{"action": "Issue a distinct workload identity per agent role and environment; bind delegated user context separately and reject anonymous production tool calls.", "change_trigger": "Unique workload identity: review on identity, audience, token lifetime, tenant binding or authorization policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-IDENTITY", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Identity inventory with environment and owner", "Denied and allowed authorization decision records"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Unique workload identity", "owner_role": "Identity platform owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unintended principal obtains another identity or scope.", "rollback": "Revoke affected credentials, deny the affected capability and restore a reviewed compatible authorization policy; verify tenant isolation before reopening access.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-IDENTITY", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C02\", \"C12\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Identity inventory with environment and owner\", \"Denied and allowed authorization decision records\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-IDENTITY\", \"implementation\": \"Issue a distinct workload identity per agent role and environment; bind delegated user context separately and reject anonymous production tool calls.\", \"layerId\": \"identity-access\", \"name\": \"Unique workload identity\", \"objective\": \"Give each agent runtime and service hop an attributable non-human identity instead of a shared account.\", \"order\": 1, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S06\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.4.1\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Identity platform owner\", \"verification\": \"Attempt a production-like tool call with no workload identity, a sibling identity and the intended identity; confirm only the intended identity succeeds and each decision is attributable.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Attempt a production-like tool call with no workload identity, a sibling identity and the intended identity; confirm only the intended identity succeeds and each decision is attributable.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Mint short-lived tokens for the intended resource server and minimum operation; validate issuer, audience and expiry; prohibit token passthrough and keep revocation available.", "change_trigger": "Short-lived audience-bound credentials: review on identity, audience, token lifetime, tenant binding or authorization policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-SCOPED-TOKENS", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Token policy showing lifetime, audience and scopes", "Negative authorization test results", "Credential revocation procedure"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Short-lived audience-bound credentials", "owner_role": "Identity and access engineer", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unintended principal obtains another identity or scope.", "rollback": "Revoke affected credentials, deny the affected capability and restore a reviewed compatible authorization policy; verify tenant isolation before reopening access.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-SCOPED-TOKENS", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C04\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Token policy showing lifetime, audience and scopes\", \"Negative authorization test results\", \"Credential revocation procedure\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-SCOPED-TOKENS\", \"implementation\": \"Mint short-lived tokens for the intended resource server and minimum operation; validate issuer, audience and expiry; prohibit token passthrough and keep revocation available.\", \"layerId\": \"identity-access\", \"name\": \"Short-lived audience-bound credentials\", \"objective\": \"Limit credential reuse by constraining lifetime, audience and scope to the exact resource operation.\", \"order\": 2, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S05\", \"S06\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C5.1.2\", \"C9.4.3\", \"C10.2.7\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Identity and access engineer\", \"verification\": \"Replay expired, wrong-audience, over-scoped and forwarded tokens against the resource boundary and confirm fail-closed rejection without downstream forwarding.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Replay expired, wrong-audience, over-scoped and forwarded tokens against the resource boundary and confirm fail-closed rejection without downstream forwarding.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Evaluate subject, tenant, tool, operation, arguments, resource, user delegation and current policy in a deterministic enforcement service before every privileged call.", "change_trigger": "Deterministic policy decision point: review on identity, audience, token lifetime, tenant binding or authorization policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-POLICY-DECISION", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Versioned authorization policy", "Policy decision test suite", "Decision log samples with policy version"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Deterministic policy decision point", "owner_role": "Authorization service owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unintended principal obtains another identity or scope.", "rollback": "Revoke affected credentials, deny the affected capability and restore a reviewed compatible authorization policy; verify tenant isolation before reopening access.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-POLICY-DECISION", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C03\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Versioned authorization policy\", \"Policy decision test suite\", \"Decision log samples with policy version\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-POLICY-DECISION\", \"implementation\": \"Evaluate subject, tenant, tool, operation, arguments, resource, user delegation and current policy in a deterministic enforcement service before every privileged call.\", \"layerId\": \"identity-access\", \"name\": \"Deterministic policy decision point\", \"objective\": \"Keep permission decisions outside probabilistic model output.\", \"order\": 3, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S05\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C5.2.5\", \"C9.5.3\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Authorization service owner\", \"verification\": \"Submit model requests that ask to bypass policy, change arguments after approval or use an unauthorized resource; confirm the enforcement point denies each call.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Submit model requests that ask to bypass policy, change arguments after approval or use an unauthorized resource; confirm the enforcement point denies each call.