Daily Papers

Large language models can generate code and call tools with remarkable fluency, yet deploying them as practical software engineering assistants still expose stubborn gaps: finite context windows, single mistakes that derail entire sessions, agents that get stuck in dead ends, AI slop, and generated changes that are difficult to review or revert. We present KISS Sorcar, a general-purpose assistant and integrated development environment (IDE) built on top of the KISS Agent Framework, a stupidly-simple AI agent framework of roughly 1,850 lines of code. The framework addresses these gaps using a robust system prompt and through a five-layer agent hierarchy in which each layer adds exactly one concern: budget-tracked ReAct execution, automatic continuation across sub-sessions via summarization, coding, and browser tools with parallel sub-agents, persistent multi-turn chat with history recall, and git worktree isolation so every task runs on its own branch. To assess the power of the KISS agent framework, we implemented KISS Sorcar as a free, open-source Visual Studio Code extension that runs locally and effectively for long-horizon tasks, and supports browser automation, multimodal input, and Docker containers. In this research, we deliberately prioritize output quality over latency: giving a frontier model adequate time to validate its own output -- running linters, type checkers, and tests -- dramatically reduces the low-quality code that plagues faster but less thorough agents. The entire system was built using itself in 4.5 months, providing a continuous stress test in which any agent-introduced bug immediately impairs its own ability to work. On Terminal Bench 2.0, KISS Sorcar achieves a 62.2% overall pass rate with Claude Opus 4.6, comparing favorably to Claude Code (58%) and Cursor Composer 2 (61.7).

Recent advances in multi-agent systems have shown great potential for solving complex tasks. However, when multiple agents edit a shared codebase concurrently, their changes can silently conflict and inconsistent views lead to integration failures. Existing multi-agent systems address this through workspace isolation (e.g., one git worktree per agent), but this defers conflict resolution to a post-hoc merge step where recovery is expensive. In this paper, we propose STORM, i.e., STate-ORiented Management for multi-agent collaboration. Specifically, STORM manages agent states by mediating their interactions with the shared workspace, ensuring that each agent operates on a consistent view of the codebase and that conflicting edits are detected and resolved at write time. We evaluate STORM on Commit0 and PaperBench across multiple LLMs. STORM outperforms the git-worktree-based multi-agent baseline by +18.7 on Commit0-Lite and +1.4 on PaperBench, while achieving comparable or better cost efficiency. Combined with single-agent runs, STORM reaches highest scores of 87.6 and 78.2 on the two benchmarks respectively, suggesting that explicit state management is a more effective foundation for multi-agent collaboration than workspace isolation. STORM can also be plugged into any multi-agent system seamlessly.

AI agents have become increasingly capable at isolated software engineering (SWE) tasks such as resolving issues on Github. Yet long-horizon tasks involving multiple interdependent subtasks still pose challenges both with respect to accuracy, and with respect to timely completion. A natural approach to solving these long-horizon tasks in a timely manner is asynchronous multi-agent collaboration, where multiple agents work on different parts of the task at the same time. But effective application of multi-agent systems has proven surprisingly difficult: concurrent edits by multiple agents interfere with each other, dependencies are difficult to synchronize, and combining partial progress into a coherent whole is challenging. On the other hand, human developers have long relied on mature collaboration infrastructure to manage these challenges in large software projects. Inspired by these collaboration primitives, we introduce Centralized Asynchronous Isolated Delegation (CAID), a structured multi-agent coordination paradigm grounded in three core SWE primitives: centralized task delegation, asynchronous execution, and isolated workspaces. CAID constructs dependency-aware task plans through a central manager, executes subtasks concurrently in isolated workspaces, and consolidates progress via structured integration with executable test-based verification. In empirical evaluation, we find that CAID improves accuracy over single-agent baselines by 26.7% absolute on paper reproduction tasks (PaperBench) and 14.3% on Python library development tasks (Commit0). Through systematic analysis, we find that branch-and-merge is a central coordination mechanism for multi-agent collaboration, and that SWE primitives such as git worktree, git commit, and git merge enable it to be realized in a reliable and executable manner.

