Add 16 bundle(s): ic_ingress_pool_quota_miskey, ic_orchestrator_cup_body_bomb, ic_quic_halfopen_pin, ic_xnet_concurrency_cap

README.md

@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ size_categories:
   - n<1K
 ---
 
-<!-- nr-bundle-count: 690 -->
-<!-- nr-chains: aptos,bitcoin,cardano,casper,conflux,cosmos,dogecoin,ethereum,icon,iota,kaspa,libp2p,litecoin,monero,solana,solana-agave,sui,xrp,zcash -->
+<!-- nr-bundle-count: 706 -->
+<!-- nr-chains: aptos,bitcoin,cardano,casper,conflux,cosmos,dogecoin,ethereum,ic,icon,iota,kaspa,libp2p,litecoin,monero,solana,solana-agave,sui,xrp,zcash -->
 <!-- Keep the count marker equal to the live dataset's bundle-dir count. scripts/publish_dataset.py
      (--card at publish, --check-card-only for daily monitoring) asserts it and fails loud on drift. -->
 
 # nr-bundles-public
 
 <!-- AUTO:headline:BEGIN — generated by scripts/dataset_card_composition.py from the live+staged bundle set; do not hand-edit -->
-A curated, multi-modal dataset of blockchain validator infrastructure under attack and benign workloads. **690 bundles** across **19 chains and network stacks** (Aptos, Bitcoin, Cardano, casper, conflux, Cosmos, Dogecoin, Ethereum, icon, IOTA, kaspa, libp2p, Litecoin, Monero, Solana, Solana (Agave), Sui, XRP, zcash), all thirteen families in the taxonomy (twelve attack classes plus `benign`), and **128 attack primitive_ids** — including faithful wire-level reproductions of **68 publicly disclosed CVEs and security advisories** in blockchain node software. Released as the public sample of NullRabbit's bundle corpus, which underpins [NullRabbit Labs'](https://huggingface.co/NullRabbit) ML research on autonomous defence for decentralised networks.
+A curated, multi-modal dataset of blockchain validator infrastructure under attack and benign workloads. **706 bundles** across **20 chains and network stacks** (Aptos, Bitcoin, Cardano, casper, conflux, Cosmos, Dogecoin, Ethereum, ic, icon, IOTA, kaspa, libp2p, Litecoin, Monero, Solana, Solana (Agave), Sui, XRP, zcash), all thirteen families in the taxonomy (twelve attack classes plus `benign`), and **132 attack primitive_ids** — including faithful wire-level reproductions of **68 publicly disclosed CVEs and security advisories** in blockchain node software. Released as the public sample of NullRabbit's bundle corpus, which underpins [NullRabbit Labs'](https://huggingface.co/NullRabbit) ML research on autonomous defence for decentralised networks.
 <!-- AUTO:headline:END -->
 
 ## What this dataset is
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ These are **validator / node-software** vulnerability classes only. On-chain con
 ## What's included
 
 <!-- AUTO:totals:BEGIN — generated by scripts/dataset_card_composition.py; do not hand-edit -->
-**690 bundles total: 683 attack, 7 benign.** By provenance class: **268 `original`** (NullRabbit's own disclosed findings, each with a published operator advisory), **31 legacy-sample** (the 2026-05-13 Solana/Sui curation), and **391 `public-cve-replication`** (faithful reproductions of already-public CVEs / advisories). The raw `packets.pcap` is dropped from every bundle (`BundleFiles.packets_pcap=False`); no pre-termination pcap variant is retained.
+**706 bundles total: 699 attack, 7 benign.** By provenance class: **284 `original`** (NullRabbit's own disclosed findings, each with a published operator advisory), **31 legacy-sample** (the 2026-05-13 Solana/Sui curation), and **391 `public-cve-replication`** (faithful reproductions of already-public CVEs / advisories). The raw `packets.pcap` is dropped from every bundle (`BundleFiles.packets_pcap=False`); no pre-termination pcap variant is retained.
 <!-- AUTO:totals:END -->
 
 The `Pcap modality` column in the tables below specifies which network-layer file is present on disk per bundle: `pre-term TLS` means `pcap_pre_termination.pcap` is retained (encrypted TLS frames; IP/TCP headers visible); `none` means the raw `packets.pcap` was dropped and no pre-term variant exists (`BundleFiles.packets_pcap=False` in the manifest).