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Carry an immutable tenant identifier from authenticated request through retrieval, memory, policy and tool calls; separate tenant keys and deny missing or conflicting scope.", "change_trigger": "Tenant-bound authorization context: review on identity, audience, token lifetime, tenant binding or authorization policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-TENANT-BOUNDARY", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Tenant data-flow diagram", "Cross-tenant isolation test report", "Tenant-scoped key and policy inventory"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Tenant-bound authorization context", "owner_role": "Application security owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unintended principal obtains another identity or scope.", "rollback": "Revoke affected credentials, deny the affected capability and restore a reviewed compatible authorization policy; verify tenant isolation before reopening access.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-TENANT-BOUNDARY", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C02\", \"C12\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Tenant data-flow diagram\", \"Cross-tenant isolation test report\", \"Tenant-scoped key and policy inventory\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\", \"contain\"], \"id\": \"CTL-TENANT-BOUNDARY\", \"implementation\": \"Carry an immutable tenant identifier from authenticated request through retrieval, memory, policy and tool calls; separate tenant keys and deny missing or conflicting scope.\", \"layerId\": \"identity-access\", \"name\": \"Tenant-bound authorization context\", \"objective\": \"Prevent shared agent infrastructure from resolving data, memory or tools outside the active tenant.\", \"order\": 4, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S04\", \"S06\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C8.1.3\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Application security owner\", \"verification\": \"Run cross-tenant negative tests for retrieval, cache, memory and tool resources, including forged and absent tenant identifiers; confirm denial and alerting.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Run cross-tenant negative tests for retrieval, cache, memory and tool resources, including forged and absent tenant identifiers; confirm denial and alerting.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Normalize supported encodings, retain source metadata, label external data as untrusted, classify sensitive fields and minimize or redact them before model context, memory, logs and tool calls; preserve trust labels across later boundaries.", "change_trigger": "Content trust, classification and minimization: review on prompt hierarchy, content source, parser, output schema or isolation boundary changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-CONTENT-TRUST", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Input trust and data-classification taxonomy", "Normalization and sensitive-field redaction corpus results", "End-to-end provenance and data-minimization trace"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Content trust, classification and minimization", "owner_role": "AI application engineer", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Untrusted content crosses an instruction or data boundary.", "rollback": "Quarantine the affected input path and restore a compatible reviewed prompt/parser boundary; recheck legitimate and adversarial inputs before routing traffic.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-CONTENT-TRUST", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C01\", \"C02\", \"C19\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Input trust and data-classification taxonomy\", \"Normalization and sensitive-field redaction corpus results\", \"End-to-end provenance and data-minimization trace\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-CONTENT-TRUST\", \"implementation\": \"Normalize supported encodings, retain source metadata, label external data as untrusted, classify sensitive fields and minimize or redact them before model context, memory, logs and tool calls; preserve trust labels across later boundaries.\", \"layerId\": \"input-instruction\", \"name\": \"Content trust, classification and minimization\", \"objective\": \"Preserve origin and trust while classifying, minimizing and redacting sensitive fields before content reaches model context, memory, logs or tools.\", \"order\": 1, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S09\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C2.1.1\", \"C2.1.2\", \"C9.3.7\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"AI application engineer\", \"verification\": \"Feed encoded, nested and relayed content containing seeded sensitive fields through every ingestion and propagation path; confirm normalization, classification and trust labels persist while disallowed fields are absent from model context, memory, logs and tool payloads.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Feed encoded, nested and relayed content containing seeded sensitive fields through every ingestion and propagation path; confirm normalization, classification and trust labels persist while disallowed fields are absent from model context, memory, logs and tool payloads.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Represent system policy, user intent and untrusted data in separate fields; delimit external content; refuse instructions originating from data fields and test conflict handling.", "change_trigger": "Instruction and data separation: review on prompt hierarchy, content source, parser, output schema or isolation boundary changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-INSTRUCTION-HIERARCHY", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Prompt and message-boundary specification", "Injection evaluation results", "Documented conflict-handling behavior"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Instruction and data separation", "owner_role": "AI application security engineer", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Untrusted content crosses an instruction or data boundary.", "rollback": "Quarantine the affected input path and restore a compatible reviewed prompt/parser boundary; recheck legitimate and adversarial inputs before routing traffic.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-INSTRUCTION-HIERARCHY", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C01\", \"C15\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Prompt and message-boundary specification\", \"Injection evaluation results\", \"Documented conflict-handling behavior\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-INSTRUCTION-HIERARCHY\", \"implementation\": \"Represent system policy, user intent and untrusted data in separate fields; delimit external content; refuse instructions originating from data fields and test conflict handling.\", \"layerId\": \"input-instruction\", \"name\": \"Instruction and data separation\", \"objective\": \"Prevent retrieved or tool-returned content from silently acquiring system-level authority.