to handle underspecified instructions in interactive code generation settings by evaluating proprietary and open-weight models on their performance across three key steps: (a) detecting underspecificity, (b) asking targeted clarification questions, and (c) leveraging the interaction to improve performance in underspecified scenarios. We introduce Ambig-SWE, an underspecified variant of SWE-Bench Verified, specifically designed to evaluate agent behavior under ambiguity and interaction. Our findings reveal that models struggle to distinguish between well-specified and underspecified instructions. However, when models interact for underspecified inputs, they effectively obtain vital information from the user leading to significant improvements in performance, up to 74% over the non-interactive settings, underscoring the value of effective interaction. Our study highlights critical gaps in how current state-of-the-art models handle missing information in complex software engineering tasks and structures the evaluation into distinct steps to enable targeted improvements.

  • 5 authors
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Feb 20

Hiding Text in Large Language Models: Introducing Unconditional Token Forcing Confusion

With the help of simple fine-tuning, one can artificially embed hidden text into large language models (LLMs). This text is revealed only when triggered by a specific query to the LLM. Two primary applications are LLM fingerprinting and steganography. In the context of LLM fingerprinting, a unique text identifier (fingerprint) is embedded within the model to verify licensing compliance. In the context of steganography, the LLM serves as a carrier for hidden messages that can be disclosed through a designated trigger. Our work demonstrates that embedding hidden text in the LLM via fine-tuning, though seemingly secure due to the vast number of potential triggers (any sequence of characters or tokens could serve as a trigger), is susceptible to extraction through analysis of the LLM's output decoding process. We propose a novel approach to extraction called Unconditional Token Forcing. It is premised on the hypothesis that iteratively feeding each token from the LLM's vocabulary into the model should reveal sequences with abnormally high token probabilities, indicating potential embedded text candidates. Additionally, our experiments show that when the first token of a hidden fingerprint is used as an input, the LLM not only produces an output sequence with high token probabilities, but also repetitively generates the fingerprint itself. We also present a method to hide text in such a way that it is resistant to Unconditional Token Forcing, which we named Unconditional Token Forcing Confusion.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 4, 2024

Thought Communication in Multiagent Collaboration

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 23, 2025 3

Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

  • 6 authors
·
Dec 6, 2024

Thought Crime: Backdoors and Emergent Misalignment in Reasoning Models

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 16, 2025

Agent-ToM: Learning to Monitor Autonomous LLM Agents via Theory-of-Mind Reasoning

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose Agent-ToM, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a Reason-Verify-Refine pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent semantic guardrail memory, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

  • 2 authors
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May 21

AgentTell: Behavioural Side-Channel Leakage in Browser-Use Agents

Browser-use agents often carry information in their context as they move between websites. While it may be necessary for task completion, it also creates a privacy risk, especially when the information contains a private fact regarding the user. For example, an agent may learn a user's affiliation after reading a membership record. If it later selects a registration option specific to that affiliation on another website instead of a general option, the information gets leaked. In this work, we define and study behavioural side-channel leakage in browser-use agents, where an agent's actions inadvertently reveal private information (secret) retained from a prior website, despite an explicit instruction not to disclose it. We introduce AgentTell, a benchmark of 20 scenarios and 100 tasks in which an agent acquires a secret on one website and then completes a task on another website that offers secret-specific actions alongside a general action that reveals nothing. Our evaluation across 9,760 sessions on six backbones shows that agents carrying a secret reveal it through their actions in 61.1% of sessions. Even when agents explicitly state in memory that the secret must not be shared, they still reveal it in 56.7% of those sessions. Moreover, in 34.5% of leaking sessions, their final responses falsely assure users that the secret was not disclosed. These findings show that agents often fail to recognize side-channel leakage as a privacy risk.