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crp_0162b76bc2ad49f0/manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_0162b76bc2ad49f0",
+  "attack_id": "atk_0162b76bc2ad49f0",
+  "genome_id": "8e339a1e0bd2f5ab",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "connection_exhaustion",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_quic_halfopen_pin",
+  "posture": "distributed",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_quic_halfopen_pin_distributed_N500_r2",
+  "target_env": "ic-quic-transport",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:34:18.022797Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:34:20.838140Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "distributed",
+    "rep": 2,
+    "layer": "ic-quic-transport",
+    "attack_family_label": "quic_halfopen_pin",
+    "target_port": 56905,
+    "quic_port_prod": 4100,
+    "conns": 500,
+    "initial_datagram_bytes": 1200,
+    "crypto_declared_len": 4096,
+    "crypto_body_bytes": 200,
+    "distinct_scid_per_conn": true,
+    "first_byte_hex": "c3",
+    "quic_version": "00000001",
+    "per_ip_udp_cap": false,
+    "retry_address_validation": false,
+    "mtls_post_handshake": true,
+    "pace_s": 0.0,
+    "hold_s": 2.0,
+    "measured_rss_delta_mib_at_n": 25.5,
+    "measured_kib_per_conn_at_n": 128.0,
+    "measured_ceiling_conns": 3000,
+    "measured_ceiling_rss_delta_mib": 278,
+    "measured_ceiling_abs_rss_mib": 420,
+    "measured_per_conn_kib": 100,
+    "measured_total_conns": 12200,
+    "measured_rejected_at_admission": 0,
+    "measured_binary": "release-2026-05-29_04-44-base",
+    "measured_commit": "a47e5434753752c1d2972fbc4407d14f88964285",
+    "measured_date": "2026-06-02",
+    "initials_attempted": 500,
+    "initials_sent": 500,
+    "distinct_scids": 500,
+    "bind_fail": 0,
+    "distinct_src_ips": 8,
+    "bytes_per_initial": 1200,
+    "bytes_sent_total": 600000
+  },
+  "expected_detection_signature": null,
+  "files": {
+    "packets_pcap": false,
+    "host_parquet": false,
+    "app_parquet": false,
+    "protocol_parquet": false,
+    "responses_parquet": false,
+    "vectors_parquet": false
+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_quic_halfopen": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/dfinity/ic \u2014 rs/p2p/quic_transport/src/connection_manager.rs: the accept loop spawns every inbound QUIC Initial into an UNBOUNDED `inbound_connecting` JoinSet with `EndpointConfig::default()` (no Retry / no address validation) and NO per-source-IP UDP pre-handshake budget (`max_simultaneous_connections_per_ip_address` is TCP-only). The mTLS NodeId allow-list is enforced only AFTER the per-connection quinn/rustls state is committed, so certificate trust does not mitigate the pre-handshake pin.",
+    "source_note": "IC quic_transport half-open QUIC handshake memory pin (IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN): a burst of QUIC v1 Initial packets (distinct SCID each) whose CRYPTO frame declares a large TLS handshake length (4096) but delivers a truncated ClientHello (~200 B) leaves rustls 'incomplete, waiting', so each `Connecting` future lives to the pre-handshake timeout pinning ~100 KiB/conn. No Retry (EndpointConfig::default()), no per-IP UDP cap, mTLS only after state is committed. Measured on the real replica (release-2026-05-29_04-44-base, commit a47e543, 2026-06-02): n=200 -> +25.5 MiB (~128 KiB/conn), n=1000 -> +129 MiB (~132 KiB/conn), n=3000 -> +278 MiB (abs 420 MiB, ~95 KiB/conn); across 12,200 total connections ZERO were rejected at admission. MEDIUM/5.9 (bounded only by IC's default-deny firewall + 512 GiB replica RAM, not by any transport control). NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN.",
+    "class": "quic-halfopen-pin",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "measured_ceiling_conns": 3000,
+    "measured_ceiling_rss_delta_mib": 278,
+    "measured_ceiling_abs_rss_mib": 420,
+    "measured_per_conn_kib": 100,
+    "measured_total_conns": 12200,
+    "measured_rejected_at_admission": 0,
+    "measured_binary": "release-2026-05-29_04-44-base",
+    "measured_commit": "a47e5434753752c1d2972fbc4407d14f88964285",
+    "measured_date": "2026-06-02",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC quic_transport truncated-CRYPTO half-open QUIC Initial flood. IC quic_transport half-open QUIC handshake memory pin (IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN): a burst of QUIC v1 Initial packets (distinct SCID each) whose CRYPTO frame declares a large TLS handshake length (4096) but delivers a truncated ClientHello (~200 B) leaves rustls 'incomplete, waiting', so each `Connecting` future lives to the pre-handshake timeout pinning ~100 KiB/conn. No Retry (EndpointConfig::default()), no per-IP UDP cap, mTLS only after state is committed. Measured on the real replica (release-2026-05-29_04-44-base, commit a47e543, 2026-06-02): n=200 -> +25.5 MiB (~128 KiB/conn), n=1000 -> +129 MiB (~132 KiB/conn), n=3000 -> +278 MiB (abs 420 MiB, ~95 KiB/conn); across 12,200 total connections ZERO were rejected at admission. MEDIUM/5.9 (bounded only by IC's default-deny firewall + 512 GiB replica RAM, not by any transport control). NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN."
+}