\", \"order\": 2, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S02\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S09\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C2.1.3\", \"C2.1.6\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"AI application security engineer\", \"verification\": \"Use direct and indirect injection cases that conflict with system and user intent; confirm external text cannot alter policy or authorize a capability.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Use direct and indirect injection cases that conflict with system and user intent; confirm external text cannot alter policy or authorize a capability.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Define strict schemas for tool arguments, tool results and agent messages; reject unknown fields, invalid types, oversized values and instructions in data-only fields.", "change_trigger": "Schema-bound boundary output: review on prompt hierarchy, content source, parser, output schema or isolation boundary changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-OUTPUT-SCHEMA", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Versioned boundary schemas", "Schema fuzz-test report", "Rejected-payload telemetry sample"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Schema-bound boundary output", "owner_role": "Platform API owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Untrusted content crosses an instruction or data boundary.", "rollback": "Quarantine the affected input path and restore a compatible reviewed prompt/parser boundary; recheck legitimate and adversarial inputs before routing traffic.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-OUTPUT-SCHEMA", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C02\", \"C03\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Versioned boundary schemas\", \"Schema fuzz-test report\", \"Rejected-payload telemetry sample\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-OUTPUT-SCHEMA\", \"implementation\": \"Define strict schemas for tool arguments, tool results and agent messages; reject unknown fields, invalid types, oversized values and instructions in data-only fields.\", \"layerId\": \"input-instruction\", \"name\": \"Schema-bound boundary output\", \"objective\": \"Reject free-form model or tool output before it becomes executable input to another component.\", \"order\": 3, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.3.2\", \"C10.4.1\", \"C10.4.2\", \"C10.4.3\", \"C10.4.4\", \"C10.4.5\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Platform API owner\", \"verification\": \"Fuzz each schema with extra fields, type confusion, oversized payloads and instruction-bearing strings; confirm invalid records never reach an execution boundary.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Fuzz each schema with extra fields, type confusion, oversized payloads and instruction-bearing strings; confirm invalid records never reach an execution boundary.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Process untrusted content in a tool-free or separately privileged stage and pass only a validated structured result into an action-capable stage.", "change_trigger": "Untrusted-content processing isolation: review on prompt hierarchy, content source, parser, output schema or isolation boundary changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-UNTRUSTED-ISOLATION", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Trust-boundary architecture diagram", "Capability inventory for ingestion stage", "Injection-to-tool negative test"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Untrusted-content processing isolation", "owner_role": "AI platform architect", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Untrusted content crosses an instruction or data boundary.", "rollback": "Quarantine the affected input path and restore a compatible reviewed prompt/parser boundary; recheck legitimate and adversarial inputs before routing traffic.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-UNTRUSTED-ISOLATION", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C01\", \"C02\", \"C03\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Trust-boundary architecture diagram\", \"Capability inventory for ingestion stage\", \"Injection-to-tool negative test\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"contain\"], \"id\": \"CTL-UNTRUSTED-ISOLATION\", \"implementation\": \"Process untrusted content in a tool-free or separately privileged stage and pass only a validated structured result into an action-capable stage.\", \"layerId\": \"input-instruction\", \"name\": \"Untrusted-content processing isolation\", \"objective\": \"Break the direct path from untrusted interpretation to privileged tool execution.\", \"order\": 4, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.3.5\", \"C9.3.6\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"AI platform architect\", \"verification\": \"Inject tool-call instructions into every external source and confirm the content-processing stage has no credential, tool or egress path capable of carrying them out.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Inject tool-call instructions into every external source and confirm the content-processing stage has no credential, tool or egress path capable of carrying them out.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Resolve an allowlisted tool manifest, validate arguments, bind user and workload context and make a fresh deterministic policy decision for every invocation.", "change_trigger": "Per-invocation tool authorization: review on tool arguments, permissions, sandbox, network destinations or retry semantics change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-TOOL-AUTH", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Tool manifest and permission matrix", "Per-invocation denial tests", "Authorization decision trace"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Per-invocation tool authorization", "owner_role": "Tool gateway owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "A tool action exceeds its authorized scope or creates duplicate external effects.", "rollback": "Disable the affected write or execution capability. Restore a compatible restricted route after replay checks; separately assess compensation for completed external effects.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-TOOL-AUTH", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C03\", \"C05\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Tool manifest and permission matrix\", \"Per-invocation denial tests\", \"Authorization decision trace\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-TOOL-AUTH\", \"implementation\": \"Resolve an allowlisted tool manifest, validate arguments, bind user and workload context and make a fresh deterministic policy decision for every invocation.\", \"layerId\": \"tool-execution\", \"name\": \"Per-invocation tool authorization\", \"objective\": \"Authorize the exact tool, operation and arguments at the moment of use.\", \"order\": 1, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S05\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.5.1\", \"C10.2.4\", \"C10.2.5\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Tool gateway owner\", \"verification\": \"Try unauthorized tools, substituted arguments, stale approvals and calls outside delegated user scope; confirm each is denied before side effects.