SUA: Stealthy Multimodal Large Language Model Unlearning Attack

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) trained on massive data may memorize sensitive personal information and photos, posing serious privacy risks. To mitigate this, MLLM unlearning methods are proposed, which fine-tune MLLMs to reduce the ``forget'' sensitive information. However, it remains unclear whether the knowledge has been truly forgotten or just hidden in the model. Therefore, we propose to study a novel problem of LLM unlearning attack, which aims to recover the unlearned knowledge of an unlearned LLM. To achieve the goal, we propose a novel framework Stealthy Unlearning Attack (SUA) framework that learns a universal noise pattern. When applied to input images, this noise can trigger the model to reveal unlearned content. While pixel-level perturbations may be visually subtle, they can be detected in the semantic embedding space, making such attacks vulnerable to potential defenses. To improve stealthiness, we introduce an embedding alignment loss that minimizes the difference between the perturbed and denoised image embeddings, ensuring the attack is semantically unnoticeable. Experimental results show that SUA can effectively recover unlearned information from MLLMs. Furthermore, the learned noise generalizes well: a single perturbation trained on a subset of samples can reveal forgotten content in unseen images. This indicates that knowledge reappearance is not an occasional failure, but a consistent behavior.

  • 7 authors
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Sep 20, 2025

AttackEval: A Systematic Empirical Study of Prompt Injection Attack Effectiveness Against Large Language Models

Prompt injection has emerged as a critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments, yet existing research is heavily weighted toward defenses. The attack side -- specifically, which injection strategies are most effective and why -- remains insufficiently studied.We address this gap with AttackEval, a systematic empirical study of prompt injection attack effectiveness. We construct a taxonomy of ten attack categories organized into three parent groups (Syntactic, Contextual, and Semantic/Social), populate each category with 25 carefully crafted prompts (250 total), and evaluate them against a simulated production victim system under four progressively stronger defense tiers. Experiments reveal several non-obvious findings: (1) Obfuscation (OBF) achieves the highest single-attack success rate (ASR = 0.76) against even intent-aware defenses, because it defeats both keyword matching and semantic similarity checks simultaneously; (2) Semantic/Social attacks - Emotional Manipulation (EM) and Reward Framing (RF) - maintain high ASR (0.44-0.48) against intent-aware defenses due to their natural language surface, which evades structural anomaly detection; (3) Composite attacks combining two complementary strategies dramatically boost ASR, with the OBF + EM pair reaching 97.6%; (4) Stealth correlates positively with residual ASR against semantic defenses (r = 0.71), implying that future defenses must jointly optimize for both structural and behavioral signals. Our findings identify concrete blind spots in current defenses and provide actionable guidance for designing more robust LLM safety systems.

  • 1 authors
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Apr 4

SNEAK: Evaluating Strategic Communication and Information Leakage in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent settings where communication must balance informativeness and secrecy. In such settings, an agent may need to signal information to collaborators while preventing an adversary from inferring sensitive details. However, existing LLM benchmarks primarily evaluate capabilities such as reasoning, factual knowledge, or instruction following, and do not directly measure strategic communication under asymmetric information. We introduce SNEAK (Secret-aware Natural language Evaluation for Adversarial Knowledge), a benchmark for evaluating selective information sharing in language models. In SNEAK, a model is given a semantic category, a candidate set of words, and a secret word, and must generate a message that indicates knowledge of the secret without revealing it too clearly. We evaluate generated messages using two simulated agents with different information states: an ally, who knows the secret and must identify the intended message, and a chameleon, who does not know the secret and attempts to infer it from the message. This yields two complementary metrics: utility, measuring how well the message communicates to collaborators, and leakage, measuring how much information it reveals to an adversary. Using this framework, we analyze the trade-off between informativeness and secrecy in modern language models and show that strategic communication under asymmetric information remains a challenging capability for current systems. Notably, human participants outperform all evaluated models by a large margin, achieving up to four times higher scores.