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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_08607f4eb32f46db",
+  "attack_id": "atk_08607f4eb32f46db",
+  "genome_id": "740715e12c40a69d",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "connection_exhaustion",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_xnet_concurrency_cap",
+  "posture": "low-volume",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_xnet_concurrency_cap_low-volume_p5_r0",
+  "target_env": "ic-xnet",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:25.789843Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:28.592938Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "low-volume",
+    "rep": 0,
+    "layer": "ic-xnet-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "concurrency_cap_exhaustion",
+    "endpoint": "xnet stream pull",
+    "xnet_path": "/api/v1/stream/tdb26-jop6k-aogll-7ltgs-eruif-6kk7m-qbrjb-kux3o-r52nv-og6ef-mae?msg_begin=0&witness_begin=0&byte_limit=18446744073709551615",
+    "http_method": "GET",
+    "xnet_max_concurrent": 4,
+    "holders": 4,
+    "probes": 5,
+    "hold_s": 2.0,
+    "probe_pace_s": 0.0,
+    "holder_body_len": 532,
+    "byte_limit_query": 18446744073709551615,
+    "non_blocking_try_acquire": true,
+    "per_nodeid_rate_limit": false,
+    "measured_cap": 4,
+    "measured_5th_request_status": 503,
+    "measured_5th_request_body": "Queue full",
+    "measured_5th_request_immediate": true,
+    "measured_new_xnet_rejection_pct_while_held": 100,
+    "measured_holder_body_len": 532,
+    "measured_reach": "any-registered-IC-node (TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All, lib.rs:261)",
+    "measured_byte_limit_unbounded": "byte_limit.unwrap_or(usize::MAX) (certified_slice_pool.rs:405)",
+    "measured_attacker_conns_to_saturate": 4,
+    "measured_severity": "MEDIUM",
+    "holders_fired": 4,
+    "probes_fired": 5,
+    "probe_503_count": 5,
+    "probe_200_count": 0,
+    "probe_other_count": 0,
+    "server_acquired_200": 4,
+    "server_rejected_503": 5,
+    "distinct_src_ips": 1
+  },
+  "expected_detection_signature": null,
+  "files": {
+    "packets_pcap": false,
+    "host_parquet": false,
+    "app_parquet": false,
+    "protocol_parquet": false,
+    "responses_parquet": false,
+    "vectors_parquet": false
+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_xnet_concurrency_cap": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/dfinity/ic \u2014 rs/http_endpoints/xnet/src/lib.rs:54 (const XNET_ENDPOINT_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS: usize = 4), :156-168 (try_acquire_owned() NON-BLOCKING; overflow returns 503 body \"Queue full\" immediately, no queue), :214 (Semaphore::new(XNET_ENDPOINT_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)), :261 (tls.server_config(SomeOrAllNodes::All) admits ANY registered IC node); compounds with rs/xnet/payload_builder/src/certified_slice_pool.rs:405 (byte_limit.unwrap_or(usize::MAX), no clamp on the byte_limit query param).",
+    "source_note": "IC xnet endpoint concurrency-cap DoS (IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP): the replica's cross-subnet xnet stream HTTP endpoint caps concurrent requests at a hard-coded 4 (lib.rs:54) enforced by a NON-BLOCKING try_acquire_owned() (lib.rs:156-168) \u2014 when all 4 permits are held, the 5th+ request returns an immediate 503 \"Queue full\" with NO queuing. TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All (lib.rs:261) admits any registered IC node, so a single host holding 4 concurrent slow xnet GETs denies 100% of new cross-subnet xnet stream pulls on that replica; each held request can be made arbitrarily slow via byte_limit=usize::MAX (certified_slice_pool.rs:405, no clamp). Measured (in-process Rust integration test on FakeStateManager w/ an encode barrier, dfinity/ic @ HEAD): 4 GETs take all permits; 5th GET -> 503 \"Queue full\" immediately; after release the 4 complete 200 + 532-byte body. MEDIUM measured; reach = any-registered-IC-node. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP.",
+    "class": "concurrency-cap-exhaustion",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "measured_cap": 4,
+    "measured_5th_request_status": 503,
+    "measured_5th_request_body": "Queue full",
+    "measured_new_xnet_rejection_pct_while_held": 100,
+    "measured_reach": "any-registered-IC-node (TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All)",
+    "measured_byte_limit_unbounded": "usize::MAX (certified_slice_pool.rs:405)",
+    "measured_severity": "MEDIUM",
+    "source_anchors": "lib.rs:54,156-168,214,261; certified_slice_pool.rs:405",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC xnet 4-permit concurrency-cap exhaustion -> 503 'Queue full'. IC xnet endpoint concurrency-cap DoS (IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP): the replica's cross-subnet xnet stream HTTP endpoint caps concurrent requests at a hard-coded 4 (lib.rs:54) enforced by a NON-BLOCKING try_acquire_owned() (lib.rs:156-168) \u2014 when all 4 permits are held, the 5th+ request returns an immediate 503 \"Queue full\" with NO queuing. TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All (lib.rs:261) admits any registered IC node, so a single host holding 4 concurrent slow xnet GETs denies 100% of new cross-subnet xnet stream pulls on that replica; each held request can be made arbitrarily slow via byte_limit=usize::MAX (certified_slice_pool.rs:405, no clamp). Measured (in-process Rust integration test on FakeStateManager w/ an encode barrier, dfinity/ic @ HEAD): 4 GETs take all permits; 5th GET -> 503 \"Queue full\" immediately; after release the 4 complete 200 + 532-byte body. MEDIUM measured; reach = any-registered-IC-node. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP."
+}