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Try unauthorized tools, substituted arguments, stale approvals and calls outside delegated user scope; confirm each is denied before side effects.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Run code in an ephemeral least-privilege sandbox with no inherited credentials, read-only base image, bounded CPU, memory, storage, process count and wall time.", "change_trigger": "Isolated execution sandbox: review on tool arguments, permissions, sandbox, network destinations or retry semantics change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-SANDBOX", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Sandbox profile and base-image digest", "Escape and resource-limit test report", "Teardown and residue check"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Isolated execution sandbox", "owner_role": "Runtime security engineer", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "A tool action exceeds its authorized scope or creates duplicate external effects.", "rollback": "Disable the affected write or execution capability. Restore a compatible restricted route after replay checks; separately assess compensation for completed external effects.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-SANDBOX", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C06\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Sandbox profile and base-image digest\", \"Escape and resource-limit test report\", \"Teardown and residue check\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-SANDBOX\", \"implementation\": \"Run code in an ephemeral least-privilege sandbox with no inherited credentials, read-only base image, bounded CPU, memory, storage, process count and wall time.\", \"layerId\": \"tool-execution\", \"name\": \"Isolated execution sandbox\", \"objective\": \"Constrain generated code and commands to explicit filesystem, process, resource and lifetime boundaries.\", \"order\": 2, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S08\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.3.1\", \"C10.1.3\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Runtime security engineer\", \"verification\": \"Exercise filesystem escape, process spawning, secret discovery, resource exhaustion and timeout cases; confirm containment and reliable teardown.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Exercise filesystem escape, process spawning, secret discovery, resource exhaustion and timeout cases; confirm containment and reliable teardown.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Block direct network access and broker approved destinations, protocols and methods through an allowlist with DNS and redirect controls, payload limits and destination logging.", "change_trigger": "Deny-by-default egress broker: review on tool arguments, permissions, sandbox, network destinations or retry semantics change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-EGRESS", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Egress allowlist with business purpose", "Egress bypass test results", "Destination and volume log sample"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Deny-by-default egress broker", "owner_role": "Cloud network security owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "A tool action exceeds its authorized scope or creates duplicate external effects.", "rollback": "Disable the affected write or execution capability. Restore a compatible restricted route after replay checks; separately assess compensation for completed external effects.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-EGRESS", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C07\", \"C16\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Egress allowlist with business purpose\", \"Egress bypass test results\", \"Destination and volume log sample\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\", \"contain\"], \"id\": \"CTL-EGRESS\", \"implementation\": \"Block direct network access and broker approved destinations, protocols and methods through an allowlist with DNS and redirect controls, payload limits and destination logging.\", \"layerId\": \"tool-execution\", \"name\": \"Deny-by-default egress broker\", \"objective\": \"Restrict agent-controlled network traffic to necessary, observable destinations and methods.\", \"order\": 3, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S10\", \"S11\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.3.7\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Cloud network security owner\", \"verification\": \"Attempt direct IP, alternate DNS, redirect, proxy and unlisted destination paths from agent execution; confirm denial and attributable telemetry.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Attempt direct IP, alternate DNS, redirect, proxy and unlisted destination paths from agent execution; confirm denial and attributable telemetry.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Attach an idempotency key to each logical action, reject replay, prefer staged commits and define compensating or rollback operations before enabling high-impact tools.", "change_trigger": "Idempotency and reversible action design: review on tool arguments, permissions, sandbox, network destinations or retry semantics change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-IDEMPOTENCY", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Idempotency-key contract", "Replay and partial-failure test report", "Compensating-action runbook"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Idempotency and reversible action design", "owner_role": "Workflow service owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "A tool action exceeds its authorized scope or creates duplicate external effects.", "rollback": "Disable the affected write or execution capability. Restore a compatible restricted route after replay checks; separately assess compensation for completed external effects.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-IDEMPOTENCY", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C05\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Idempotency-key contract\", \"Replay and partial-failure test report\", \"Compensating-action runbook\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-IDEMPOTENCY\", \"implementation\": \"Attach an idempotency key to each logical action, reject replay, prefer staged commits and define compensating or rollback operations before enabling high-impact tools.\", \"layerId\": \"tool-execution\", \"name\": \"Idempotency and reversible action design\", \"objective\": \"Prevent retries or duplicated decisions from multiplying external side effects and preserve a recovery path.\", \"order\": 4, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.2.3\", \"C9.2.4\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Workflow service owner\", \"verification\": \"Repeat, delay and reorder identical action requests and simulate partial failure; confirm a single committed effect and a tested recovery path.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Repeat, delay and reorder identical action requests and simulate partial failure; confirm a single committed effect and a tested recovery path.