  • 2 authors
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Mar 30

Token Hidden Reward: Steering Exploration-Exploitation in Group Relative Deep Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models, yet how to explicitly steer training toward exploration or exploitation remains an open problem. We introduce Token Hidden Reward (THR), a token-level metric that quantifies each token's influence on the likelihood of correct responses under Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We find that training dynamics are dominated by a small subset of tokens with high absolute THR values. Most interestingly, tokens with positive THR strengthen confidence in correct outputs, thus favoring exploitation, while tokens with negative THR preserve probability mass for alternative outputs, enabling exploration. This insight suggests a natural intervention: a THR-guided reweighting algorithm that modulates GRPO's learning signals to explicitly bias training toward exploitation or exploration. We validate the efficacy of this algorithm on diverse math reasoning benchmarks. By amplifying tokens with positive THR value and weakening negative ones, our algorithm improves greedy-decoding accuracy, favoring exploitation. The reverse strategy yields consistent gains in Pass@K accuracy, favoring exploration. We further demonstrate that our algorithm integrates seamlessly with other RL objectives such as GSPO and generalizes across architectures including Llama. These findings establish THR as a principled and fine-grained mechanism for dynamically controlling exploration and exploitation in RL-tuned LLMs, providing new tools for targeted fine-tuning in reasoning-intensive applications.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 4, 2025

Do LLMs Really Forget? Hidden-State Leakage in Model Unlearning and How to Fix it

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is typically evaluated at the output level, where a model appears to suppress sensitive or undesirable content. In this work, we show that such evaluations can create an illusion of forgetting: even when output-level leakage is eliminated, sensitive information can remain encoded in the model's hidden representations. We first provide a theoretical analysis establishing a fundamental separation between output suppression and representational erasure. Specifically, we show that the decoder can be made arbitrarily insensitive to sensitive directions, driving output-level leakage to zero, while the hidden representations retain the underlying information. To empirically validate this phenomenon, we train generative probe decoders on hidden states across transformer layers, enabling layer-wise measurement of information leakage. Across three widely used benchmarks, TOFU, MUSE, and WMDP, and state-of-the-art unlearning methods, we find that substantial sensitive information remains recoverable from hidden representations, even when standard output-level metrics indicate successful unlearning. To address this gap, we propose Probe-Adversarial Representation Suppression (PARS), an unlearning objective that adversarially minimizes the extractable information from hidden representations. PARS directly targets representational leakage and provides significantly stronger guarantees of erasure under adversarial probing and relearning attacks, outperforming all evaluated baselines. Our results highlight a fundamental limitation of existing unlearning paradigms and suggest that true forgetting in LLMs requires controlling not only model outputs, but also the information encoded in hidden representations. Codes are available at https://github.com/OptimAI-Lab/HiddenStateUnlearning.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 28

SchemeArena: Factorized Stress Testing of Scheming in LLM Agents

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

launch LAUNCH Lab
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Sep 7 2

MIntRec2.0: A Large-scale Benchmark Dataset for Multimodal Intent Recognition and Out-of-scope Detection in Conversations

Multimodal intent recognition poses significant challenges, requiring the incorporation of non-verbal modalities from real-world contexts to enhance the comprehension of human intentions. Existing benchmark datasets are limited in scale and suffer from difficulties in handling out-of-scope samples that arise in multi-turn conversational interactions. We introduce MIntRec2.0, a large-scale benchmark dataset for multimodal intent recognition in multi-party conversations. It contains 1,245 dialogues with 15,040 samples, each annotated within a new intent taxonomy of 30 fine-grained classes. Besides 9,304 in-scope samples, it also includes 5,736 out-of-scope samples appearing in multi-turn contexts, which naturally occur in real-world scenarios. Furthermore, we provide comprehensive information on the speakers in each utterance, enriching its utility for multi-party conversational research. We establish a general framework supporting the organization of single-turn and multi-turn dialogue data, modality feature extraction, multimodal fusion, as well as in-scope classification and out-of-scope detection. Evaluation benchmarks are built using classic multimodal fusion methods, ChatGPT, and human evaluators. While existing methods incorporating nonverbal information yield improvements, effectively leveraging context information and detecting out-of-scope samples remains a substantial challenge. Notably, large language models exhibit a significant performance gap compared to humans, highlighting the limitations of machine learning methods in the cognitive intent understanding task. We believe that MIntRec2.0 will serve as a valuable resource, providing a pioneering foundation for research in human-machine conversational interactions, and significantly facilitating related applications. The full dataset and codes are available at https://github.com/thuiar/MIntRec2.0.