Large language models (LLMs) extended as systems, such as ChatGPT, have begun supporting third-party applications. These LLM apps leverage the de facto natural language-based automated execution paradigm of LLMs: that is, apps and their interactions are defined in natural language, provided access to user data, and allowed to freely interact with each other and the system. These LLM app ecosystems resemble the settings of earlier computing platforms, where there was insufficient isolation between apps and the system. Because third-party apps may not be trustworthy, and exacerbated by the imprecision of natural language interfaces, the current designs pose security and privacy risks for users. In this paper, we evaluate whether these issues can be addressed through execution isolation and what that isolation might look like in the context of LLM-based systems, where there are arbitrary natural language-based interactions between system components, between LLM and apps, and between apps. To that end, we propose IsolateGPT, a design architecture that demonstrates the feasibility of execution isolation and provides a blueprint for implementing isolation, in LLM-based systems. We evaluate IsolateGPT against a number of attacks and demonstrate that it protects against many security, privacy, and safety issues that exist in non-isolated LLM-based systems, without any loss of functionality. The performance overhead incurred by IsolateGPT to improve security is under 30% for three-quarters of tested queries.

Software engineering tools increasingly rely on LLM based agents to localize files to change to resolve a software issue. Most AI agents explore repositories linearly, that is, visiting one directory or file per step. We postulate that this is a structural mismatch for changes that span several subsystems. We compare linear sequential exploration against non-linear, domain-scoped parallel agentic exploration. Using SWE Bench Pro as initial benchmark, we focus on ansible as an exemplar. We construct an approach for persistent-session evaluation of GitHub issues anchored at a single base commit. We compare our non-linear domain-agent file traversal system against a base LLM without direct repository access, a single agent Recursive Language Model (RLM) baseline with a persistent Python REPL and an external CLI baseline using Codex 5.5 High. Domain scoped parallel agent spawning with a small Haiku-class model achieves the highest micro F1 among Haiku class models by a large margin. Domain-agents is the second highest behind only the much larger Codex 5.5 High on our own expanded benchmark including over more recent PRs from 2025 and 2026. On the original, curated, 2020 SWE-bench Pro benchmark, a larger Sonnet plain LLM baseline attains higher micro F1 by predicting few files, leading to higher precision, but at significantly lower all gold recall. We also present three additional findings. First, documentation evolution is a latent dependency unresolved by any approach. Second, naive file system access can degrade localization driven by test-file over prediction. Lastly, forced multi-agent consultation does not measurably help and raises token cost substantially.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Beyond scratch coding, exploiting large-scale code repositories (e.g., GitHub) for practical tasks is vital in real-world software development, yet current benchmarks rarely evaluate code agents in such authentic, workflow-driven scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce GitTaskBench, a benchmark designed to systematically assess this capability via 54 realistic tasks across 7 modalities and 7 domains. Each task pairs a relevant repository with an automated, human-curated evaluation harness specifying practical success criteria. Beyond measuring execution and task success, we also propose the alpha-value metric to quantify the economic benefit of agent performance, which integrates task success rates, token cost, and average developer salaries. Experiments across three state-of-the-art agent frameworks with multiple advanced LLMs show that leveraging code repositories for complex task solving remains challenging: even the best-performing system, OpenHands+Claude 3.7, solves only 48.15% of tasks. Error analysis attributes over half of failures to seemingly mundane yet critical steps like environment setup and dependency resolution, highlighting the need for more robust workflow management and increased timeout preparedness. By releasing GitTaskBench, we aim to drive progress and attention toward repository-aware code reasoning, execution, and deployment -- moving agents closer to solving complex, end-to-end real-world tasks. The benchmark and code are open-sourced at https://github.com/QuantaAlpha/GitTaskBench.