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Enforce separate namespaces, authorize every read and write, carry tenant and subject provenance and deny cross-purpose retrieval by default.", "change_trigger": "Authorized memory namespace: review on memory namespace, writer policy, retention, provenance or retrieval behavior changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-MEMORY-AUTH", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Memory authorization matrix", "Namespace isolation test report", "Denied-access audit samples"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Authorized memory namespace", "owner_role": "Data platform owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Unauthorized or stale memory affects a later decision.", "rollback": "Quarantine affected entries and restore an authorized compatible memory snapshot; preserve the audit trail and do not restore deleted or revoked data.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-MEMORY-AUTH", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C08\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Memory authorization matrix\", \"Namespace isolation test report\", \"Denied-access audit samples\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-MEMORY-AUTH\", \"implementation\": \"Enforce separate namespaces, authorize every read and write, carry tenant and subject provenance and deny cross-purpose retrieval by default.\", \"layerId\": \"memory-integrity\", \"name\": \"Authorized memory namespace\", \"objective\": \"Bind memory reads and writes to the current identity, tenant, purpose and retention class.\", \"order\": 1, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C8.1.3\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Data platform owner\", \"verification\": \"Attempt memory reads and writes across users, tenants, roles and purposes; confirm denial and an attributable audit record.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Attempt memory reads and writes across users, tenants, roles and purposes; confirm denial and an attributable audit record.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Validate memory schemas, retain source and writer identity, classify trust, detect conflicting high-impact facts and quarantine suspicious writes before retrieval.", "change_trigger": "Memory write validation and provenance: review on memory namespace, writer policy, retention, provenance or retrieval behavior changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-MEMORY-VALIDATION", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Memory schema and trust policy", "Poisoning test corpus results", "Quarantine queue sample"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Memory write validation and provenance", "owner_role": "AI data security owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Unauthorized or stale memory affects a later decision.", "rollback": "Quarantine affected entries and restore an authorized compatible memory snapshot; preserve the audit trail and do not restore deleted or revoked data.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-MEMORY-VALIDATION", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C08\", \"C09\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Memory schema and trust policy\", \"Poisoning test corpus results\", \"Quarantine queue sample\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\", \"contain\"], \"id\": \"CTL-MEMORY-VALIDATION\", \"implementation\": \"Validate memory schemas, retain source and writer identity, classify trust, detect conflicting high-impact facts and quarantine suspicious writes before retrieval.\", \"layerId\": \"memory-integrity\", \"name\": \"Memory write validation and provenance\", \"objective\": \"Keep untrusted, contradictory or malformed content from silently becoming persistent decision context.\", \"order\": 2, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C8.2.1\", \"C8.2.3\", \"C8.2.4\", \"C8.2.5\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"AI data security owner\", \"verification\": \"Submit malformed, untrusted, contradictory and cross-scope memories; confirm rejection or quarantine and retained provenance.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Submit malformed, untrusted, contradictory and cross-scope memories; confirm rejection or quarantine and retained provenance.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Version writes, apply explicit TTL and deletion rules, preserve source metadata and record which memory versions influenced each material decision.", "change_trigger": "Versioned memory lifecycle: review on memory namespace, writer policy, retention, provenance or retrieval behavior changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-MEMORY-LIFECYCLE", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Retention and deletion schedule", "Memory version history sample", "Expiry and deletion test results"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Versioned memory lifecycle", "owner_role": "Data governance owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Unauthorized or stale memory affects a later decision.", "rollback": "Quarantine affected entries and restore an authorized compatible memory snapshot; preserve the audit trail and do not restore deleted or revoked data.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-MEMORY-LIFECYCLE", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C08\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Retention and deletion schedule\", \"Memory version history sample\", \"Expiry and deletion test results\"], \"functions\": [\"detect\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-MEMORY-LIFECYCLE\", \"implementation\": \"Version writes, apply explicit TTL and deletion rules, preserve source metadata and record which memory versions influenced each material decision.\", \"layerId\": \"memory-integrity\", \"name\": \"Versioned memory lifecycle\", \"objective\": \"Make persistent agent state inspectable, expirable and attributable over time.\", \"order\": 3, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": false, \"sourceIds\": [\"S01\", \"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C8.3.1\", \"C8.3.2\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Data governance owner\", \"verification\": \"Advance expiry, delete a subject and replay a decision trace; confirm expired data is unavailable and the influencing memory versions remain identifiable.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Advance expiry, delete a subject and replay a decision trace; confirm expired data is unavailable and the influencing memory versions remain identifiable.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Detect anomalous write or retrieval patterns, isolate affected namespaces, block further influence and support operator-approved rollback with preserved audit evidence.", "change_trigger": "Memory quarantine and rollback: review on memory namespace, writer policy, retention, provenance or retrieval behavior changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-MEMORY-ROLLBACK", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Memory anomaly rules", "Quarantine and rollback exercise report", "Preserved incident evidence index"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Memory quarantine and rollback", "owner_role": "Security operations owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "Unauthorized or stale memory affects a later decision.", "rollback": "Quarantine affected entries and restore an authorized compatible memory snapshot; preserve the audit trail and do not restore deleted or revoked data.