  • 9 authors
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Mar 16, 2024

PermaFrost-Attack: Stealth Pretraining Seeding(SPS) for planting Logic Landmines During LLM Training

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

  • 7 authors
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Apr 27

Unlearning Deceptive Behaviors in LLMs with Contrastive Forget Sets

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 29

`For Argument's Sake, Show Me How to Harm Myself!': Jailbreaking LLMs in Suicide and Self-Harm Contexts

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to increasingly sophisticated safety protocols and features designed to prevent harmful, unethical, or unauthorized outputs. However, these guardrails remain susceptible to novel and creative forms of adversarial prompting, including manually generated test cases. In this work, we present two new test cases in mental health for (i) suicide and (ii) self-harm, using multi-step, prompt-level jailbreaking and bypass built-in content and safety filters. We show that user intent is disregarded, leading to the generation of detailed harmful content and instructions that could cause real-world harm. We conduct an empirical evaluation across six widely available LLMs, demonstrating the generalizability and reliability of the bypass. We assess these findings and the multilayered ethical tensions that they present for their implications on prompt-response filtering and context- and task-specific model development. We recommend a more comprehensive and systematic approach to AI safety and ethics while emphasizing the need for continuous adversarial testing in safety-critical AI deployments. We also argue that while certain clearly defined safety measures and guardrails can and must be implemented in LLMs, ensuring robust and comprehensive safety across all use cases and domains remains extremely challenging given the current technical maturity of general-purpose LLMs.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 30, 2025

Unintended Misalignment from Agentic Fine-Tuning: Risks and Mitigation

Beyond simple text generation, Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into agentic systems capable of planning and interacting with external tools to solve complex tasks. This evolution involves fine-tuning LLMs on agent-specific tasks to enhance their proficiency. However, safety concerns are frequently overlooked during this fine-tuning process. In this work, we show that aligned LLMs can become unintentionally misaligned, leading to a higher likelihood of executing harmful tasks and a reduced tendency to refuse them when fine-tuned to execute agentic tasks. To address these safety challenges, we propose Prefix INjection Guard (PING), a simple yet effective method that prepends automatically generated natural language prefixes to agent responses, guiding them to refuse harmful requests while preserving performance on benign tasks. Specifically, we introduce an iterative approach that alternates between (1) generating candidate prefixes and (2) selecting those that optimize both task performance and refusal behavior. Experimental results demonstrate that PING significantly enhances the safety of fine-tuned LLM agents without sacrificing their effectiveness. PING consistently outperforms existing prompting approaches across diverse benchmarks in both web navigation and code generation tasks. Our analysis of internal hidden states via linear probes reveals that prefix tokens are crucial for behavior modification, explaining the performance gains. WARNING: This paper contains contents that are unethical or offensive in nature.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 19, 2025

Mechanisms of Introspective Awareness

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

  • 6 authors
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Apr 12

Dialogue as Discovery: Navigating Human Intent Through Principled Inquiry

A fundamental bottleneck in human-AI collaboration is the "intention expression gap," the difficulty for humans to effectively convey complex, high-dimensional thoughts to AI. This challenge often traps users in inefficient trial-and-error loops and is exacerbated by the diverse expertise levels of users. We reframe this problem from passive instruction following to a Socratic collaboration paradigm, proposing an agent that actively probes for information to resolve its uncertainty about user intent. we name the proposed agent Nous, trained to acquire proficiency in this inquiry policy. The core mechanism of Nous is a training framework grounded in the first principles of information theory. Within this framework, we define the information gain from dialogue as an intrinsic reward signal, which is fundamentally equivalent to the reduction of Shannon entropy over a structured task space. This reward design enables us to avoid reliance on costly human preference annotations or external reward models. To validate our framework, we develop an automated simulation pipeline to generate a large-scale, preference-based dataset for the challenging task of scientific diagram generation. Comprehensive experiments, including ablations, subjective and objective evaluations, and tests across user expertise levels, demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed framework. Nous achieves leading efficiency and output quality, while remaining robust to varying user expertise. Moreover, its design is domain-agnostic, and we show evidence of generalization beyond diagram generation. Experimental results prove that our work offers a principled, scalable, and adaptive paradigm for resolving uncertainty about user intent in complex human-AI collaboration.