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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_0ca1b1ef67184f3c",
+  "attack_id": "atk_0ca1b1ef67184f3c",
+  "genome_id": "7def912a4225e6bf",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "connection_exhaustion",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_quic_halfopen_pin",
+  "posture": "saturating",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_quic_halfopen_pin_saturating_N1000_r1",
+  "target_env": "ic-quic-transport",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:34:15.074153Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:34:17.899321Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "saturating",
+    "rep": 1,
+    "layer": "ic-quic-transport",
+    "attack_family_label": "quic_halfopen_pin",
+    "target_port": 51386,
+    "quic_port_prod": 4100,
+    "conns": 1000,
+    "initial_datagram_bytes": 1200,
+    "crypto_declared_len": 4096,
+    "crypto_body_bytes": 200,
+    "distinct_scid_per_conn": true,
+    "first_byte_hex": "c3",
+    "quic_version": "00000001",
+    "per_ip_udp_cap": false,
+    "retry_address_validation": false,
+    "mtls_post_handshake": true,
+    "pace_s": 0.0,
+    "hold_s": 2.0,
+    "measured_rss_delta_mib_at_n": 129.0,
+    "measured_kib_per_conn_at_n": 132.0,
+    "measured_ceiling_conns": 3000,
+    "measured_ceiling_rss_delta_mib": 278,
+    "measured_ceiling_abs_rss_mib": 420,
+    "measured_per_conn_kib": 100,
+    "measured_total_conns": 12200,
+    "measured_rejected_at_admission": 0,
+    "measured_binary": "release-2026-05-29_04-44-base",
+    "measured_commit": "a47e5434753752c1d2972fbc4407d14f88964285",
+    "measured_date": "2026-06-02",
+    "initials_attempted": 1000,
+    "initials_sent": 1000,
+    "distinct_scids": 1000,
+    "bind_fail": 0,
+    "distinct_src_ips": 1,
+    "bytes_per_initial": 1200,
+    "bytes_sent_total": 1200000
+  },
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+  "files": {
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+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_quic_halfopen": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/dfinity/ic \u2014 rs/p2p/quic_transport/src/connection_manager.rs: the accept loop spawns every inbound QUIC Initial into an UNBOUNDED `inbound_connecting` JoinSet with `EndpointConfig::default()` (no Retry / no address validation) and NO per-source-IP UDP pre-handshake budget (`max_simultaneous_connections_per_ip_address` is TCP-only). The mTLS NodeId allow-list is enforced only AFTER the per-connection quinn/rustls state is committed, so certificate trust does not mitigate the pre-handshake pin.",
+    "source_note": "IC quic_transport half-open QUIC handshake memory pin (IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN): a burst of QUIC v1 Initial packets (distinct SCID each) whose CRYPTO frame declares a large TLS handshake length (4096) but delivers a truncated ClientHello (~200 B) leaves rustls 'incomplete, waiting', so each `Connecting` future lives to the pre-handshake timeout pinning ~100 KiB/conn. No Retry (EndpointConfig::default()), no per-IP UDP cap, mTLS only after state is committed. Measured on the real replica (release-2026-05-29_04-44-base, commit a47e543, 2026-06-02): n=200 -> +25.5 MiB (~128 KiB/conn), n=1000 -> +129 MiB (~132 KiB/conn), n=3000 -> +278 MiB (abs 420 MiB, ~95 KiB/conn); across 12,200 total connections ZERO were rejected at admission. MEDIUM/5.9 (bounded only by IC's default-deny firewall + 512 GiB replica RAM, not by any transport control). NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN.",
+    "class": "quic-halfopen-pin",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "measured_ceiling_conns": 3000,
+    "measured_ceiling_rss_delta_mib": 278,
+    "measured_ceiling_abs_rss_mib": 420,
+    "measured_per_conn_kib": 100,
+    "measured_total_conns": 12200,
+    "measured_rejected_at_admission": 0,
+    "measured_binary": "release-2026-05-29_04-44-base",
+    "measured_commit": "a47e5434753752c1d2972fbc4407d14f88964285",
+    "measured_date": "2026-06-02",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC quic_transport truncated-CRYPTO half-open QUIC Initial flood. IC quic_transport half-open QUIC handshake memory pin (IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN): a burst of QUIC v1 Initial packets (distinct SCID each) whose CRYPTO frame declares a large TLS handshake length (4096) but delivers a truncated ClientHello (~200 B) leaves rustls 'incomplete, waiting', so each `Connecting` future lives to the pre-handshake timeout pinning ~100 KiB/conn. No Retry (EndpointConfig::default()), no per-IP UDP cap, mTLS only after state is committed. Measured on the real replica (release-2026-05-29_04-44-base, commit a47e543, 2026-06-02): n=200 -> +25.5 MiB (~128 KiB/conn), n=1000 -> +129 MiB (~132 KiB/conn), n=3000 -> +278 MiB (abs 420 MiB, ~95 KiB/conn); across 12,200 total connections ZERO were rejected at admission. MEDIUM/5.9 (bounded only by IC's default-deny firewall + 512 GiB replica RAM, not by any transport control). NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_QUIC_HALFOPEN_PIN."
+}