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-MEMORY-ROLLBACK", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C09\", \"C14\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Memory anomaly rules\", \"Quarantine and rollback exercise report\", \"Preserved incident evidence index\"], \"functions\": [\"detect\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-MEMORY-ROLLBACK\", \"implementation\": \"Detect anomalous write or retrieval patterns, isolate affected namespaces, block further influence and support operator-approved rollback with preserved audit evidence.\", \"layerId\": \"memory-integrity\", \"name\": \"Memory quarantine and rollback\", \"objective\": \"Remove suspected poisoned state and restore a known version without destroying investigation evidence.\", \"order\": 4, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": false, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C8.2.4\", \"C8.3.2\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Security operations owner\", \"verification\": \"Seed a known poisoned record, trigger detection, quarantine the namespace and restore the prior version; confirm downstream retrieval no longer returns the record.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Seed a known poisoned record, trigger detection, quarantine the namespace and restore the prior version; confirm downstream retrieval no longer returns the record.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Maintain a versioned allowlist of component identity, source, version, digest, permissions and owner; reject undeclared capabilities at build and connection time.", "change_trigger": "Component and capability allowlist: review on component identity, digest, provenance, dependency graph, owner or admission policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-COMPONENT-ALLOWLIST", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Approved component and capability registry", "Admission-policy test results", "Exception record with expiry when applicable"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Component and capability allowlist", "owner_role": "Product security owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unapproved component or capability enters the runtime.", "rollback": "Block the suspect component and restore a reviewed compatible dependency set; verify signatures, access scope and current revocation status before reuse.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-COMPONENT-ALLOWLIST", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C10\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Approved component and capability registry\", \"Admission-policy test results\", \"Exception record with expiry when applicable\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-COMPONENT-ALLOWLIST\", \"implementation\": \"Maintain a versioned allowlist of component identity, source, version, digest, permissions and owner; reject undeclared capabilities at build and connection time.\", \"layerId\": \"supply-chain\", \"name\": \"Component and capability allowlist\", \"objective\": \"Prevent unreviewed packages, tools, skills, models and servers from entering the agent path.\", \"order\": 1, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S07\", \"S08\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C6.1.1\", \"C6.1.2\", \"C6.1.3\", \"C6.1.4\", \"C10.1.1\", \"C10.1.2\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Product security owner\", \"verification\": \"Introduce an unlisted package, tool, skill and MCP server in a release candidate; confirm each is blocked before use.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Introduce an unlisted package, tool, skill and MCP server in a release candidate; confirm each is blocked before use.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Pin immutable digests, verify signed provenance against declared build expectations and trusted roots and fail closed on mismatch or missing evidence.", "change_trigger": "Digest and provenance verification: review on component identity, digest, provenance, dependency graph, owner or admission policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-INTEGRITY-PROVENANCE", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Pinned artifact digest set", "Verified provenance statement", "Trusted-root and build-expectation policy"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Digest and provenance verification", "owner_role": "Software supply-chain security owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unapproved component or capability enters the runtime.", "rollback": "Block the suspect component and restore a reviewed compatible dependency set; verify signatures, access scope and current revocation status before reuse.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-INTEGRITY-PROVENANCE", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C10\", \"C11\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Pinned artifact digest set\", \"Verified provenance statement\", \"Trusted-root and build-expectation policy\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-INTEGRITY-PROVENANCE\", \"implementation\": \"Pin immutable digests, verify signed provenance against declared build expectations and trusted roots and fail closed on mismatch or missing evidence.\", \"layerId\": \"supply-chain\", \"name\": \"Digest and provenance verification\", \"objective\": \"Verify that the admitted artifact is the expected output from an identified build and trusted source.\", \"order\": 2, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S07\", \"S08\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C6.1.2\", \"C6.1.3\", \"C6.1.4\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Software supply-chain security owner\", \"verification\": \"Substitute the artifact, builder identity, source reference and signature root independently; confirm admission fails for every mismatch.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Substitute the artifact, builder identity, source reference and signature root independently; confirm admission fails for every mismatch.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Generate a release-bound inventory with component version, digest, source, license, owner, privileges and transitive dependencies; retain it with the release record.", "change_trigger": "AI bill of materials and ownership: review on component identity, digest, provenance, dependency graph, owner or admission policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-AIBOM", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Release-bound SBOM or AIBOM", "Runtime-to-inventory reconciliation report", "Named component owners"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "AI bill of materials and ownership", "owner_role": "Release engineering owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unapproved component or capability enters the runtime.", "rollback": "Block the suspect component and restore a reviewed compatible dependency set; verify signatures, access scope and current revocation status before reuse.