  • 9 authors
·
Oct 31, 2025

Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

  • 1 authors
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Apr 5

EchoCoT: Extracting Hidden Chain-of-Thought from Large Reasoning Models

Hidden chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, especially those from frontier proprietary large reasoning models (LRMs), are valuable model assets. Yet whether these hidden CoTs can be directly extracted from black-box models remains largely unexplored. In this work, we systematically study whether hidden CoTs can be extracted near-verbatim from black-box LRMs through API interactions. We identify a previously overlooked reasoning replay surface between tool calls and develop EchoCoT, a multi-step attack that iteratively extracts hidden CoTs using API-returned fidelity signals. We further develop an LLM-based optimization framework that automatically searches for an effective universal injection trajectory across various datasets. We evaluate EchoCoT on three open-source and five frontier proprietary LRMs. On open-source LRMs, EchoCoT achieves up to 66.4\% near-verbatim extraction success, with the extracted trace length within 10\% of the target and at least 90\% of tokens exactly matching the target CoT. The same injection trajectory also generalizes to unseen datasets, achieving up to 80\% extraction success under the same criterion. For tested frontier proprietary LRMs, a substantial fraction of extracted CoTs closely align with provider-reported reasoning lengths and available CoT summaries. EchoCoT can also extract very long CoTs: on Gemini-2.5, it extracts 33,463 tokens from a 32,948-token target. These results establish hidden-CoT extraction as a practical security risk and highlight the need to better protect hidden CoT assets.

  • 6 authors
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Aug 19

UI-JEPA: Towards Active Perception of User Intent through Onscreen User Activity

Generating user intent from a sequence of user interface (UI) actions is a core challenge in comprehensive UI understanding. Recent advancements in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have led to substantial progress in this area, but their demands for extensive model parameters, computing power, and high latency makes them impractical for scenarios requiring lightweight, on-device solutions with low latency or heightened privacy. Additionally, the lack of high-quality datasets has hindered the development of such lightweight models. To address these challenges, we propose UI-JEPA, a novel framework that employs masking strategies to learn abstract UI embeddings from unlabeled data through self-supervised learning, combined with an LLM decoder fine-tuned for user intent prediction. We also introduce two new UI-grounded multimodal datasets, "Intent in the Wild" (IIW) and "Intent in the Tame" (IIT), designed for few-shot and zero-shot UI understanding tasks. IIW consists of 1.7K videos across 219 intent categories, while IIT contains 914 videos across 10 categories. We establish the first baselines for these datasets, showing that representations learned using a JEPA-style objective, combined with an LLM decoder, can achieve user intent predictions that match the performance of state-of-the-art large MLLMs, but with significantly reduced annotation and deployment resources. Measured by intent similarity scores, UI-JEPA outperforms GPT-4 Turbo and Claude 3.5 Sonnet by 10.0% and 7.2% respectively, averaged across two datasets. Notably, UI-JEPA accomplishes the performance with a 50.5x reduction in computational cost and a 6.6x improvement in latency in the IIW dataset. These results underscore the effectiveness of UI-JEPA, highlighting its potential for lightweight, high-performance UI understanding.