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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_2af3593c5c854c88",
+  "attack_id": "atk_2af3593c5c854c88",
+  "genome_id": "19f098f8133c606e",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "memory_amp",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_orchestrator_cup_body_bomb",
+  "posture": "saturating",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_orchestrator_cup_body_bomb_saturating_r1",
+  "target_env": "ic-orchestrator-cup-http1",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:11.015602Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:11.828720Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "saturating",
+    "rep": 1,
+    "layer": "ic-orchestrator-http1",
+    "method": "GET",
+    "path": "/_/catch_up_package",
+    "attack_family_label": "http_body_bomb",
+    "transfer_encoding": "chunked",
+    "chunk_size_bytes": 1048576,
+    "pace_s": 0.0,
+    "n_flows": 1,
+    "request_bytes": 138,
+    "response_bytes_wire_per_flow": 25165824,
+    "response_bytes_wire_total": 25165824,
+    "amp_ratio_wire": 182361.0,
+    "response_wire_capped": true,
+    "no_http_body_util_limited": true,
+    "only_bound_is_timeout": true,
+    "measured_window_s": 30,
+    "measured_heap_pin_bytes_30s_window": 42949672960,
+    "measured_peak_rss_bytes": 58948426137,
+    "measured_heap_to_byte_ratio": 1.0,
+    "measured_prod_1gbps_bytes_per_req": 4026531840,
+    "measured_prod_10gbps_bytes_per_req": 40265318400,
+    "measured_backoff_doubles_per_round": true,
+    "faithful_ceiling_bytes_this_posture": 42949672960,
+    "response_bytes_read_total": 25166148,
+    "flows_completed": 1
+  },
+  "expected_detection_signature": null,
+  "files": {
+    "packets_pcap": false,
+    "host_parquet": false,
+    "app_parquet": false,
+    "protocol_parquet": false,
+    "responses_parquet": false,
+    "vectors_parquet": false
+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_cup_body_bomb": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "dfinity/ic rs/orchestrator/src/catch_up_package_provider.rs:343-372 (timeout(self.backoff, res.into_body().collect()) \u2014 no http_body_util::Limited byte cap; secondary site rs/canister_client/src/http_client.rs:302)",
+    "source_note": "IC orchestrator CUP body-bomb: the CUP-pull response path calls res.into_body().collect() bounded only by timeout(self.backoff, ...) \u2014 TIME not BYTES \u2014 with no http_body_util::Limited wrapper. A malicious subnet replica answers a CUP-pull GET with an unbounded chunked-transfer body; the requesting orchestrator accumulates the whole stream into a Collected<Bytes> heap buffer. Measured (hyper 1.x probe, 2026-05-26): +40 GB heap pin in one 30 s backoff window, peak RSS 54.9 GB, heap-to-bytes ratio ~1:1. Prod translation @ 30 s: 3.75 GB/req (1 Gbps) to 37.5 GB/req (10 Gbps); backoff doubles per failed round (30s->60s->120s). HIGH measured, subnet-internal reach. chains/ic/findings/IC_N2_CUP_BODY_BOMB; NullRabbit measurement.",
+    "class": "measured-memory-amplification",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "attack_family_label": "http_body_bomb",
+    "measured_request_bytes": 138,
+    "measured_response_bytes": 42949672960,
+    "measured_window_s": 30,
+    "measured_heap_pin_bytes_30s_window": 42949672960,
+    "measured_peak_rss_bytes": 58948426137,
+    "measured_server_streamed_bytes_30s": 72048076390,
+    "measured_heap_to_byte_ratio": 1.0,
+    "measured_prod_1gbps_bytes_per_req": 4026531840,
+    "measured_prod_10gbps_bytes_per_req": 40265318400,
+    "measured_backoff_doubles_per_round": true,
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC orchestrator CUP body-bomb. IC orchestrator CUP body-bomb: the CUP-pull response path calls res.into_body().collect() bounded only by timeout(self.backoff, ...) \u2014 TIME not BYTES \u2014 with no http_body_util::Limited wrapper. A malicious subnet replica answers a CUP-pull GET with an unbounded chunked-transfer body; the requesting orchestrator accumulates the whole stream into a Collected<Bytes> heap buffer. Measured (hyper 1.x probe, 2026-05-26): +40 GB heap pin in one 30 s backoff window, peak RSS 54.9 GB, heap-to-bytes ratio ~1:1. Prod translation @ 30 s: 3.75 GB/req (1 Gbps) to 37.5 GB/req (10 Gbps); backoff doubles per failed round (30s->60s->120s). HIGH measured, subnet-internal reach. chains/ic/findings/IC_N2_CUP_BODY_BOMB; NullRabbit measurement."
+}

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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_35e825bd25f44f66",
+  "attack_id": "atk_35e825bd25f44f66",
+  "genome_id": "00cdf7a25c172242",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "connection_exhaustion",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_xnet_concurrency_cap",
+  "posture": "distributed",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_xnet_concurrency_cap_distributed_p20_r2",
+  "target_env": "ic-xnet",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:31.883388Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:34.686138Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "distributed",