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-AIBOM", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C10\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Release-bound SBOM or AIBOM\", \"Runtime-to-inventory reconciliation report\", \"Named component owners\"], \"functions\": [\"detect\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-AIBOM\", \"implementation\": \"Generate a release-bound inventory with component version, digest, source, license, owner, privileges and transitive dependencies; retain it with the release record.\", \"layerId\": \"supply-chain\", \"name\": \"AI bill of materials and ownership\", \"objective\": \"Keep an actionable inventory of the models, data-dependent services, tools and software that form each release.\", \"order\": 3, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": false, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S07\", \"S08\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C6.2.1\", \"C6.2.2\", \"C6.2.3\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Release engineering owner\", \"verification\": \"Select a deployed release and reconcile its runtime components against the retained inventory; investigate every missing or unexpected item.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Select a deployed release and reconcile its runtime components against the retained inventory; investigate every missing or unexpected item.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Scan dependencies, review material version or permission changes, require policy-based admission and maintain a tested path to quarantine, revoke and rebuild affected releases.", "change_trigger": "Dependency admission and revocation: review on component identity, digest, provenance, dependency graph, owner or admission policy changes.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-DEPENDENCY-ADMISSION", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Dependency change review", "Admission scan results", "Component revocation exercise"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Dependency admission and revocation", "owner_role": "Application security owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unapproved component or capability enters the runtime.", "rollback": "Block the suspect component and restore a reviewed compatible dependency set; verify signatures, access scope and current revocation status before reuse.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-DEPENDENCY-ADMISSION", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C10\", \"C11\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Dependency change review\", \"Admission scan results\", \"Component revocation exercise\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-DEPENDENCY-ADMISSION\", \"implementation\": \"Scan dependencies, review material version or permission changes, require policy-based admission and maintain a tested path to quarantine, revoke and rebuild affected releases.\", \"layerId\": \"supply-chain\", \"name\": \"Dependency admission and revocation\", \"objective\": \"Detect risky component changes before release and remove affected versions quickly after new evidence.\", \"order\": 4, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S07\", \"S08\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C6.1.1\", \"C6.1.2\", \"C6.1.3\", \"C6.1.4\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Application security owner\", \"verification\": \"Simulate a newly disallowed component version and confirm build admission stops, deployed inventory is found and the rebuild or rollback procedure succeeds.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Simulate a newly disallowed component version and confirm build admission stops, deployed inventory is found and the rebuild or rollback procedure succeeds.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Emit structured, access-controlled records for correlation ID, workload and user identity, tenant, input trust class, policy version and decision, tool arguments, result and approval reference.", "change_trigger": "End-to-end action audit trail: review on logging, limits, approval scope, escalation routes or containment mechanisms change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-AUDIT", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Structured audit event schema", "Sample reconstructed action trace", "Log access and retention policy"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "End-to-end action audit trail", "owner_role": "Observability platform owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unsafe action continues without a usable audit, approval or containment path.", "rollback": "Stop the affected action route, preserve available evidence and use a read-only or human-mediated fallback until the audit and containment path is exercised.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-AUDIT", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C12\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Structured audit event schema\", \"Sample reconstructed action trace\", \"Log access and retention policy\"], \"functions\": [\"detect\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-AUDIT\", \"implementation\": \"Emit structured, access-controlled records for correlation ID, workload and user identity, tenant, input trust class, policy version and decision, tool arguments, result and approval reference.\", \"layerId\": \"monitoring-oversight\", \"name\": \"End-to-end action audit trail\", \"objective\": \"Reconstruct which identity, input, policy, model decision, tool and result produced a material side effect.\", \"order\": 1, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S06\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C12.1.1\", \"C12.1.3\", \"C12.4.2\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Observability platform owner\", \"verification\": \"Choose a material test action and reconstruct its complete chain from ingress to result without relying on model prose or mutable application state.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Choose a material test action and reconstruct its complete chain from ingress to result without relying on model prose or mutable application state.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Set enforceable per-task and per-identity limits for requests, tokens, iterations, tool calls, elapsed time and spend; terminate rather than merely alert at a hard boundary.", "change_trigger": "Hard action, iteration and spend limits: review on logging, limits, approval scope, escalation routes or containment mechanisms change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-RATE-SPEND", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Versioned limit policy", "Boundary and concurrency test results", "Stop-decision telemetry"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Hard action, iteration and spend limits", "owner_role": "AI platform operations owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unsafe action continues without a usable audit, approval or containment path.", "rollback": "Stop the affected action route, preserve available evidence and use a read-only or human-mediated fallback until the audit and containment path is exercised.