Currently, most machine learning models are trained by centralized teams and are rarely updated. In contrast, open-source software development involves the iterative development of a shared artifact through distributed collaboration using a version control system. In the interest of enabling collaborative and continual improvement of machine learning models, we introduce Git-Theta, a version control system for machine learning models. Git-Theta is an extension to Git, the most widely used version control software, that allows fine-grained tracking of changes to model parameters alongside code and other artifacts. Unlike existing version control systems that treat a model checkpoint as a blob of data, Git-Theta leverages the structure of checkpoints to support communication-efficient updates, automatic model merges, and meaningful reporting about the difference between two versions of a model. In addition, Git-Theta includes a plug-in system that enables users to easily add support for new functionality. In this paper, we introduce Git-Theta's design and features and include an example use-case of Git-Theta where a pre-trained model is continually adapted and modified. We publicly release Git-Theta in hopes of kickstarting a new era of collaborative model development.

Vulnerabilities in open-source software can cause cascading effects in the modern digital ecosystem. It is especially worrying if these vulnerabilities repeat across many projects, as once the adversaries find one of them, they can scale up the attack very easily. Unfortunately, since developers frequently reuse code from their own or external code resources, some nearly identical vulnerabilities exist across many open-source projects. We conducted a study to examine the prevalence of a particular vulnerable code pattern that enables path traversal attacks (CWE-22) across open-source GitHub projects. To handle this study at the GitHub scale, we developed an automated pipeline that scans GitHub for the targeted vulnerable pattern, confirms the vulnerability by first running a static analysis and then exploiting the vulnerability in the context of the studied project, assesses its impact by calculating the CVSS score, generates a patch using GPT-4, and reports the vulnerability to the maintainers. Using our pipeline, we identified 1,756 vulnerable open-source projects, some of which are very influential. For many of the affected projects, the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score higher than 9.0), as it can be exploited remotely without any privileges and critically impact the confidentiality and availability of the system. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the maintainers, and 14\% of the reported vulnerabilities have been remediated. We also investigated the root causes of the vulnerable code pattern and assessed the side effects of the large number of copies of this vulnerable pattern that seem to have poisoned several popular LLMs. Our study highlights the urgent need to help secure the open-source ecosystem by leveraging scalable automated vulnerability management solutions and raising awareness among developers.

A software supply chain attack is characterized by the injection of malicious code into a software package in order to compromise dependent systems further down the chain. Recent years saw a number of supply chain attacks that leverage the increasing use of open source during software development, which is facilitated by dependency managers that automatically resolve, download and install hundreds of open source packages throughout the software life cycle. This paper presents a dataset of 174 malicious software packages that were used in real-world attacks on open source software supply chains, and which were distributed via the popular package repositories npm, PyPI, and RubyGems. Those packages, dating from November 2015 to November 2019, were manually collected and analyzed. The paper also presents two general attack trees to provide a structured overview about techniques to inject malicious code into the dependency tree of downstream users, and to execute such code at different times and under different conditions. This work is meant to facilitate the future development of preventive and detective safeguards by open source and research communities.

Multi-agent LLM systems share state through memory stores, vector indices, and tool registries. We model such sharing as long-running read-generate-write operations under deterministic-generation semantics -- the regime durable-execution engines enforce by deterministic replay -- and formalize four concurrency anomalies in TLA+: stale-generation, phantom-tool, causal-cascade, and tool-effect reordering, structural analogues of classical isolation anomalies, each with a TLC counter-example. The exclusion lattice over these anomalies is trivial; the contribution is the mechanically verified realizability and strict separation of one maximal chain within it, L_0 subsetneq cdots subsetneq L_4, to our knowledge the first machine-checked consistency hierarchy for such runtimes. A development of 274 Verus obligations (zero assume, zero admit; trust base: two structural axioms and a mutex correspondence) proves the detectors sound and complete against the specifications and each runtime its avoidance set. Three deployed Rust runtimes realize L0-L1 (pessimistic locking, serializable snapshot isolation, default-SI), each verified against stale-generation and refined to its state machine; L2-L4 are exec-mode-verified with dependency-free prevention twins (A3, A6, A2: 0/1000 versus 1000/1000), and L2 is run live across three model families (A3 prevented in all 120 retracted sessions). We reproduce a silent lost update in ByteDance's deer-flow, formalizing its fix as a verified L_0 to L_1 refinement, and exhibit tool-effect reordering in LangGraph's ToolNode on unmodified output, removed by an L3 commit-order sequencer. The verified detector, refinements, and realizability artifacts are the contribution; the phenomena and lattice are classical.