+    "rep": 2,
+    "layer": "ic-xnet-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "concurrency_cap_exhaustion",
+    "endpoint": "xnet stream pull",
+    "xnet_path": "/api/v1/stream/tdb26-jop6k-aogll-7ltgs-eruif-6kk7m-qbrjb-kux3o-r52nv-og6ef-mae?msg_begin=0&witness_begin=0&byte_limit=18446744073709551615",
+    "http_method": "GET",
+    "xnet_max_concurrent": 4,
+    "holders": 4,
+    "probes": 20,
+    "hold_s": 2.0,
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+    "holder_body_len": 532,
+    "byte_limit_query": 18446744073709551615,
+    "non_blocking_try_acquire": true,
+    "per_nodeid_rate_limit": false,
+    "measured_cap": 4,
+    "measured_5th_request_status": 503,
+    "measured_5th_request_body": "Queue full",
+    "measured_5th_request_immediate": true,
+    "measured_new_xnet_rejection_pct_while_held": 100,
+    "measured_holder_body_len": 532,
+    "measured_reach": "any-registered-IC-node (TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All, lib.rs:261)",
+    "measured_byte_limit_unbounded": "byte_limit.unwrap_or(usize::MAX) (certified_slice_pool.rs:405)",
+    "measured_attacker_conns_to_saturate": 4,
+    "measured_severity": "MEDIUM",
+    "holders_fired": 4,
+    "probes_fired": 20,
+    "probe_503_count": 20,
+    "probe_200_count": 0,
+    "probe_other_count": 0,
+    "server_acquired_200": 4,
+    "server_rejected_503": 20,
+    "distinct_src_ips": 8
+  },
+  "expected_detection_signature": null,
+  "files": {
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+    "host_parquet": false,
+    "app_parquet": false,
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+    "vectors_parquet": false
+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_xnet_concurrency_cap": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/dfinity/ic \u2014 rs/http_endpoints/xnet/src/lib.rs:54 (const XNET_ENDPOINT_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS: usize = 4), :156-168 (try_acquire_owned() NON-BLOCKING; overflow returns 503 body \"Queue full\" immediately, no queue), :214 (Semaphore::new(XNET_ENDPOINT_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)), :261 (tls.server_config(SomeOrAllNodes::All) admits ANY registered IC node); compounds with rs/xnet/payload_builder/src/certified_slice_pool.rs:405 (byte_limit.unwrap_or(usize::MAX), no clamp on the byte_limit query param).",
+    "source_note": "IC xnet endpoint concurrency-cap DoS (IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP): the replica's cross-subnet xnet stream HTTP endpoint caps concurrent requests at a hard-coded 4 (lib.rs:54) enforced by a NON-BLOCKING try_acquire_owned() (lib.rs:156-168) \u2014 when all 4 permits are held, the 5th+ request returns an immediate 503 \"Queue full\" with NO queuing. TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All (lib.rs:261) admits any registered IC node, so a single host holding 4 concurrent slow xnet GETs denies 100% of new cross-subnet xnet stream pulls on that replica; each held request can be made arbitrarily slow via byte_limit=usize::MAX (certified_slice_pool.rs:405, no clamp). Measured (in-process Rust integration test on FakeStateManager w/ an encode barrier, dfinity/ic @ HEAD): 4 GETs take all permits; 5th GET -> 503 \"Queue full\" immediately; after release the 4 complete 200 + 532-byte body. MEDIUM measured; reach = any-registered-IC-node. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP.",
+    "class": "concurrency-cap-exhaustion",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "measured_cap": 4,
+    "measured_5th_request_status": 503,
+    "measured_5th_request_body": "Queue full",
+    "measured_new_xnet_rejection_pct_while_held": 100,
+    "measured_reach": "any-registered-IC-node (TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All)",
+    "measured_byte_limit_unbounded": "usize::MAX (certified_slice_pool.rs:405)",
+    "measured_severity": "MEDIUM",
+    "source_anchors": "lib.rs:54,156-168,214,261; certified_slice_pool.rs:405",
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC xnet 4-permit concurrency-cap exhaustion -> 503 'Queue full'. IC xnet endpoint concurrency-cap DoS (IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP): the replica's cross-subnet xnet stream HTTP endpoint caps concurrent requests at a hard-coded 4 (lib.rs:54) enforced by a NON-BLOCKING try_acquire_owned() (lib.rs:156-168) \u2014 when all 4 permits are held, the 5th+ request returns an immediate 503 \"Queue full\" with NO queuing. TLS SomeOrAllNodes::All (lib.rs:261) admits any registered IC node, so a single host holding 4 concurrent slow xnet GETs denies 100% of new cross-subnet xnet stream pulls on that replica; each held request can be made arbitrarily slow via byte_limit=usize::MAX (certified_slice_pool.rs:405, no clamp). Measured (in-process Rust integration test on FakeStateManager w/ an encode barrier, dfinity/ic @ HEAD): 4 GETs take all permits; 5th GET -> 503 \"Queue full\" immediately; after release the 4 complete 200 + 532-byte body. MEDIUM measured; reach = any-registered-IC-node. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N3_XNET_CONCURRENCY_CAP."
+}