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-RATE-SPEND", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C13\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Versioned limit policy\", \"Boundary and concurrency test results\", \"Stop-decision telemetry\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\", \"contain\"], \"id\": \"CTL-RATE-SPEND\", \"implementation\": \"Set enforceable per-task and per-identity limits for requests, tokens, iterations, tool calls, elapsed time and spend; terminate rather than merely alert at a hard boundary.\", \"layerId\": \"monitoring-oversight\", \"name\": \"Hard action, iteration and spend limits\", \"objective\": \"Stop autonomous execution before it exceeds the approved operational envelope.\", \"order\": 2, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.1.1\", \"C9.1.2\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"AI platform operations owner\", \"verification\": \"Drive each meter to its configured boundary independently and confirm no further model or tool action occurs after the stop decision.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Drive each meter to its configured boundary independently and confirm no further model or tool action occurs after the stop decision.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Pause before side effects, show complete operation parameters and impact, bind approver identity and nonce to the unchanged request and expire or invalidate approval after modification.", "change_trigger": "Bound human approval for high-impact action: review on logging, limits, approval scope, escalation routes or containment mechanisms change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-HUMAN-APPROVAL", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["High-impact action classification", "Approval binding specification", "Mutation and replay test report"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Bound human approval for high-impact action", "owner_role": "Business risk owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unsafe action continues without a usable audit, approval or containment path.", "rollback": "Stop the affected action route, preserve available evidence and use a read-only or human-mediated fallback until the audit and containment path is exercised.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-HUMAN-APPROVAL", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C05\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"High-impact action classification\", \"Approval binding specification\", \"Mutation and replay test report\"], \"functions\": [\"prevent\", \"detect\"], \"id\": \"CTL-HUMAN-APPROVAL\", \"implementation\": \"Pause before side effects, show complete operation parameters and impact, bind approver identity and nonce to the unchanged request and expire or invalidate approval after modification.\", \"layerId\": \"monitoring-oversight\", \"name\": \"Bound human approval for high-impact action\", \"objective\": \"Require accountable human authorization for the exact irreversible or high-impact operation.\", \"order\": 3, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.2.1\", \"C9.2.8\", \"C9.2.9\", \"C9.2.10\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Business risk owner\", \"verification\": \"Change parameters, identity, context and timing after approval; confirm every mutation requires a new approval and the original cannot be replayed.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Change parameters, identity, context and timing after approval; confirm every mutation requires a new approval and the original cannot be replayed.", "verified_at": null}
{"action": "Provide an independent operator path to trip circuit breakers, revoke credentials, block tool and egress access, quarantine memory or workloads and retain audit evidence.", "change_trigger": "Out-of-band containment and kill procedure: review on logging, limits, approval scope, escalation routes or containment mechanisms change.", "config": "security", "control_id": "CTL-KILL-SWITCH", "decision_job": "RELEASE_EVIDENCE", "evidence_type": ["Out-of-band kill runbook", "Credential and capability revocation test", "Containment exercise timeline"], "field_origin": "action/verification/evidence/owner: source; risk/boundary/trigger/rollback: engineering proposal", "limitations": ["Engineering draft; independent human review is pending.", "A listed artifact or suggested role does not establish operating effectiveness or an actual assignment.", "New normalized fields require canonical upstream adoption before public release."], "name": "Out-of-band containment and kill procedure", "owner_role": "Incident response owner", "review_status": "NOT_REVIEWED", "risk": "An unsafe action continues without a usable audit, approval or containment path.", "rollback": "Stop the affected action route, preserve available evidence and use a read-only or human-mediated fallback until the audit and containment path is exercised.", "snapshot_at": "2026-09-17T06:17:24Z", "source_commit_sha": "a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee", "source_data_hash": "sha256:a50333997f3f9832df16329f27d8e5be608c50ba1dffea0282ee1b1eff0956a6", "source_native_id": "CTL-KILL-SWITCH", "source_payload_json": "{\"claimIds\": [\"C14\", \"C20\"], \"evidenceArtifacts\": [\"Out-of-band kill runbook\", \"Credential and capability revocation test\", \"Containment exercise timeline\"], \"functions\": [\"detect\", \"contain\", \"recover\"], \"id\": \"CTL-KILL-SWITCH\", \"implementation\": \"Provide an independent operator path to trip circuit breakers, revoke credentials, block tool and egress access, quarantine memory or workloads and retain audit evidence.\", \"layerId\": \"monitoring-oversight\", \"name\": \"Out-of-band containment and kill procedure\", \"objective\": \"Stop an unsafe action chain even when the agent, model or primary application path is unavailable or compromised.\", \"order\": 4, \"releaseGateWhenRequired\": true, \"sourceIds\": [\"S03\", \"S04\", \"S12\"], \"standardRefs\": [\"C9.1.3\", \"C9.6.1\", \"C9.6.2\", \"C9.6.3\", \"C12.4.3\"], \"suggestedOwnerRole\": \"Incident response owner\", \"verification\": \"Run a timed exercise with the agent control plane unavailable; confirm operators can stop calls, revoke authority, isolate affected state and preserve evidence.\"}", "source_url": "https://github.com/PharosProduction/agent-security-control-mapper/blob/a35b9c30594162eadf4d790d33bd18aaa785bcee/data/controls.json", "status": "DRAFT", "system_boundary": "Agent runtime, delegated identities and connected tools in the selected environment.", "verification": "Run a timed exercise with the agent control plane unavailable; confirm operators can stop calls, revoke authority, isolate affected state and preserve evidence.", "verified_at": null}