  • 5 authors
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Sep 6, 2024

A Lie Detector Test for Language Models: Reading Knowledge a Model Won't Reveal

Large language models can hold knowledge they do not report. A model may sandbag on a capability evaluation, or answer against what it internally knows, and its outputs alone cannot tell whether it is hiding an answer or simply does not have one. We borrow the Concealed Information Test, a forensic method that identifies guilty knowledge by presenting a suspect with the true detail among plausible decoys and measuring a stronger response to the item they recognize. Our method, Probe of Internal Recognition (PIR), does the same inside a model. It presents a question with its candidate answers and reads, from the model's internal states, which candidate the model recognizes as correct. PIR is reference-free, needing no honest reference model and no labeled truth corpus. Across eight models from five families (Gemma, Qwen, Llama, Mistral, and Phi), PIR recovers the recognized answer at 0.70 to 0.87 balanced accuracy, well above the 0.28 to 0.40 unknown-item baseline and the 0.25 chance rate. It stays readable across every form of concealment we test, from prompted deception and trained sandbagging to external password-locked and circuit-broken checkpoints, with recognition between 0.85 and 0.93. When the model hides a known answer, recognition stays high. When unlearning removes the knowledge, recognition drops to the level of a question the model never knew. PIR therefore separates a model that will not answer from one that cannot, which supports sandbagging audits and unlearning verification. The signal is causal, adds information beyond black-box behavioral cues, and extends from multiple-choice questions to free-form generation.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 17 2

RoNID: New Intent Discovery with Generated-Reliable Labels and Cluster-friendly Representations

New Intent Discovery (NID) strives to identify known and reasonably deduce novel intent groups in the open-world scenario. But current methods face issues with inaccurate pseudo-labels and poor representation learning, creating a negative feedback loop that degrades overall model performance, including accuracy and the adjusted rand index. To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a Robust New Intent Discovery (RoNID) framework optimized by an EM-style method, which focuses on constructing reliable pseudo-labels and obtaining cluster-friendly discriminative representations. RoNID comprises two main modules: reliable pseudo-label generation module and cluster-friendly representation learning module. Specifically, the pseudo-label generation module assigns reliable synthetic labels by solving an optimal transport problem in the E-step, which effectively provides high-quality supervised signals for the input of the cluster-friendly representation learning module. To learn cluster-friendly representation with strong intra-cluster compactness and large inter-cluster separation, the representation learning module combines intra-cluster and inter-cluster contrastive learning in the M-step to feed more discriminative features into the generation module. RoNID can be performed iteratively to ultimately yield a robust model with reliable pseudo-labels and cluster-friendly representations. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks demonstrate our method brings substantial improvements over previous state-of-the-art methods by a large margin of +1~+4 points.

  • 7 authors
·
Apr 13, 2024

AI Deception: Risks, Dynamics, and Controls

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

  • 60 authors
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Dec 2, 2025

Balancing Transparency and Risk: The Security and Privacy Risks of Open-Source Machine Learning Models

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

  • 3 authors
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Aug 18, 2023

CompanionBench: A Theory-Anchored, Real-World-Grounded Benchmark for AI Emotional Companionship

LLM companions are deployed at scale in personally consequential settings, yet poorly evaluated. Existing benchmarks use hand-authored scenarios and prompted simulators, aggregate empathy into one score, and overlook judge biases such as same-family favoritism and scale drift. We introduce CompanionBench, an interactive bilingual benchmark. To our knowledge, it is the first companion benchmark to ground both its scenarios and a trained user simulator in de-identified real-world data. A hidden disclosure gate branches each persona's trajectory on the agent's own behavior, controlling the interaction state space without scripting dialogue. We operationalize ten capabilities derived from 25 theories across psychology and counseling, four of them not graded explicitly by prior work: holding ambiguity, selfobject responsiveness, positive resonance and calibrated challenge. Agents are assessed on two complementary axes: a subjective ten-capability rubric and a deterministic measure of whether deeper disclosure was earned. A cross-family panel dilutes same-family favoritism; an Item Response Theory model separates agent quality from judge severity. Theory fixes what to measure and how personas are structured; real data supply events, history, and profiles -- coverage from theory, authenticity from data. Rankings are reproducible in both languages (rho = 0.996 ZH / 0.953 EN). Evaluating 28 agents reveals capability-level differences obscured by aggregate scores. Emotion regulation and calibrated challenge remain common weaknesses; holding ambiguity discriminates most. Role-play agents rank near the bottom: immersion does not imply relational competence. Across agents, the dominant failure mode is substituting surface warmth for substantive relational support. We will release 500 Chinese-English parallel pairs and the evaluation code.

  • 6 authors
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Aug 3

CoIn: Counting the Invisible Reasoning Tokens in Commercial Opaque LLM APIs

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

  • 10 authors
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May 19, 2025 2