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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_3d7746a453fc4b6a",
+  "attack_id": "atk_3d7746a453fc4b6a",
+  "genome_id": "6a8e0987b48d3120",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "connection_exhaustion",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_ingress_pool_quota_miskey",
+  "posture": "distributed",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_ingress_pool_quota_miskey_distributed_N800_r2",
+  "target_env": "ic-ingress-http",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:33:14.015718Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:33:14.827430Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "distributed",
+    "rep": 2,
+    "layer": "ic-ingress-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "ingress_quota_flood",
+    "request_flood_family": "request_flood",
+    "endpoint": "/api/v2/canister/rrkah-fqaaa-aaaaa-aaaaq-cai/call",
+    "canister_id": "rrkah-fqaaa-aaaaa-aaaaq-cai",
+    "method": "POST",
+    "target_port": 43265,
+    "posts": 800,
+    "body_bytes": 250,
+    "ingress_pool_max_count": 10000,
+    "ingress_pool_max_bytes": 100000000,
+    "quota_keyed_on": "carrier_node_id",
+    "quota_should_key_on": "signing_principal",
+    "pace_s": 0.0,
+    "measured_trip_inserts": 10001,
+    "measured_trip_seconds": 0.04,
+    "measured_purge_pct": 100,
+    "measured_on_state_change_ms": 200,
+    "measured_sustain_rate_ingress_per_s": 50000,
+    "measured_msg_bytes": 250,
+    "measured_subnet_replicas": 40,
+    "measured_subnet_bandwidth_mb": 40,
+    "posts_attempted": 800,
+    "posts_sent": 800,
+    "accepted_202": 800,
+    "bind_fail": 0,
+    "distinct_src_ips": 8,
+    "connections_used": 8,
+    "req_bytes": 393,
+    "bytes_sent_total": 314400
+  },
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+  "files": {
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+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_ingress_quota_flood": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/dfinity/ic \u2014 ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key: HTTP-arriving ingress is inserted with node_id = self.node_id (the carrier replica's OWN NodeId) at rs/http_endpoints/public/src/call.rs:391 (self.node_id set call.rs:104), not the signing principal; the per-peer quota exceeds_limit() then gates one SHARED bucket (rs/artifact_pool/src/ingress_pool.rs:226-232, prod caps ingress_pool_max_count=10000 / ingress_pool_max_bytes=100000000 in rs/ic_os/config/tool/templates/ic.json5.template:49-50), and RemoveFromUnvalidated (rs/ingress_manager/src/ingress_handler.rs:60-76) purges ALL unvalidated ingress for that peer. The IC team's own stale TODO acknowledges the mis-key: rs/interfaces/src/ingress_pool.rs:22-25.",
+    "source_note": "IC ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key (IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY): every HTTP-arriving ingress message buckets under the carrier replica's own NodeId instead of the signing principal (call.rs:391), so a single shared per-NodeId quota gates ALL public HTTP ingress. Submitting 10001 small signed HTTP ingress POSTs trips exceeds_limit (measured 0.04s at production caps 10000 / 100 MB); the handler's RemoveFromUnvalidated then purges 100% of legit unvalidated HTTP ingress on that replica at the next on_state_change (~200ms). PUBLIC reach; ~50k signed-ingress/s keeps a replica wiped; ~40 MB total bandwidth pins a 40-replica subnet. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY.",
+    "class": "ingress-quota-flood",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "request_flood_family": "request_flood",
+    "measured_trip_inserts": 10001,
+    "measured_trip_seconds": 0.04,
+    "measured_purge_pct": 100,
+    "measured_sustain_rate_ingress_per_s": 50000,
+    "measured_subnet_replicas": 40,
+    "measured_subnet_bandwidth_mb": 40,
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key flood. IC ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key (IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY): every HTTP-arriving ingress message buckets under the carrier replica's own NodeId instead of the signing principal (call.rs:391), so a single shared per-NodeId quota gates ALL public HTTP ingress. Submitting 10001 small signed HTTP ingress POSTs trips exceeds_limit (measured 0.04s at production caps 10000 / 100 MB); the handler's RemoveFromUnvalidated then purges 100% of legit unvalidated HTTP ingress on that replica at the next on_state_change (~200ms). PUBLIC reach; ~50k signed-ingress/s keeps a replica wiped; ~40 MB total bandwidth pins a 40-replica subnet. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY."
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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_4c9486a4dddb453f",
+  "attack_id": "atk_4c9486a4dddb453f",
+  "genome_id": "c37c6f09e25d4b02",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "memory_amp",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_orchestrator_cup_body_bomb",
+  "posture": "mimicry",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_orchestrator_cup_body_bomb_mimicry_r3",
+  "target_env": "ic-orchestrator-cup-http1",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:12.842438Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:32:14.048168Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "mimicry",
+    "rep": 3,
+    "layer": "ic-orchestrator-http1",
+    "method": "GET",
+    "path": "/_/catch_up_package",
+    "attack_family_label": "http_body_bomb",
+    "transfer_encoding": "chunked",
+    "chunk_size_bytes": 65536,
+    "pace_s": 0.003,
+    "n_flows": 1,
+    "request_bytes": 138,
+    "response_bytes_wire_per_flow": 8388608,
+    "response_bytes_wire_total": 8388608,
+    "amp_ratio_wire": 60787.0,
+    "response_wire_capped": true,
+    "no_http_body_util_limited": true,
+    "only_bound_is_timeout": true,
+    "measured_window_s": 30,
+    "measured_heap_pin_bytes_30s_window": 42949672960,
+    "measured_peak_rss_bytes": 58948426137,
+    "measured_heap_to_byte_ratio": 1.0,
+    "measured_prod_1gbps_bytes_per_req": 4026531840,
+    "measured_prod_10gbps_bytes_per_req": 40265318400,
+    "measured_backoff_doubles_per_round": true,
+    "faithful_ceiling_bytes_this_posture": 42949672960,
+    "response_bytes_read_total": 8389844,
+    "flows_completed": 1
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+  "files": {
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+    "host_parquet": false,
+    "app_parquet": false,
+    "protocol_parquet": false,
+    "responses_parquet": false,
+    "vectors_parquet": false
+  },
+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_cup_body_bomb": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "dfinity/ic rs/orchestrator/src/catch_up_package_provider.rs:343-372 (timeout(self.backoff, res.into_body().collect()) \u2014 no http_body_util::Limited byte cap; secondary site rs/canister_client/src/http_client.rs:302)",
+    "source_note": "IC orchestrator CUP body-bomb: the CUP-pull response path calls res.into_body().collect() bounded only by timeout(self.backoff, ...) \u2014 TIME not BYTES \u2014 with no http_body_util::Limited wrapper. A malicious subnet replica answers a CUP-pull GET with an unbounded chunked-transfer body; the requesting orchestrator accumulates the whole stream into a Collected<Bytes> heap buffer. Measured (hyper 1.x probe, 2026-05-26): +40 GB heap pin in one 30 s backoff window, peak RSS 54.9 GB, heap-to-bytes ratio ~1:1. Prod translation @ 30 s: 3.75 GB/req (1 Gbps) to 37.5 GB/req (10 Gbps); backoff doubles per failed round (30s->60s->120s). HIGH measured, subnet-internal reach. chains/ic/findings/IC_N2_CUP_BODY_BOMB; NullRabbit measurement.",
+    "class": "measured-memory-amplification",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "attack_family_label": "http_body_bomb",
+    "measured_request_bytes": 138,
+    "measured_response_bytes": 42949672960,
+    "measured_window_s": 30,
+    "measured_heap_pin_bytes_30s_window": 42949672960,
+    "measured_peak_rss_bytes": 58948426137,
+    "measured_server_streamed_bytes_30s": 72048076390,
+    "measured_heap_to_byte_ratio": 1.0,
+    "measured_prod_1gbps_bytes_per_req": 4026531840,
+    "measured_prod_10gbps_bytes_per_req": 40265318400,
+    "measured_backoff_doubles_per_round": true,
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC orchestrator CUP body-bomb. IC orchestrator CUP body-bomb: the CUP-pull response path calls res.into_body().collect() bounded only by timeout(self.backoff, ...) \u2014 TIME not BYTES \u2014 with no http_body_util::Limited wrapper. A malicious subnet replica answers a CUP-pull GET with an unbounded chunked-transfer body; the requesting orchestrator accumulates the whole stream into a Collected<Bytes> heap buffer. Measured (hyper 1.x probe, 2026-05-26): +40 GB heap pin in one 30 s backoff window, peak RSS 54.9 GB, heap-to-bytes ratio ~1:1. Prod translation @ 30 s: 3.75 GB/req (1 Gbps) to 37.5 GB/req (10 Gbps); backoff doubles per failed round (30s->60s->120s). HIGH measured, subnet-internal reach. chains/ic/findings/IC_N2_CUP_BODY_BOMB; NullRabbit measurement."
+}

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+{
+  "bundle_version": 3,
+  "shape": "v0.0",
+  "corpus_id": "crp_4c9cd93657b042b9",
+  "attack_id": "atk_4c9cd93657b042b9",
+  "genome_id": "e5efec0a7eb0407c",
+  "assessment_id": null,
+  "family_id": "connection_exhaustion",
+  "primitive_id": "ic_ingress_pool_quota_miskey",
+  "posture": "mimicry",
+  "ground_truth_label": "attack",
+  "chain": "ic",
+  "run_tag": "knownclass_ic_ic_ingress_pool_quota_miskey_mimicry_N300_r3",
+  "target_env": "ic-ingress-http",
+  "generation_method": "hand",
+  "started_at": "2026-07-09T15:33:14.898680Z",
+  "ended_at": "2026-07-09T15:33:16.931639Z",
+  "attack_parameters": {
+    "posture": "mimicry",
+    "rep": 3,
+    "layer": "ic-ingress-http",
+    "attack_family_label": "ingress_quota_flood",
+    "request_flood_family": "request_flood",
+    "endpoint": "/api/v2/canister/rrkah-fqaaa-aaaaa-aaaaq-cai/call",
+    "canister_id": "rrkah-fqaaa-aaaaa-aaaaq-cai",
+    "method": "POST",
+    "target_port": 38599,
+    "posts": 300,
+    "body_bytes": 250,
+    "ingress_pool_max_count": 10000,
+    "ingress_pool_max_bytes": 100000000,
+    "quota_keyed_on": "carrier_node_id",
+    "quota_should_key_on": "signing_principal",
+    "pace_s": 0.004,
+    "measured_trip_inserts": 10001,
+    "measured_trip_seconds": 0.04,
+    "measured_purge_pct": 100,
+    "measured_on_state_change_ms": 200,
+    "measured_sustain_rate_ingress_per_s": 50000,
+    "measured_msg_bytes": 250,
+    "measured_subnet_replicas": 40,
+    "measured_subnet_bandwidth_mb": 40,
+    "posts_attempted": 300,
+    "posts_sent": 300,
+    "accepted_202": 300,
+    "bind_fail": 0,
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+    "bytes_sent_total": 117900
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+  "provenance": {
+    "traffic_source": "reproducer-attack",
+    "fidelity_class": "lab",
+    "target_authorisation": "self-owned",
+    "engagement_id": null,
+    "tooling": {
+      "known_class_ic_ingress_quota_flood": "1.0"
+    },
+    "pcap_path_pre_termination": null,
+    "public_source": "https://github.com/dfinity/ic \u2014 ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key: HTTP-arriving ingress is inserted with node_id = self.node_id (the carrier replica's OWN NodeId) at rs/http_endpoints/public/src/call.rs:391 (self.node_id set call.rs:104), not the signing principal; the per-peer quota exceeds_limit() then gates one SHARED bucket (rs/artifact_pool/src/ingress_pool.rs:226-232, prod caps ingress_pool_max_count=10000 / ingress_pool_max_bytes=100000000 in rs/ic_os/config/tool/templates/ic.json5.template:49-50), and RemoveFromUnvalidated (rs/ingress_manager/src/ingress_handler.rs:60-76) purges ALL unvalidated ingress for that peer. The IC team's own stale TODO acknowledges the mis-key: rs/interfaces/src/ingress_pool.rs:22-25.",
+    "source_note": "IC ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key (IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY): every HTTP-arriving ingress message buckets under the carrier replica's own NodeId instead of the signing principal (call.rs:391), so a single shared per-NodeId quota gates ALL public HTTP ingress. Submitting 10001 small signed HTTP ingress POSTs trips exceeds_limit (measured 0.04s at production caps 10000 / 100 MB); the handler's RemoveFromUnvalidated then purges 100% of legit unvalidated HTTP ingress on that replica at the next on_state_change (~200ms). PUBLIC reach; ~50k signed-ingress/s keeps a replica wiped; ~40 MB total bandwidth pins a 40-replica subnet. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY.",
+    "class": "ingress-quota-flood",
+    "source_class": "original",
+    "request_flood_family": "request_flood",
+    "measured_trip_inserts": 10001,
+    "measured_trip_seconds": 0.04,
+    "measured_purge_pct": 100,
+    "measured_sustain_rate_ingress_per_s": 50000,
+    "measured_subnet_replicas": 40,
+    "measured_subnet_bandwidth_mb": 40,
+    "tcpdump_returncode": 0,
+    "capture_module": "chains._shared.capture_multimodal"
+  },
+  "notes": "known-class repro (traffic): IC ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key flood. IC ingress-pool per-NodeId quota mis-key (IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY): every HTTP-arriving ingress message buckets under the carrier replica's own NodeId instead of the signing principal (call.rs:391), so a single shared per-NodeId quota gates ALL public HTTP ingress. Submitting 10001 small signed HTTP ingress POSTs trips exceeds_limit (measured 0.04s at production caps 10000 / 100 MB); the handler's RemoveFromUnvalidated then purges 100% of legit unvalidated HTTP ingress on that replica at the next on_state_change (~200ms). PUBLIC reach; ~50k signed-ingress/s keeps a replica wiped; ~40 MB total bandwidth pins a 40-replica subnet. NullRabbit measurement; chains/ic/findings/IC_N1_INGRESS_POOL_QUOTA_MISKEY."
+}

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